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I 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
XML (Extensible Mark-up Language) databases are an active research 
area. The topic of security in XML databases is important as it includes 
protecting sensitive data and providing a secure environment to users. Trust 
based access is an established technique in many fields, such as networks and 
distributed systems, but it has not previously been used for XML databases. In 
Trust Based Access Control, user privileges are calculated dynamically 
depending on the user’s behaviour. 
In this thesis, the novel idea of applying Trust Based Access Control 
(TBAC) for XML databases has been developed. This approach improves 
security and provides dynamic access control for XML databases. It manages 
access policy depending on users’ trustworthiness and prevents unauthorised 
processes, malicious transactions, and misuse from both outsiders and insiders. 
A practical Trust Based Access Control system for XML databases was 
evaluated. The dynamic access control has been tested from security, scalability, 
functionality, performance, and storage perspectives. The experimental results 
illustrate the flexibility of Trust Values and the scalability of the system with 
small to large XML databases and with various numbers of users. The results 
show that the main research idea of this study is worth pursuing and the system 
could be developed further. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
XML databases are an active research topic (Abiteboul et al., 2000; 
Champion, 2001; Tidwell, 2002; Oqbuji, 2004b; Vakali et al., 2005; Anderson, 
2008; Jonge, 2008; Whatley, 2009; W3C, 2010; Palani, 2011; Sun and Wang, 
2011; Abd El-Aziz and Kannan, 2012b; Abd El-Aziz and Kannan, 2012c; 
Noaman and Almansour, 2012; Verma et al., 2012; Desai, 2013; Thimma et al., 
2013; Vela et al., 2013; W3Schools, 2013a). As with any database, they can 
contain sensitive and important data; therefore it is imperative to be able to 
provide a secure environment to deal with the data. This thesis concerns 
controlling access to data in XML databases. 
Secure systems need access control to manage access to the data and 
prevent malicious processes. Traditional access models are limited in that they 
are static and focus mostly on protection from outsiders. The research described 
here is an attempt to address these limitations in the context of XML databases. 
The insider threat is a huge topic in data security and many methods have been 
proposed to identify misuse behaviour (Yi and Panda, 2003; Chinchani et al., 
2005; Chagarlamudi et al., 2009), yet there has been no work on dynamic 
updates to access privileges in relation to trust for XML databases. 
Trust Based Access Control has become established in many applications 
such as networks. It uses a trust management system that automatically 
calculates users’ trust values. The trust values are updated according to an 
evaluation of the user’s history. 
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In this thesis, Trust Based Access Control has been applied to XML 
databases in order to provide dynamic access control and solve misuse problems 
from both outsiders and insiders. It relies on evaluation of users’ history of errors 
and illegal transactions and makes automatic updates in users’ privileges 
according to their behaviour. The research hypothesis, motivations, and 
contributions are fully described in Chapter 5. 
This short Chapter gives an overview of the thesis and Section 1.2 
outlines its structure. While working on this research, a number of papers were 
published: Section 1.3 lists the published work. 
1.2 Thesis Structure 
The thesis can be divided into three parts. The first part, Chapters 1-5, 
discusses the related background work and explains the research aims. The 
second part, which consists of Chapters 6-8, describes the system design and 
components. The experimental results and evaluation are covered in the third 
part, namely Chapters 9-12. 
The thesis consists of the following Chapters: 
Chapter 1: Introduction. This Chapter gives a brief introduction to this 
thesis. It shows the thesis structure and lists published work.  
Chapter 2: XML Background. This Chapter covers the basic concepts in 
XML. It includes components, tree structure, schema, query, and parsing 
techniques of XML. 
Chapter 3: Related Work on Security in XML Databases. This Chapter 
discusses the existing types of access control systems. It describes several access 
techniques currently applied to XML databases. 
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Chapter 4: Related Work on Trust Based Access Control. This Chapter 
shows the features of Trust Based Access Control and explains the main 
concepts. It describes several models that were designed based on this approach 
and explains the calculations of Trust Value (TV). 
Chapter 5: The Research Hypothesis. This Chapter explains the research 
motivations, objectives, and contributions. It highlights the research hypothesis. 
Some of the contents of this Chapter are based on previously published papers 
(Farooqi and North, 2011a; Farooqi and North, 2011b) . 
Chapter 6: Trust Based Access Control for XML Databases. This 
Chapter describes the main outlines of the system design. The system consists of 
the trust module and the access control module. It also explains the system 
processes, the policy file, and boundary management. This Chapter is based on 
previously published papers (Farooqi and North, 2011b; Farooqi and North, 
2012b; Farooqi and North, 2013). 
Chapter 7: The Trust Module. This Chapter focuses on one of the two 
main components of the system. It explains the trust calculations, defining errors 
and bad transaction rules, capturing misuse, and logging. Some of the contents 
of this Chapter were published in previous papers (Farooqi and North, 2011b; 
Farooqi and North, 2012b; Farooqi and North, 2012c; Farooqi and North, 2012d; 
Farooqi and North, 2013). 
Chapter 8: The Access Control Module. This Chapter describes the 
other main component of the system, the one which is responsible for handling 
Trust Values for data and users. It shows the access decision process in both 
access permitted and access denied situations. This Chapter is based on the work 
published in (Farooqi and North, 2012a). 
Chapter 9: The Experiments’ Design. This Chapter highlights the 
designs of seven different experiments to test the system implementation. It 
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shows the objectives and setup for all the experiments. It also discusses the tools, 
platforms, real world data sets, benchmarks, and user sets. 
 Chapter 10: The Results and Analysis. This Chapter illustrates the 
results for the seven experiments whose design is discussed designed in Chapter 
9. The results analyse the performance, scalability, and security in individual 
modules and the integration of the whole system. The comparative results are 
discussed and presented graphically. Some experimental results were published 
in previous papers (Farooqi and North, 2012a; Farooqi and North, 2012b; 
Farooqi and North, 2012d; Farooqi and North, 2013). 
Chapter 11: The Evaluation. This Chapter evaluates the practical works, 
highlights the strengths, and addresses the limitations of this work. 
Chapter 12: Conclusion and Future Work. This Chapter summarises the 
thesis’ findings and suggests interesting points for future research. 
1.3 Publications 
Some of the contents of this thesis were published in the following: 
1.3.1 Peer Reviewed Papers 
[1] FAROOQI, N. & NORTH, S. 2013. Performance Evaluation of Trust 
Based Access Control for XML Databases. In- press, The Journal of Internet 
Technology and Secured Transactions (JITST), Volume 2, pp. 1-8. 
[2] FAROOQI, N. & NORTH, S. 2012d. A Performance Evaluation of 
Logging in XML Databases Using an XLog File for Trust Based Access 
Control. International Journal of Intelligent Computing Research (IJICR), 
Volume 3, pp. 337-341. 
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Xplore, pp. 336-340. 
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[6] FAROOQI, N. & NORTH, S. 2011b. Trust-Based Access Control for 
XML Databases. The 6th International Conference for Internet Technology and 
Secured Transactions (ICITST-2011). Abu Dhabi, UAE: IEEE Xplore, pp.764-
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[8] “Trust Based Access Control for XML Databases” in Computer 
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event in May 2011. 
[9] “A Practical Trust Based Access Control for XML Databases” in 
Computer Science department, The University of Sheffield, UK, during the 
research retreat event in May 2012. 
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1.4 Conclusion 
This thesis focuses on developing dynamic Trust Based Access Control 
to improve security and prevent misuse. The research objectives and 
contributions are described later in Chapter 5, after a discussion of the related 
work in XML security. The next Chapter gives the general background of XML 
and explains its main concepts.  
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2 XML DATABASES’ BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
The Extensible Mark-up Language (XML) has become widely used. 
XML is commonly used to store, transfer, present, and retrieve data in many 
applications (Abiteboul et al., 2000; Champion, 2001; Tidwell, 2002; Oqbuji, 
2004b; Vakali et al., 2005; Anderson, 2008; Jonge, 2008; Whatley, 2009; W3C, 
2010; Palani, 2011; W3Schools, 2013a). Due to the recent increase in the 
availability of XML databases, much research has been undertaken to improve 
their usefulness. They are a relatively new kind of database but, like traditional 
databases, they require storage strategies and query languages. However, some 
important areas have not been thoroughly investigated. One of these areas is 
security in XML databases. As mentioned in the previous Chapter, this thesis 
revolves around providing secure access to XML databases using Trust Based 
Access Control.  
This Chapter aims to outline the underlying concepts. The XML 
environment is very wide. This Chapter gives a general background for XML. It 
explains XML’s main concepts, syntax, and schema in Section 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 
respectively. It shows how an XML file can be structured as a tree in Section 2.5 
and how to navigate it using XPath in Section 2.6. The next Chapter will explore 
background in security for XML databases. 
2.2 XML Concepts 
The Extensible Mark-up Language (XML) has become widely used for 
structured data representation (Abiteboul et al., 2000; Champion, 2001; Tidwell, 
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2002; Oqbuji, 2004b; Vakali et al., 2005; Anderson, 2008; Jonge, 2008; 
Whatley, 2009; W3C, 2010; Palani, 2011; TotalXML, 2011; Thimma et al., 
2013; W3Schools, 2013a). It was derived from SGML in 1996 and 
recommended by W3C in 1998 (Tidwell, 2002; Oqbuji, 2004b; Whatley, 2009; 
W3C, 2010; TotalXML, 2011) but differs from HTML since it focuses on 
storing and transferring data rather than controlling its appearance. There are 
many advantages of using XML. It is a self-describing language that gives users 
the freedom to create their own tags. It is known for its flexibility due to this 
feature (Tidwell, 2002). It is a simple text based language and portable data 
format (Abiteboul et al., 2000; Harold and Means, 2002; Tidwell, 2002; Ray, 
2003; Whatley, 2009; W3C, 2010; Palani, 2011; W3Schools, 2013a) and 
readable by most platforms, so it can be shared between different applications.  
XML files have many components, including elements (e.g. 
<Customer>), attributes (e.g. birthdate=”16-6-1987”), and comments (e.g. <!--
Written by NSF -- >) (Walsh, 1998; Abiteboul et al., 2000; Tidwell, 2002; 
Whatley, 2009; W3Schools, 2013a). Figure 2.1 shows the XML document for a 
bank database. The three main components of the XML file are summarised in 
the next Section. 
2.3 XML Syntax 
2.3.1 Elements 
The XML element is considered the basic component of the file. 
Normally, it includes the opening tag e.g. <Customer> and a matching closing 
tag </Customer> but it can be an empty tag <Customer/>. The value of the 
element, that which is enclosed between the pair of tags, can be a text, other 
elements, or both. Elements can include attributes such as <Customer 
birthdate=”16-6-1987”> (Walsh, 1998; Abiteboul et al., 2000; Tidwell, 2002; 
Whatley, 2009). 
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Figure ‎2.1 The bank XML database 
 
2.3.2 Attributes 
XML attributes provide information about the element that is not usually 
changed. They are placed inside the opening tag and consist of the attributes 
name and its value. The attribute value is placed inside quotation marks. There 
are also reference attributes that are used as pointers to the element itself or to 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<!- - Written by NSF- -> 
<Bank> 
<Customer birthdate=”16-6-1987”> 
<Name> john smith </Name> 
<Mobile> 07777777 </Mobile> 
<Address> city name, street name, postcode </Address> 
<Balance> £2000 </Balance> 
<Card> 
<Number> 192837465 </Number> 
<Start date> 11-11-2010 </Start date> 
<End date> 11-11-2012 </End date> 
<Security code> 2222 </Security code> 
</Card> 
<Transactions> 
<Transaction id=”3333”> 
<Type> draw </Type> 
<Amount>£80 </Amount> 
</Transaction> 
<Transaction id=”3334”> 
<Type> credit card payment <Type> 
<Amount>£40 </Amount> 
</Transaction> 
</Transaction> 
</Customer> 
<Customer birthdate=”7-8-1950”> 
… 
… 
</Customer> 
<Customer birthdate=”27-9-1970”> 
… 
… 
</Customer> 
</Bank> 
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other elements (Walsh, 1998; Abiteboul et al., 2000; Tidwell, 2002; Whatley, 
2009). 
Attributes should be distinguished from elements. Attributes are used for 
specific and static values. Dynamic and changeable data are normally included 
as elements. As mentioned above, the element value can be a string, other sub-
elements, or both. Attributes are more difficult to use and maintain than 
elements, so it is useful to limit their use (Abiteboul et al., 2000; Tidwell, 2002; 
Ray, 2003; Whatley, 2009; W3Schools, 2013a).  
2.3.3 Comments 
XML is a simple and clear language but, as with any language, 
comments are used to clarify the complexity of the code or to add notes for the 
writer or reader. The comment syntax is exactly the same as in HTML (e.g. <!--
Written by NSF -- >) (Tizag.; Harold and Means, 2002; Tidwell, 2002; Ray, 
2003; Whatley, 2009; W3Schools, 2013a). 
2.3.4  Well-Formed File 
Although XML is flexible and gives freedom to users to create their own 
tags, there are some basic rules that should be followed: 
 An XML file should have one root element. 
 Starting and ending tags must match and are case sensitive. 
 Nested elements should be ordered; the most recent opening tag should be 
closed before closing any earlier opening tags. 
 The value of attribute should be placed between quotation marks. 
 An attribute name inside an element should be unique. 
When the XML file conforms to all these rules, it is called well-formed 
XML (Abiteboul et al., 2000; Harold and Means, 2002; Ray, 2003; Whatley, 
2009; W3Schools, 2013a). 
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2.4 Schemas 
Schemas are a major topic in XML. However, this Section gives only a 
brief introduction to this topic because it is not relevant to much of this thesis 
except in a few specialist areas.  
In general, a schema is a database description that is developed in the 
design stage of the databases and it is quite static (Molina et al., 2009; Elmasri 
and Navathe, 2011). In the context of XML, a schema is used to store the file 
structure and show the elements’ relationships. Several types can be used with 
XML files, such as DTD (Abiteboul et al., 2000; Lee and Chu, 2000; Harold and 
Means, 2002; Chase, 2003b; Ray, 2003; Molina et al., 2009), XML Schema 
(Abiteboul et al., 2000; Lee and Chu, 2000; Radiya and Dixit, 2000; Harold and 
Means, 2002; Ray, 2003; Molina et al., 2009; Waldt, 2010), RELAX NG 
(Chase, 2003a; Ray, 2003), and Schematron (Lee and Chu, 2000; Ray, 2003; 
Oqbuji, 2004a). The most popular ones are DTD and XML Schema. 
DTD is the oldest way to describe an XML file’s structure. It lists all the 
contents: elements and attributes. It can be defined inside the XML file as 
internal DTD or outside in a separate file as external DTD. The external DTD is 
used more than the internal because it can be related to many XML files and can 
define their syntax. DTD limitations such as namespace problems and lack of 
data types were overcome by introduction of the XML Schema. XML Schema is 
more readable than a DTD. It can also be defined as an internal XML Schema or 
an external file. A well-formed XML file is called valid XML when it has DTD 
or schema (Abiteboul et al., 2000; Radiya and Dixit, 2000; Harold and Means, 
2002; Tidwell, 2002; Chase, 2003b; Ray, 2003; Molina et al., 2009; Whatley, 
2009; Waldt, 2010; Elmasri and Navathe, 2011). 
Chapter 2: XML DATABASES’ BACKGROUND 
 
12 
 
2.5 Tree Structure 
An XML document is usually represented as a tree that starts with a root 
element and branches to many sub-trees that end with leaf nodes. The tree has 
nodes that reflect XML file components such as elements and attributes 
(Abiteboul et al., 2000; Darugar, 2000; Harold and Means, 2002; Ray, 2003; 
W3Schools, 2013a). The tree idea is derived from graph theory. An XML file 
can have only one tree representation (Ray, 2003).  
The tree shows the XML document components and reflects its structure 
in graphical form. Many relationships between nodes can be defined using the 
tree. The root element is called the parent and it has many children in the lower 
level. The children at the same level are called siblings (Abiteboul et al., 2000; 
Harold and Means, 2002; Ray, 2003; W3Schools, 2013a). All these relations are 
described further in the XPath Section (2.6.1). Although, the tree based structure 
provides easy random access to either data or structure it consumes a large 
amount of memory (Darugar, 2000). Figure 2.2 shows the XML tree for the 
XML document in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2.2 The tree of the bank XML database 
customer 
customer customer 
birthdate 
Bank 
name mobile address balance card transaction     
num 
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Security 
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2.6 Query Languages 
XML files require a query language to extract data. In this Section, the 
two most popular XML query languages, XPath and XQuery, are discussed.  
2.6.1 XPath 
XPath is XML path language, which uses path expressions to navigate an 
XML tree and address specific parts, either a node or a set of nodes. The path 
expression is similar to that of file systems. XPath was recommended by W3C in 
November 1999. It handles the XML file as a tree. It is used as a simple query 
language and supports other query languages, such as XQuery. It defines nodes’ 
relationships: parent, child, sibling, ancestor, and descendant. The parent and 
child relation is formed between adjacent levels of the tree. Each child has only 
one parent on a higher level. The parent can have any number of children 
including zero. Children at the same level with the same parent are called 
siblings. The ancestor relation goes up from any node until it reaches the root. In 
contrast, descendant goes down from a node until it reaches the leaves (Tizag.; 
Harold and Means, 2002; Ray, 2003; Molina et al., 2009; W3C, 2010; Elmasri 
and Navathe, 2011; W3Schools, 2013a). 
XPath expressions show the location of elements and attributes in XML 
files. The syntax of XPath includes many special marks to identify the node 
(Tizag.; Harold and Means, 2002; Ray, 2003; Molina et al., 2009; W3C, 2010; 
Elmasri and Navathe, 2011; W3Schools, 2013a); the basic marks are explained 
in Figure 2.3 (W3Schools, 2013a).  
 
 
 
Figure ‎2.3 Basic marks are used in XPath expression (W3Schools). 
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To explain how these marks are used, here are some examples of XPath 
expressions for the bank database, shown in Figure 2.1 on page 9: 
/bank/customer/mobile 
This expression can be used to access the mobile node that is a child of 
customer node and a descendant of bank node. 
/bank/transaction@id 
This expression is used to select the identifier (id) attribute of a 
transaction node. 
Predicates can be used in XPath expressions to find specific nodes and 
values. They are inserted in square brackets “[ ]” (Tizag.; Harold and Means, 
2002; Ray, 2003; Molina et al., 2009; W3C, 2010; Elmasri and Navathe, 2011; 
W3Schools, 2013a). For example, to find all transactions that have an amount 
over £50, the predicate is used in the XPath expression as follows: 
/bank/customer/transaction [amount>50] 
Furthermore, XPath expressions use axes to identify  groups of nodes 
related to the specific node (Tizag.; Harold and Means, 2002; Ray, 2003; Molina 
et al., 2009; W3C, 2010; Elmasri and Navathe, 2011; W3Schools, 2013a). 
Figure 2.4 shows XPath axes’ names and results (W3Schools, 2013a).   
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2.4 XPath axes (W3Schools) 
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XPath expressions can be classified into two types: absolute path and 
relative path. The absolute path for a specific node is the full path starting from 
root to the node. The relative path is shorter and is based on a specific node only 
(Tizag.; Harold and Means, 2002; Ray, 2003; W3C, 2010; W3Schools, 2013a). 
2.6.2 XQuery 
This Section only gives an overview of XQuery because it is not very 
relevant to this work. XQuery is a language used to query and extract data from 
XML files. It is based on XPath with extensions to cover XPath’s limitations. 
XQuery provides the ability to handle queries using functions. It is flexible and 
can deal with complex queries. It provides FLOWER expression (FOR, LET, 
WHERE, and RETURN) to extract data, similar to SQL in relational databases 
(Cameron, 2008; Molina et al., 2009; Boag et al., 2011; Elmasri and Navathe, 
2011; W3Schools, 2013b).  
In general, XPath is considered a simple query language for XML files, 
and XQuery a more general and powerful one. Nevertheless this research will 
use XPath due to its simplicity and clarity and because the complexity of queries 
is not relevant. Using XPath in the system is discussed more fully in Chapter 9. 
2.7 XML Parsing 
The parser is an important component for processing an XML file. It is 
included in all applications that use XML. It aims to parse the XML text and 
create a representation as a tree or stream. Many parsers are used to construct 
XML files, such as DOM, SAX, JDOM, and Xerces2. Both DOM and SAX are 
discussed in the following Sections because they are the most popular and 
widely used.  
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2.7.1 DOM 
Data Object Model (DOM) was developed by W3C (Hégaret et al., 
2005). DOM parses an XML file and constructs it as a tree of objects in a 
memory. This tree represents the content of the XML file and shows the 
relationships between objects such as parent, child, and sibling. It converts each 
element in the XML file to a node in the tree (W3C, 2003; Eriksen, 2004) as 
described in Section 2.3. 
DOM offers an easy method to navigate, access, and manipulate the 
XML data (Frank et al., 2003). It supports traversal in any direction and allows 
both read and write processes simultaneously. It provides random access to 
XML data using the tree structure (W2, 2008; W1, 2009). Using DOM offers a 
suitable environment for XPath (Berglund et al., 2010) and handling queries and 
updates (Al-Badawi, 2010). This parser can be used in several platforms 
including .NET, C++, and Java (Zhang, 2006). 
However, creating and loading the XML tree into memory consumes 
storage space and run time. Large XML files face obstacles when parsed under 
DOM due to requiring a large memory space. Figure 2.5 shows how DOM 
represents the XML file as a tree.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2.5 DOM tree for the XML file (Frank et al., 2003) 
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2.7.2 SAX 
SAX is an acronym for Simple API for XML (Brownell, 2002; SAX, 
2004). It parses the XML file and creates a stream based on events. Each event 
represents an element in the XML file. The order of events follows the order of 
elements in the XML file. It is simple, fast, and provides high level of 
performance in parsing because it does not store the XML file in the memory 
(Nazmul, 1999) and so supports the parsing of large XML files, unlike DOM. 
However, it is limited to reading the XML data with no manipulation. It 
restricts navigation by providing only a top down traversal and a sequential 
access to data. Therefore, back navigation is not possible (W2, 2008; W1, 2009). 
In general, it focuses on parsing and creating events. Objects can be created by 
interrupting these events. Figure 2.6 shows events of the XML file that are 
created by SAX.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎2.6 SAX events for the XML file (Frank et al., 2003) 
Each of these two parsers has its advantages and disadvantages. The 
choice between DOM and SAX depends mainly on the system requirements. 
DOM was selected as the parser at the implementation stage in this research. 
This is because the system needs to know the whole structure of the XML file, 
uses random access to nodes, and does traversal in any direction. All these 
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requirements are provided by DOM but are not supported by SAX. However, 
using DOM in the implementation limits the scalability test when evaluating the 
huge XML databases due to storage restrictions. This limitation is discussed in 
Chapter 9. 
2.8 XML Databases 
An XML file can be either data-centric or document-centric. The data-
centric type reflects that data in XML is highly structured and is commonly 
stored in databases. The document-centric type concerns semi structured textual 
content such as books (Bourret, 2005; Sun and Wang, 2011; Noaman and 
Almansour, 2012). Only the data centric type is relevant here due to its 
relationship to databases application. 
There has been a debate as to whether XML is a database or not. XML 
can be considered a technology that used to build databases since it has the 
ability to store and retrieve data like other types of databases (Bourret, 2005; Sun 
and Wang, 2011; Noaman and Almansour, 2012). It includes many common 
databases features: it stores data in XML files, owns schemas (DTD and XML 
Schemas) and query languages (XPath and XQuery), and provides interfaces 
based on programming languages such as DOM and SAX. At the same time it 
lacks many features of database management systems such as security, multi- 
access, and recovery (Steegmans et al., 2004; Bourret, 2005; Noaman and 
Almansour, 2012). These limitations call into question XML’s status as a 
database. Researchers have been concerned about these limitations and have 
tried to develop the XML database environment. This research is one such 
attempt. It aims to improve security in XML databases. 
An XML database can be categorised into either an enabled XML 
database or a native XML database (Steegmans et al., 2004; Bourret, 2005; 
Molina et al., 2009; Papamarkos et al., 2009; Elmasri and Navathe, 2011). The 
enabled XML database stores data based on existing approaches using traditional 
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databases such as relational databases. The most important feature of using this 
type is to support existing applications, since a large number of XML files are 
already stored in relational databases (Steegmans et al., 2004; Papamarkos et al., 
2009; Abd El-Aziz and Kannan, 2012b). This type depends on well-known and 
familiar approaches. It requires mapping techniques to transfer data from the 
XML structure to the relational structure (Steegmans et al., 2004; Elmasri and 
Navathe, 2011). It suffers from limitations. It does not handle large XML files 
well due to number of joins (Papamarkos et al., 2009). It is not concerned about 
hierarchical structure, nested data, and elements order. Some information may be 
lost during the conversion (Steegmans et al., 2004; Bourret, 2005; Sun and 
Wang, 2011; Noaman and Almansour, 2012).  
 The second approach is native XML databases, which are based on an 
XML file as the basic unit. This type is an appropriate approach to manage XML 
databases (Fiebig et al., 2002; Steegmans et al., 2004; Sun and Wang, 2011). It 
can easily be searched and its content managed because it is all in one place 
(Bourret, 2005; Sun and Wang, 2011). The native approach supports XML query 
languages, which improves the retrieval process (Steegmans et al., 2004; 
Bourret, 2005; Papamarkos et al., 2009; Sun and Wang, 2011). It is more 
flexible than XML-enabled databases (Bourret, 2005). The main limitation of 
this type is that it provides data in only XML format (Bourret, 2005; Abd El-
Aziz and Kannan, 2012b). This approach can also be classified into two types 
according to Bourret (2005) and Papamarkos et al. (2009): text-based and 
model-based. The text-based approach handles the XML file as  text and stores it 
as a file in the file systems or in relational databases as a CLOB/BLOB. The 
model-based type handles XML data as objects and the file is represented as a 
tree, as in DOM (Staken, 2001; Steegmans et al., 2004; Bourret, 2005; Harold, 
2005; Sun and Wang, 2011; Noaman and Almansour, 2012). This research will 
focus only on native XML databases.  
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2.9 Conclusion 
XML is a vast topic and not all of its aspects were covered in this limited 
Chapter. The basic points are included to give sufficient background to 
understand the research aims and the systems’ platforms. The next Chapter is a 
literature review of access control systems since the topic of the thesis is access 
control for XML. 
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3 RELATED WORK ON SECURITY IN XML 
DATABASES  
3.1 Introduction  
XML databases are widely used in many different areas. Like any 
databases, they are used to store, retrieve, and provide data and information in an 
organised manner. They are multiuser systems, meaning they can be accessed by 
millions of users and they can provide a huge amount of data. This large amount 
of data needs to be controlled, managed, and organised. In addition, this data can 
be sensitive and personal. All data and especially confidential data need to be 
protected and saved in a secure environment. Therefore, XML databases should 
manage data securely to protect user rights and data privacy from loss or misuse 
(Izadi et al., 2007; Li and Hong, 2008; Gollmann, 2011; Thimma et al., 2013).  
This thesis focuses on the access control, which is one of the main techniques to 
improve security in XML databases. 
In this Chapter, the general background of XML security is discussed in 
Section 3.2.  The rest of the Chapter describes the work related to access control. 
In Section 3.3, access control concepts are explained and compared. Section 3.4 
provides a literature review of several types of access control. In Section 3.5, 
access control techniques that are currently applied to XML databases are 
discussed in detail.  Labelling technique is also described in Section 3.6 due to 
its relationship to access control. 
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3.2 XML Security 
The main aim of XML security technologies is to protect information and 
ensure users have proper authorisation. These technologies include XML 
signature, XML encryption, and XML access control (Jo et al., 2005; Ardagna et 
al., 2007; Zhu et al., 2009; Myint, 2010; Gollmann, 2011). Both signature and 
encryption techniques are low level features whereas access control is 
considered a high level approach to security policies (Cho et al., 2002). Digital 
signature and encryption focus on making the data itself secure but access 
control provides secure access to data (Verma et al., 2012).  
In general, all three techniques are used for data protection, but each one 
provides specific features that make it different from the others. Access control 
essentially concerns data confidentiality. Encryption is also used to preserve 
confidentiality when the data is transmitted via different platforms. Digital 
signature aims to prevent data tampering (Bertino and Sandhu, 2005). Security 
in XML includes communication security and managerial security. Both digital 
signature and encryption are designed to handle communication security, but 
access control approach works on the managerial security (Myint, 2010). W3C 
recommended XML signature, XML encryption, and XML key management 
specification (XKMS), which is used to support both signature and encryption 
(Ardagna et al., 2007; Ekelhart et al., 2008; Verma et al., 2012). 
Some XML-based access control languages were developed by 
commercial companies. They are considered as specification security languages 
based on XML. XACML and SAML are products of the OASIS security 
services technical committee and XACL was proposed by IBM (OASIS; Hada 
and Kudo, 2000; OASIS, 2005). XACML is Extensible Access Control Mark-up 
Language that declares the access control policy and aims to provide a standard 
terminology among multiple systems. It is built on XML and is combined with 
the RBAC approach for XML (OASIS). SAML is Security Assertion Mark-up 
Language that is used for authentication and authorisations between identity and 
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service providers online. XACL is XML Access Control Language that specifies 
policies on subject, object, action, and condition to enforce security in XML 
documents. However, these languages have limited features that have been 
extended and improved (Bertino and Sandhu, 2005; Abd El-Aziz and Kannan, 
2012a). 
The access control technology is one of the main approaches to guarantee 
security and some authors describe it as the most effective one in XML 
databases (Hitchens and Varadharajan, 2001; Li et al., 2005; Qi et al., 2005; Lee 
and Yu, 2008; Li and Hong, 2008; Gonzalez et al., 2009; Zhu et al., 2009). It is 
also one of the main issues in XML (Gonzalez et al., 2009; Sun and Wang, 
2011). At present there are no standards and well-defined rules for access control 
in XML (Lee and Yu, 2008; Gonzalez et al., 2009). This is clearly a point 
worthy of more investigation. This thesis focuses only on the access control 
technology. The work related to an access control approach is described in detail 
in the following sections. 
3.3 Access Control Concepts 
Access control is an important topic in security and it is applied in many 
computer fields such as operating systems, networks, and databases (Bertino and 
Sandhu, 2005; Chin and Older, 2011; Elmasri and Navathe, 2011; Gollmann, 
2011; Hui et al., 2011). This research focuses on access control for XML 
databases. In general, access control models control and manage users’ access to 
XML nodes or attributes according to policy rules. They help to prevent 
inappropriate access that breaches data security. The following Sections cover 
policy rules’ concepts and the access control structure. 
Any access control technique requires a security policy that defines the 
access levels for different users. It specifies who can access what and with what 
privileges. These rules are also called authorisation specifications (Gabillon, 
2004; Qi et al., 2005; Di Vimercati et al., 2008). The term ‘privileges’, which is 
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frequently used in this area, means a right that is given to a subject to perform 
specific actions and operations on objects (Damiani et al., 2005; Gollmann, 
2011). Usually the main syntax of policy rules is represented as <subject, object, 
action>. Subjects are entities that can access and achieve resources and data 
through requests. Each subject may be a user’s identification, his location, IP 
address, or a combination of them; it can also be a group of users. Objects can be 
defined as items that are accessed through requests. Each Object can refer to an 
XML document, a single node, or an attribute. Action refers to privileges such as 
read (browse) and write (insert, update, delete); it is also called access mode 
(Chan et al., 2004; Gabillon, 2004; Di Vimercati et al., 2005; Gabillon, 2005; Jo 
et al., 2005; Di Vimercati et al., 2008; Li and Hong, 2008; Gollmann, 2011; 
Thimma et al., 2013). 
Access authorisation is sometimes (Damiani et al., 2001; Di Vimercati et 
al., 2005; Jo et al., 2005; Di Vimercati et al., 2008; Byun and Park, 2010) also 
extended by adding sign and type factors to the main syntax and appears as 
<subject, object, action, sign, type>. The sign is represented by positive + or 
negative – marks. It reflects that the access is either permitted or denied. The 
type refers to the authorisation type, which is local, recursive, soft, hard, or a 
mixture of them. The term local means the authorisations apply for an element 
and its attributes only while recursive includes the element, sub elements, and 
their attributes. Soft refers to authorisations that are applicable for instance level 
which means restricted to a specific XML file. In contrast, hard means the 
authorisation is at schema level, which indicates that the subject can work with 
any XML file based on a DTD (Di Vimercati et al., 2008) . Li and Hong (2008) 
developed temporal access control policies by adding time factor to this syntax. 
These access policies can relate to read, write, and position privileges (Park et 
al., 2004; Gabillon, 2005; Jo et al., 2005; Qi et al., 2005; An and Park, 2007; Di 
Vimercati et al., 2008; Lee and Yu, 2008). The position privilege concerns 
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hiding the node content while showing that the node exists. This is described 
further in Section 3.5.1.  
The main conceptual access control structure is an access control matrix 
that stores and manages access rights. An access control matrix contains a set of 
subjects, actions, and objects. Each subject is represented as a row and each 
object as a column in the matrix. Cells in the matrix may contain action values 
or be empty. The matrix consumes space due to empty cells and does not work 
efficiently with a large amount of data because the update process becomes 
difficult (Sandhu and Samarati, 1994; Chin and Older, 2011; Gollmann, 2011).  
Usually, the access matrix is implemented using two traditional models: 
access control list and capabilities. An Access Control List (ACL) stores the 
access rights based on the object. Each object has a list that contains all subjects 
that can access it and the action values (Sandhu and Samarati, 1994; Qi et al., 
2005; Lee and Yu, 2008; Chin and Older, 2011; Gollmann, 2011). In contrast, 
the capabilities model stores the access rights based on the subject. Each subject 
has a list of permitted objects with the action values (Sandhu and Samarati, 
1994; Qi et al., 2005; Lee and Yu, 2008; Chin and Older, 2011; Gollmann, 
2011). This type is related to Discretionary Access Control (DAC) (Gollmann, 
2011) that is fully described in Section 3.4.1. Both techniques can be applied to 
simple structured systems. They store only the positive authorisations.  
Although, the access matrix and its techniques are not relevant to this 
research, they were described above because they are fundamental points in the 
access control. In the following Section, the main access control categories are 
discussed. 
3.4 Access Control Types 
There are several classifications for access control models from different 
perspectives. Access control models can be categorised into simply: the 
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Discretionary Access Control model (DAC) and the Mandatory Access Control 
model (MAC) (Hitchens and Varadharajan, 2001; Zhu et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 
2009). However, some authors categorise them into three core categories: 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control (MAC), and 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) (Sandhu and Samarati, 1994; Jeong et al., 
2003; Chan et al., 2004; Wang and Osborn, 2004; Zhang et al., 2004; Li et al., 
2005; Zhang and Xue, 2005; Lee and Yu, 2008; Rashid et al., 2010; Thimma et 
al., 2013). In addition to these traditional categories, there are some new types: 
Attribute Based Access Control (Bobba et al., 2010; Kuhn et al., 2010; Junbeom 
and Dong Kun, 2011) and Trust Based Access Control (Bin and Shijin, 2010; 
Hua and Lili, 2010; Ma et al., 2010; Xing et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2010; Zhang 
and Rao, 2010; Singh, 2011). Likewise, there are other proposed types for access 
control such as function based access control (Qi et al., 2005), and purpose based 
access control (Byun et al., 2005; Sun et al., 2010; Sun and Wang, 2011). All 
these types are explained in the following Sections.  
3.4.1 Discretionary Access Control Model (DAC) 
Discretionary Access Control depends on the subject identity to manage 
access to databases. This type is characterised by its flexibility, so the subject 
can grant access control rights to other subjects (Sandhu and Samarati, 1994; 
Jeong et al., 2003; Chan et al., 2004; Bertino and Sandhu, 2005; Zhu et al., 2007; 
Zhu et al., 2009; Rashid et al., 2010). This flexibility leads to the implementation 
of Discretionary Access Control in several applications through Access Control 
List (ACL) (Rashid et al., 2010). It is adopted by the majority of commercial 
database management systems (DBMSs) (Sandhu and Samarati, 1994; Chan et 
al., 2004; Bertino and Sandhu, 2005; Rashid et al., 2010). However, the passing 
of access rights to other users may cause inappropriate access to sensitive 
information or permit malicious attacks on databases (Jeong et al., 2003; Rashid 
et al., 2010). Discretionary Access Control risks a loss of control of data and the 
ability to check prohibited flows of unauthorised subjects like Trojan horse 
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(Sandhu and Samarati, 1994; Zhu et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 2009; Rashid et al., 
2010).  
In the context of XML databases, many models that handle different 
approaches to query, update, view, and access data are based on DAC (Bertino et 
al., 2000; Damiani et al., 2001; Damiani et al., 2002; Di Vimercati et al., 2005; 
Murata et al., 2006; Damiani et al., 2007). Some of these models that are 
developed by Damiani et al. make the authorisation processes for accessing 
XML databases depend mainly on the DTD. It appears that the literature on 
DAC in XML databases used this basic type of access control because of its 
simplicity. These models were designed to investigate other points in XML 
databases and included DAC as a basic access control. So, the mechanism of 
applying DAC to XML Databases was not explained clearly or in detail.  
3.4.2 Mandatory Access Control Model (MAC) 
In Mandatory Accesses Control (MAC), both subjects and objects are 
classified into multiple-levels depending on the object’s content. Security levels 
have labels and the security level of an object reflects its sensitivity (Sandhu and 
Samarati, 1994; Jeong et al., 2003; Chan et al., 2004; Bertino and Sandhu, 2005; 
Zhu et al., 2007; Rashid et al., 2010). These security levels can be ordered or 
unordered. The order levels are usually classified into TopSecret, Secret, 
Confidential, and Unclassified (Sandhu and Samarati, 1994; Jeong et al., 2003; 
Bertino and Sandhu, 2005; Zhu et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 2009). The relation 
between these levels is defined as TopSecret > Secret > Confidential > 
Unclassified. Doung and Zhang (2008; 2010) define other ordered label sets in 
their access control system as Protected > Private > Public. On the other hand, 
unordered labels can be defined as names that are used in the domain of the 
databases such as Technique, Human Resources, Financial, etc (Sandhu and 
Samarati, 1994; Bertino and Sandhu, 2005; Zhu et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 2009).  
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Access operations in Mandatory Access Control depend on two 
principles: read-down and write-up. Read-down means that users can read only 
objects at their level or lower. Write-up means that users can write only at that 
level or higher. However, the write-up principle causes problems for data 
integrity because a subject in a lower level can write data at a higher level 
without having the privilege to read data at that level, and so may overwrite data. 
Some systems overcome this issue by eliminating the write-up concept and 
making the write process permitted for the same level only (Sandhu and 
Samarati, 1994; Jeong et al., 2003; Bertino and Sandhu, 2005). This type of 
access control is not adopted widely by database management systems (DBMSs) 
because defining and classifying security levels in organisations is a difficult 
process (Rashid et al., 2010). This type of access control is used in high security 
systems such as military applications (Li et al., 2005; Zhang and Xue, 2005).  
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) were applied to XML databases 
context by several authors (Cho et al., 2002; Li et al., 2005; Zhang and Xue, 
2005; Zhu et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 2009). MAC can be implemented based on 
XML files, a DTD, or an XML Schema (Cho et al., 2002; Zhang and Xue, 2005; 
Zhu et al., 2009). The core aim in MAC is to assign labels to both subjects and 
objects. Objects are elements and attributes in XML database. The labels for 
subjects are stored separately in a special file. Labels for XML databases objects 
are also stored in a separate file (Cho et al., 2002; Li et al., 2005; Zhang and 
Xue, 2005).  Zhu et al. (2007; 2009) stored objects labels as attributes of 
elements in the XML file itself or the XML schema. It appears that this method 
may consume more storage and time for access. MAC can be used in 
conjunction with other techniques described later in Section 3.5 (Li et al., 2005).  
3.4.3 Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) divides subjects (users) according to 
their roles and responsibilities in the system. Privileges and rights to access 
objects are assigned to roles and then subjects are assigned to roles depending on 
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their job (Sandhu and Samarati, 1994; Hitchens and Varadharajan, 2001; Jeong 
et al., 2003; Zhang et al., 2004; Bertino and Sandhu, 2005; Park and Giordano, 
2006; Rashid et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2010). The management of the 
authorisation process becomes easier and more effective by being broken down 
into two steps rather than assigning privileges to subjects directly. If the user’s 
role changes, it will be necessary only to revoke the old role and assign a new 
role without changing privileges. In addition, the relationship between a role and 
subject is a many to many relationship that means the role can be assigned to a 
subject or group of subjects and the subject can have one role or a group of roles 
(Hitchens and Varadharajan, 2001; Bertino and Sandhu, 2005). Usually Role 
Based Access Control has a role hierarchy that relates to all the roles in the 
systems (Hitchens and Varadharajan, 2001; Wang and Osborn, 2004; Zhang et 
al., 2004; Bertino and Sandhu, 2005; Rashid et al., 2010) . 
The administrator defines the role for each user and he can control the 
authorisation of roles by adding constraints on execution processes. This 
category of access control is the most popular one in large-scale systems and it 
has a great influence in the access control area (Zhang et al., 2004; Bertino and 
Sandhu, 2005; Park and Giordano, 2006; Xing et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2010; 
Thimma et al., 2013). However, it does face privilege abuse from internal 
subjects who reach data sources and misuse their roles (Sandhu and Samarati, 
1994; Hitchens and Varadharajan, 2001; Jeong et al., 2003; Wang and Osborn, 
2004; Bertino and Sandhu, 2005; Byun et al., 2005; Park and Giordano, 2006; 
Rashid et al., 2010; Xing et al., 2010). This type as other traditional types cannot 
easily handle privacy protection (Xing et al., 2010; Sun and Wang, 2011).  
RBAC is widely used and simple. It is implemented within XML 
databases via different models (Hitchens and Varadharajan, 2001; Wang and 
Osborn, 2004; Zhang et al., 2004; Thimma et al., 2013). It can be applied for 
both local and server systems since it supports remote access (Hitchens and 
Varadharajan, 2001; Zhang et al., 2004). These models assign authorisations via 
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policies for the whole XML file or elements themself. The access processes are 
based on XPath expressions (Hitchens and Varadharajan, 2001; Wang and 
Osborn, 2004; Zhang et al., 2004). Zhang et al. (2004) and Hitchens and 
Varadharajan (2001) depend on using XML Schema and DTD in their models. 
3.4.4 Alternative Types of Access Control 
The traditional types of access control were described in the previous 
Sections 3.4.1 – 3.4.3. This Section discusses the other approaches to access 
control including Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC), Function Based 
Access Control, and Purpose Based Access Control. Since the Trust Based 
Access Control approach is the main topic of this thesis and is not yet applied to 
XML databases, it will be described separately in detail in Chapter 5. 
Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) is a relatively new type of 
access control (Yuan and Tong, 2005). It depends on using attributes to define 
the access policy. These attributes include subject attributes, objects attributes, 
and environment attributes (Yuan and Tong, 2005; Shen, 2010; Zhang et al., 
2013). It is designed to cover the features of DAC, MAC, and RBAC (Yuan and 
Tong, 2005; Shen, 2010; Jin et al., 2012). The identification, security levels, 
classifications, and roles can be considered as attributes (Yuan and Tong, 2005; 
Jin et al., 2012). This type can also include other attributes such as time (Yuan 
and Tong, 2005). As an example of a subject attribute, the user can access the 
specific data if his age is over 18. The access claim is checked to see whether it 
meets the defined attributes or not. In the context of XML, XACML (see Section 
3.2) efficiently supports the implementation of Attribute Based Access Control 
(ABAC) for applications such as web services (Yuan and Tong, 2005; Shen, 
2010; Jin et al., 2012). Although this type is flexible, it makes the access control 
policy more complex (Jin et al., 2012). For this reason, it has not been adopted 
by large scale systems (Shen, 2010). 
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Function Based Access Control was proposed by Qi et al. (2005) using 
rule functions. These rule functions are executable code that includes the access 
control policy. They can be related to the subject, the object, or be general. 
Many XML documents can be shared using these rules functions. Unlike most 
approaches it handles both positive and negative authorisations (Qi et al., 2005; 
Di Vimercati et al., 2008). The object rule functions are similar to the ACL 
approach (see Section 3.3) and the subject access control functions are similar to 
the capability approach (see Section 3.3). It appears that this approach may not 
fit with a system with a complex structure due to its similarity to ACL and 
Capability approaches. Although the author implemented the approach 
practically, further investigations are needed to check the efficiency and 
performance in different situations such as for update privileges.  
Purpose Based Access Control restricts the access policy depending on 
the purpose notation. The purpose is the reasons behind accessing and collecting 
data. The purposes are organised in hierarchical relations using a tree structure 
(Byun et al., 2005; Sun et al., 2010; Sun and Wang, 2011). The intended purpose 
defines a set of purposes and associates them with objects. The access process is 
based on checking the access purpose and the intended purpose; if they match 
access is permitted, or otherwise denied (Byun et al., 2005; Sun et al., 2010; Sun 
and Wang, 2011). Byun et al. (2005) refer to using RBAC and assigning the 
purpose to the role. The authors state that combining these two approaches 
makes the access policy more complex. Purpose Based Access Control is applied 
theoretically to XML databases by Sun and Wang (2010; 2011). They comment 
that this approach is a first step and still requires further improvements. Lack of 
implementation means it is impossible to evaluate this type of access control.  
Some general points are concluded from describing all these access 
control types. All of them are aimed at protecting data. With respect to all 
developed models, the access control suffered from limitations and needs to be 
improved further and, in some cases, implemented to understand how they work 
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in practice. As described above, most of the approaches have limited 
implementation in XML databases. The most important point is that all of these 
approaches are static, which means defining the access policy and assigning 
privileges forever. In addition, all of these approaches lack the possibility of 
capturing misuse and insider threats. They also do not consider the user 
interaction in the access policies. These reasons lead to the implementation of 
dynamic and responsive access control for XML databases. Thus, this thesis 
focuses on applying dynamic Trust Based Access Control for XML databases. 
The research motivations and contributions are explained in Chapter 5 and the 
literature review of the Trust Based Access Control is covered in Chapter 4. The 
next Section describes different techniques used to apply access control for 
XML databases. 
3.5 Access Control Techniques For XML Databases 
The majority of traditional and proposed access control approaches for 
XML databases such as role based, mandatory based, purpose based, and 
function based focus on processing access to XML files and elements using 
XPath (Hitchens and Varadharajan, 2001; Wang and Osborn, 2004; Qi et al., 
2005; Zhu et al., 2007; Li and Hong, 2008; Landberg et al., 2010; Sun et al., 
2010). XPath was discussed in Section 2.6 is used as a basic technique to access 
a node or set of nodes in XML databases.  
An additional technique used to control access to XML databases is the 
use of views. A view presents data partially based on personalisation and 
specifications requirements (Abiteboul, 1999; Chen et al., 2002; Kozankiewicz 
et al., 2003; Balmin et al., 2004; Arion et al., 2007; Roantree et al., 2007; Gire 
and Idabal, 2008; Yuanbo et al., 2009). It can present data from different 
perspectives to different users (Abiteboul, 1999; Chen et al., 2002; Yuanbo et 
al., 2009).  The use of views for these purposes originated in relational databases 
(Elmasri and Navathe, 2003; Teorey et al., 2006; Molina et al., 2009; Elmasri 
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and Navathe, 2011). Security views are created based on users (Byun and Park, 
2010). They depend on users’ rights so, for instance, in Mandatory Access 
Control they are generated according to users’ labelling levels (Di Vimercati et 
al., 2005; Li et al., 2005). The DTD or the XML schema that can be used to 
create materialised or virtual views (Kozankiewicz et al., 2003; Balmin et al., 
2004; Yuanbo et al., 2009). They need high maintenance and much storage 
(Byun and Park, 2010). The topic of views is large and it is related to other XML 
databases techniques like optimising queries and updating data. It is mentioned 
here because it can be used to manage access control but it is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. This work is designed to manage the simple access to a specific 
node rather than make the access process more complex with dealing with 
groups of nodes in views.  
Many different models for XML access control to data have been 
proposed by using two main techniques: node filtering (Yu et al., 2002; 
Gabillon, 2004; Yu et al., 2004; Gabillon, 2005) and query rewriting (Mohan et 
al., 2005; Mohan et al., 2006a; Mohan et al., 2006b; Damiani et al., 2007; 
Damiani et al., 2008; Byun and Park, 2010; Thimma et al., 2013). Both 
techniques can use the security views. Likewise, other techniques have been 
used to develop access control systems such as labelling and path indexing (An 
and Park, 2007; Duong and Zhang, 2008; Duong, 2010; An and Park, 2011). 
These techniques consider access control from a processing query perspective 
and do not relate to applying different types of access control to XML databases. 
These techniques are discussed in the following Sections. 
3.5.1 Node Filtering 
In simple terms, node filtering means scanning and parsing the whole 
tree and giving each node a positive or negative sign. This sign is used to 
indicate whether the access is permitted or denied. The node filtering technique 
depends on access policies to create a user view that can then be integrated with 
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user queries (Gabillon, 2004; Gabillon, 2005; Damiani et al., 2008; Byun and 
Park, 2010).  
In the early stages of developing access control for XML databases, node 
filtering was usually used. Although it is simple, it suffers from limitations. It 
consumes a large amount of storage space and needs high maintenance since the 
filtering process is repeated many times for each user or group of users (Damiani 
et al., 2008; Byun and Park, 2010). 
Some traditional access control systems for XML are based on this 
technique  and were developed by Damiani et al. (2000a; 2000b; 2001; 2002), 
Yu et al. (2002; 2004) and Gabillon (2004; 2005). Researchers who used node 
filtering extended their work to develop query rewriting; this is described in 
Section 3.5.2. Some node filtering models can support only the read privilege 
(Damiani et al., 2000a; Damiani et al., 2000b; Damiani et al., 2001; Yu et al., 
2002; Yu et al., 2004) and other models applied both read and write privileges 
(Damiani et al., 2002; Gabillon, 2004; Gabillon, 2005; Di Vimercati et al., 
2008). 
A novel privilege, called position privilege, was introduced by Gabillon 
(2004, 2005) to solve some issues in node filtering techniques. The position 
privilege makes a separation between the node’s existence and its content. In 
other words, it allows the user to know about the node’s existence without 
knowing the node’s label and value. The node has a RESTRICTED label and 
Figure 3.1 explains the position privilege work (Gabillon, 2004; Gabillon, 2005). 
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Figure ‎3.1 Using the position privilege in user view (Gabillon, 2004) 
A Compressed Accessibility Map (CAM) approach for XML database 
access control was proposed to solve the storage problem and speed up the 
process in this technique (Yu et al., 2002; Yu et al., 2004). This map gathers 
together nodes that have similar accessible attributes. The compressed tree looks 
smaller than the original one and has fewer nodes. The model can provide fast 
determination of the user’s rights. The main function of this map is to identify 
whether access is allowed or not for each user. It can be defined as M=H*U*A, 
where M refers to the map, H refers to the database tree, U refers to the users, 
and A refers to the access modes. This approach contains algorithms to find the 
best compressed accessibility map to reduce the storage space consumed. A 
compressed accessibility map is created for each user and each access mode (Yu 
et al., 2002; Yu et al., 2004). Although this approach was designed to reduce the 
storage space by reducing the tree size, it still consumes a large amount of 
storage due to the presence of many users’ maps (Duong and Zhang, 2008; 
Duong, 2010). 
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The authorisation model in the node filtering technique can deal with a 
single XML document or  a group of XML documents by working with a DTD 
or XML schema (Damiani et al., 2000a; Damiani et al., 2000b; Damiani et al., 
2001; Di Vimercati et al., 2005). The access control system can add the access 
rules to the XML file or XML schema in separate files (Di Vimercati et al., 
2005).  
Node filtering is one of the two main approaches that describe how the 
access process is done in XML databases. The other approach, known as ‘query 
rewriting’, is described in the next Section. 
3.5.2 Query Rewriting 
The query rewriting technique depends on transforming possibly unsafe 
queries into safe ones that can then access the data. This technique slows access 
(Duong and Zhang, 2008; Duong, 2010; An and Park, 2011). Several models 
have been proposed based on this technique. 
Some systems that use the query rewriting create annotated schemas by 
using a variety of attributes (Mohan et al., 2005; Mohan et al., 2006a; Mohan et 
al., 2006b; Damiani et al., 2007; Mohan et al., 2007; Damiani et al., 2008). 
These attributes include access, condition, dirty. The access attribute provides 
the ‘allow’ or ‘deny’ right to the subject to access the object. The condition 
attribute includes a number of predicates. The third attribute, ‘dirty’, indicates 
that access to some node’s descendants may be denied. A user schema view can 
be easily created from the annotated schema. A finite state automation is used in 
the rewrite automation process (Damiani et al., 2007; Damiani et al., 2008).  
Mohan et al. (2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007) improved this technique by using 
virtual views based on the security view specification. The system can be 
applied for both read and write (insert, delete, update) privileges. Figure 3.2 
shows all the steps in the query rewriting process.  
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Figure ‎3.2 The access control model was proposed by Damiani et al. (2008) 
3.5.3 Tables and Files Techniques 
Some access control models do not depend on either node filtering or 
query rewriting techniques. These models use a variety of methods that avoid 
repeated processes for users. They aim to define a standard access control 
system that is suitable for all users rather than find a particular access mode for 
each user and so do not repeat the process several times (Kitagawa and 
Yoshikawa, 2005; Duong and Zhang, 2008; Duong, 2010). 
The access control system designed by Kitagawa and Yoshikawa (2005) 
depends on policy tables. The policy table handles policy rules that are defined 
based on system strategies. Due to the policy tables’ size and their numbers, a 
simplification and unification process is performed and the access decisions are 
improved by reducing the time consumed. The policy table consists of two 
columns: pathID and flag; each one of these tables represents only one role. The 
availa
ble 
sol
d 
showroo
m 
<schema xmlns=“……”> 
<element name=“showroom”> 
<element name=“vehicles” maxOccurs=“unbounded” 
minOccurs=“1”> 
<element name=“available” maxOccurs=“unbounded”> 
… 
… 
.. 
<element name=“sold” maxOccurs=“unbounded”> 
… 
</schema> 
<schema xmlns=“……”> 
<element name=“showroom” access=“allow” dirty=“true”> 
<element name=“vehicles” maxOccurs=“unbounded” minOccurs=“1” 
   access=“allow” dirty=“true”> 
<element name= “available” maxOccurs=“unbounded” 
 access=“allow” dirty=“true” condition=“C”> 
… 
… 
.. 
<element name=“sold” maxOccurs=“unbounded” access=“deny”> 
… 
</schema> 
<?xml version=“1.0”> 
<schema xmlns=“……”> 
<element name=“showroom”> 
<complexType> 
<sequence> 
<element name=“vehicles” maxOccurs=“unbounded” 
minOccurs=“1”> 
<complexType> 
<sequence> 
<element name=“available” maxOccurs=“unbounded”> 
… 
… 
… 
… 
</schema> 
S
0 
S1   
access= 
“allow” 
dirty 
S2   
access=”
allow”  
dirty 
S4   
access= 
“denied” 
S3     
access=   
“allow” dirty      
condition= 
“c” 
  
vehicles 
a. The xml file 
schema 
b. The annotated schema 
c. The view of user schema 
d. Rewriting 
automation 
Chapter 3: RELATED WORK ON SECURITY IN XML DATABASES 
 
38 
 
pathID for each node is taken from the path information table, which gives each 
path a number (ID). The flag in the policy table reflects whether access is 
allowed (+) or denied (-).  
The simplification process is used to minimise the table size by 
representing only the minimum pathID when sequential numbers have the 
similar access results. Then the unification stage occurs by creating the role table 
that consists of role name and roleID. Finally, the unifying policy table (UPT) is 
generated from the role table and policy tables. The UPT table includes pathID 
and flag key number. PathID refers to the node in the XML tree and the flag key 
number is a product of the roleID, which only allows access to this node 
(Kitagawa and Yoshikawa, 2005). This system is based on many tables, which 
means using a relational database to implement access control for the XML 
database. The authors described this technique with read privileges and did not 
mention write privileges. It appears that implementing the write privilege may 
cause some difficulties regarding integrity although they did mention this in the 
paper. For example, the delete processes need to change data in many tables, 
which may consume much more time. 
Duong and Zhang (2008) defined access control concepts in files. The 
XML Access Authorisation file (XAA) included all XML elements and their 
access levels. The access authorisation of user groups is defined in the XML 
Group Authorisation (XGA). In this technique, the access level was classified as: 
public < private < protected. Many different symbols were used to refer to 
access levels, such as “#” to refer to the protected level. When this method is 
compared with the node filtering technique on the basis of the number of nodes 
scanned and response time, it demonstrates a good performance in terms of 
speed and accuracy (Duong and Zhang, 2008; Duong, 2010). Using files to 
define access control rules and concepts is also used by many Mandatory Access 
Control models (Cho et al., 2002; Li et al., 2005; Zhang and Xue, 2005) as 
mentioned previously in Section 3.4.2. A file-based technique is used to 
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implement the Trust Based Access Control in this thesis due to its simplicity and 
clarity as well as speed. 
3.6 Labelling Techniques 
In this Section, labelling is described and its types are discussed. The 
node labelling technique gives each node in the tree a unique label; used to 
identify and access the nodes. Currently, there are several models for node 
labelling  (Cohen et al., 2002; O'Neil et al., 2004; Duong and Zhang, 2005; 
Gabillon and Fansi, 2005; Khaing and Thein, 2006; An and Park, 2007; Duong 
and Zhang, 2008; An and Park, 2011).  
The models for labelling schema are either static or dynamic. The static 
approach is not efficient due to relabelling processes, which consumes much 
time and requires maintenance. Relabelling process means changing the old 
labels for all nodes and giving them new ones. The dynamic labelling techniques 
were designed to overcome these limitations in update processes caused by 
inserts. Some dynamic labelling models used numbers (Cohen et al., 2002; 
O'Neil et al., 2004; Gabillon and Fansi, 2005) and others used a mixture of 
numbers and letters (Duong and Zhang, 2005; Khaing and Thein, 2006; An and 
Park, 2007; Duong and Zhang, 2008; An and Park, 2011). These models used 
different forms but the majority of them used the dots “.” in their labelling 
technique (Cohne et al., 2002; O’Neil et al., 2004; Duong and Zhang, 2005; 
Khaing and Thein, 2006; An and Park, 2007; Duong and Zhang, 2008; An and 
Park, 2011) although Gabillon and Fansi (2005) used the ordered pair approach 
(1,1) in their system. 
Although these dynamic models try to avoid relabelling; some models 
still need the relabelling in limited cases (O’Neil et al., 2004). Moreover, some 
systems suffer from collisions between nodes. A Collision means using the same 
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label for two different nodes. This causes a problem that affects the system’s 
work and efficiency (Duong, 2010; Khaing and Thein, 2006). 
Most existing researchers classify labelling schemes into range based (Li 
and Moon, 2001; Amagasa et al., 2003) and prefix based (Cohne et al., 2002; 
O’Neil et al., 2004; Duong and Zhang, 2005; Gabillon and Fansi, 2005; Khaing 
and Thein, 2006; Duong and Zhang, 2008; An and Park, 2011). However, a few 
authors discuss other new types based on mathematical approaches. All 
categories are discussed in the following Sections. 
3.6.1 Labelling Scheme Types 
3.6.1.1 The Ranged Based Scheme 
Range based labelling schemes (interval based labelling- region based 
labelling) can show the ancestor and descendant relations and the parent and 
child relations between nodes (Al-Shaikh et al., 2010; Duong, 2010; Xu et al., 
2010). This category includes pre/post labelling and containment labelling 
scheme (Sans and Laurent, 2008; Xu et al., 2010). The pre/post labelling 
scheme used both pre-order traversal and post-order traversal that are illustrated 
in Figure 3.3.  This labelling scheme generates the node label as pre, post, level 
(Dietz, 1982; Xu et al., 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3.3 Pre-order and Post-order labelling scheme (Dietz, 1982) 
(1, 6) 
(2, 3) 
(3, 1) (4, 2) 
(5, 5) 
(6, 4) 
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The containment labelling technique used the labelling form start, ends, 
level (Duong, 2010; Xu et al., 2010). Figure 3.4 shows the containment labelling 
technique. Other ranged based schemes used several labelling forms, which 
depend on tree traversal such as (order(x), size(x)) (Li and Moon, 2001). The 
range based scheme type is flexible but it suffers from relabelling due to using 
sequential numbers. Some solutions were proposed to overcome this problem by 
pre reserved extra spaces or using floating points (Duong and Zhang, 2005; Al-
Shaikh et al., 2010; Duong, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3.4 The containment labelling scheme (Duong, 2010) 
3.6.1.2 The Prefix Based Scheme 
The prefix based technique is encoding the tree depth. This technique 
adds the parent code to the node label as prefix (Sans and Laurent, 2008; Al-
Shaikh et al., 2010; Duong, 2010; Xu et al., 2010). The most popular algorithm 
is the Dewey label (Xu et al., 2009), which is based on a system used by 
librarians. Figure 3.5 illustrates the Dewey labelling as an example of the prefix 
based scheme type. The form of this label consists of the parent label and the 
self-node label. So, ancestor and descendent, parent and child, and the sibling 
relationship can be derived easily from the prefix based labelling scheme. There 
are several models that used this kind of labelling scheme, such as LSDX, 
FLEX, and ORDPATH (Deschler and Rundensteiner, 2003; O'Neil et al., 2004; 
Duong and Zhang, 2005; Duong and Zhang, 2008). In general, this prefix based 
(1, 12, 1) 
(2, 7, 2) 
(3, 4, 3) (5, 6, 3) 
(8, 11, 2) 
(9, 10, 3) 
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scheme type supports the tree growth. However, the breadth growth leads to 
increase the size of label (Al-Shaikh et al., 2010). This approach requires 
relabeling in some cases due to using the prefix point (Duong and Zhang, 2005; 
Duong, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3.5 Dewey labelling scheme (Xu et al. ,2002) 
3.6.1.3 The Mathematical Based Scheme 
Although much research focused on developing ranged and prefix based 
approaches and tackling their problems, some recent research uses novel 
approaches that are based on mathematical concepts (Kim et al., 2009; Na and 
Guoqing, 2010; Xu et al., 2010; Zhang and Dong, 2010). Kim et al. (2009) used 
circular concepts in their labelling approach. They proposed a general labelling 
form that depends on the concept of angles and applies a rotation angle to the 
general form when the XML file size is large. This technique restricts the length 
of the label compared to other techniques that increased the label’s length with 
repeated updates. Alternatively, Xu et al. (2010) proposed a vector code that was 
represented graphically by using X and Y axes. They then applied and 
implemented the vector technique to many existing range based labelling and 
prefix based labelling scheme models and compared the results. In addition, the 
polar coordinate system that depends on angles and vector concepts was 
proposed by Zhang and Dong (2010). The label consists of the node’s level, the 
flag for overflow, the start angle, and the end angle. When there is no space to 
1 
1.1 
1.1.1 1.1.2 
1.2 
1.2.1 
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insert a new node, overflow happens. They solved this problem by following the 
same technique as LSDX (Duong and Zhang, 2005; Duong, 2010) and adding a 
letter. Na and Guoqing (2010) classified the XML tree to partitions and gave a 
mesh partition label to all nodes. They then combined the mesh, prefix, and 
interval labels. The mathematical approaches are relatively new and need more 
investigation. 
The labelling process can improve the speed to access the node. An and 
Park (2007, 2011) relate the labelling node model to the access control model 
directly and other approaches relate them indirectly (Doung and Zhang, 2005; 
Gabillon and Fansi, 2005; Khaing and Thein, 2006; Duong, 2010). 
A direct relationship means the labelling process is used to develop the 
access control model. An and Park (2007, 2011) designed an efficient control 
system that depends on node labelling. They defined the prime number product 
that reflects the users’ access to the node. For example in the hospital database, 
the number 6 is a product of 2 and 3; 2 refer to the patients’ group and 3 refers to 
the doctors’ group. They then used this prime number to create the node’s label, 
which is structured as lL1.L2.L3: where l is the number of the level, L1 is the 
parent node label, L2 is the current node, and L3 is the role based prime number. 
Some other access control systems use the labelling to improve the query 
process (Doung and Zhang, 2005; Gabillon and Fansi, 2005; Khaing and Thein, 
2006; Doung and Zhang, 2008; Duong, 2010). Doung and Zhang (2008; 2010) 
integrated between their access model and their labelling model to provide a 
secure model to query XML databases. 
Even though issues with the labelling process have been approached in 
many different ways, it still suffers from problems that require further 
investigation. In particular problems of the space required, the speed of queries 
and relabelling. Labelling topic is beyond the research scope of this thesis but it 
is mentioned here briefly because it is related to access control.  
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3.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter reviewed work on security in XML databases and related 
topics. It described the access control types and highlighted both their 
advantages and disadvantages. Several techniques for accessing XML databases 
were described. The next Chapter discusses the related work on Trust Based 
Access Control and explains its concepts. 
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4 RELATED WORK ON TRUST BASED ACCESS 
CONTROL (TBAC) 
4.1 Introduction 
Trust Based Access Control has become an established in many areas, 
such as networks and virtual organisations (Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 1997; 
Cahill et al., 2003; Almenarez et al., 2004; Almenarez et al., 2005; Tran et al., 
2005; Almenarez et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2006; Feng et al., 2008; Jia et al., 2009; 
Ma et al., 2010; Xing et al., 2010; Zhang and Rao, 2010; Zhao et al., 2010; 
Singh, 2011). Much research has focused on developing and improving it. Trust 
Based Access Control is discussed in detail here because it is central to the 
thesis.  
This Chapter describes the main concepts of trust. Section 4.2 defines 
this term and Section 4.3 highlights the trust features. The Trust Value (TV) is 
described in Section 4.4. The trust relationships between entities can be 
classified in to direct or indirect trust. Both kinds are discussed in Section 4.5. 
The calculation of Trust Value (TV) in several applications is discussed in 
Section 4.6. Finally, conclusion summarises the main points. 
4.2 Trust 
The term ‘trust’ is defined in many fields such as sociology, psychology, 
mathematics, and economics. A related definition to the research context is 
defined by Azzedin and Maheswaran (2002) as follows:  
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“Trust‎is‎the‎firm‎belief‎ in‎the‎competence‎of‎an‎entity‎to‎act‎as‎expected‎
such that this firm belief is not a fixed value associated with the entity but rather it 
is‎subject‎to‎the‎entity’s‎behaviour and applies only within a specific context at a 
given‎time” (Azzedin and Maheswaran, 2002). 
 Trust depends on beliefs, operations, and recommendations (Almenarez 
et al., 2004; Tran et al., 2005; Feng and Yang, 2010; Singh, 2011). It requires 
effort and time to achieve but it can be lost quickly and easily (Almenarez et al., 
2006; Lin et al., 2006). Trust is taken from the real world and applied to the 
digital world. Trust, as used in the access control, means that subjects can trust 
entities such as other subjects, applications, and firms on the basis of past 
history, operations, behaviour, experience, and recommendations over time 
(Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 1997; Cahill et al., 2003; Almenarez et al., 2004; 
Almenarez et al., 2005; Almenarez et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2006; Feng et al., 
2008; Jia et al., 2009; Ma et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2010; Singh, 2011). 
4.3 Properties of Trust 
There are many advantages of using trust. The main feature is that it is 
dynamic; Trust Values are changeable and can be increased or decreased 
according to the subjects’ behaviour, history, and operations. It is subjective, 
which means a subject can be trusted to different degrees by other subjects. Each 
subject trusts itself by default but trust relationships are asymmetrical, which 
means the relationship can be different in different directions. For example, 
subject A can trust subject B but at the same time subject B does not trust subject 
A. It is transitive under some conditions, which means it can be transferred from 
one entity to others. For example, subject A trusts subject B and at the same time 
subject B trusts subject C. If subject A trusts subject B as leader, then subject A 
can trust subject C indirectly. In addition, it is dependent on both past and 
present time and on context (Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 1997; Cahill et al., 
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2003; Almenarez et al., 2004; Ryutov et al., 2005; Lin et al., 2006; Xing et al., 
2010; Zhao et al., 2010; Singh, 2011).  
4.4 Trust Value (TV) 
Trust Value in the digital world can be measured in several ways. It can 
be in a range between 0 to 1 where 0 means distrusted and 1 is trusted 
(Almenarez et al., 2004; Almenarez et al., 2005; Tran et al., 2005; Almenarez et 
al., 2006; Feng et al., 2008; Jia et al., 2009; Zhang and Rao, 2010; Singh, 2011). 
It also can be defined using real numbers such as between 1 to 10 where 1 means 
low trust and 10 is high trust (Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 1997; Zhao et al., 
2010). It can be described by using levels such as L1, L2... L5 where L1 means 
distrusted and L5 means completely trusted (Lin et al., 2006; Singh, 2011). Trust 
Value can be called trust degree when using a specific range value, and trust 
level when using named levels. The concept of a trust degree is more frequently 
adopted in practice (Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 1997; Almenarez et al., 2004; 
Almenarez et al., 2005; Tran et al., 2005; Almenarez et al., 2006; Feng et al., 
2008; Jia et al., 2009; Ma et al., 2010; Xing et al., 2010; Zhang and Rao, 2010; 
Zhao et al., 2010) than levels. Levels are used by limited systems that know the 
number of required levels and use a specific defended range of levels (Lin et al., 
2006; Singh, 2011).  The majority of models were developed based on trust 
degree because it allows a wide range of values and is more flexible. As when 
using real numbers, there is no difficulty in adding more values.  
Trust Based Access Control depends on a trust management system, 
which automatically calculates and updates the Trust Values of users. Trust 
Values rely on users’ behaviour, users’ history, users’ credit, and users’ 
operations. Users can access resources through Trust Values and levels (Ryutov 
et al., 2005; Almenarez et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2006; Ma et al., 2008; Xing et al., 
2010). 
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4.5 Trust Relationships 
Trust relationship between two entities can be categorised as either direct 
or indirect (Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 1997; Almenarez et al., 2004; Tran et al., 
2005; Singh, 2011). Direct trust relations depend on the past interactions, 
experiences, and operations between two subjects without any other external 
resources. Since not all subjects know each other, each direct relation can be 
assigned an initial value and then change over time depending on actions. The 
direct trust relation is reliable when evaluating the Trust Value. On the other 
hand, the indirect relation depends on recommendations from a third party. For 
example, subject A is a recommender who recommends subject B to interact 
with subject C because there was a good experience between subject A and 
subject C in the past (Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 1997; Almenarez et al., 2004; 
Almenarez et al., 2005; Tran et al., 2005; Ma et al., 2008; Singh, 2011). 
Naturally, direct trust is more reliable than indirect trust to evaluate the user 
behaviour (Tran et al., 2005; Ma et al., 2008). The next Section describes how 
the Trust Value is calculated in different models.  
4.6 The Calculation of Trust Value (TV) 
Trust Based Access Control models use different techniques to calculate 
Trust Values depending on their system design, needs, and goals. Each system 
finds the most effective factors in Trust Value and then includes them in the 
calculations. Some models for Trust Based Access Control depend on both direct 
and indirect relations to calculate the Trust Value (Almenarez et al., 2004; 
Almenarez et al., 2005; Tran et al., 2005; Almenarez et al., 2006; Zhang and 
Rao, 2010; Singh, 2011). Other models are based only on direct relations and 
interactions between entities in calculation processes (Xing et al., 2010; Zhao et 
al., 2010). Other factors such as reputation, contribution, and domain trust are 
also included in calculation evaluations (Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 1997; Tran 
et al., 2005; Feng et al., 2008; Ma et al., 2008; Singh, 2011).  
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In the context of networks, many methods have been proposed and used 
to calculate the Trust Value between entities. These methods and equations are 
discussed in this Section. Almenarez et al. (2006) used a mathematical model to 
calculate and recalculate the Trust Value depending on the past and present 
operations. This model is based on equation (1). 
   {
              (      )           
     (         )                
        (1) 
In formula (1),     means the recalculated Trust Value and       means 
the previous value. Where   is a difference percentage that connects with the 
subjects’ disposition in the past and the present.     is the weight variable that 
depends on past operations and is calculated according to action weight. They 
developed a probabilistic model to calculate the action value based on evaluating 
user behaviour. This model uses Bayes’ theorem. It was recommended by 
authors to handle risk management in their future work (Almenarez et al., 2006). 
The trust management system designed by Zhang and Rao (2010), which 
includes four parts: subject manager, trust manager, action monitor, and 
recommendation manager. The subject manager handles subject information 
such as subject trust value. The trust manager calculates the Trust Value using 
equation (1), which is similar to the previous model. The action monitor records 
subjects’ behaviour and the recommendation manager to handle the indirect trust 
relationship.  
 Lin et al. (2006) discussed the formal equation to calculate the Trust 
Value between two entities.  
      
∑    
 
   (  )   (  ) 
 
         (2) 
This equation (2) calculates the Trust Value between two parties P1 and 
P2 from P1’s prospective. Where   is the time for previous operations between 
them;   reflects the number of interactions;    is behaviours interaction;    is the 
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observed value for these behaviours;    is expected value for these behaviours 
(Lin et al., 2006).  
As mentioned above, any related factor can be included in the 
calculation. The contribution factor that is based on measuring the shared data in 
megabytes is included in calculating Trust Value by Tran et al. (2005). Likewise, 
Feng et al. (2008) include the reputation evaluation in the Trust Value, as in 
equation (3). The reputation is based on the evaluation of past interactions for 
the user by other users. 
         (   )                 (3) 
Where α refers to the weight given by the system, t means the local 
reputation and T is global reputation. The local reputation reflects the evaluation 
process between two nodes while the global reputation covers the whole 
network, which means all nodes evaluate the specific node. 
The trust calculation can be calculated simply by adding the direct Trust 
Value and the indirect Trust Value and multiplying each value with its weight 
(Singh, 2011).  
                         (4) 
Equation (4) shows that Trust Value depends on direct Trust Value   , 
recommended Trust Value     and their weights     and    . This simple 
concept in calculating Trust Values is used in the proposed model in this thesis. 
It is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
The maximum and minimum values are used to keep the Trust Value in 
the correct range (Xing et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2010). Some Trust Based 
Access Control modules use flowcharts to explain how their systems work step 
by step, from request to access resources (Tran et al., 2005; Feng et al., 2008; 
Ma et al., 2008). Some models implement their approach by using SUN’s 
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XACML API that depends on XACML (Almenarez et al., 2005; Zhang and Rao, 
2010; Singh, 2011). XACML is used to write and describe the access policies in 
XML. This was discussed earlier in Section 3.2. 
Trust Based Access Control can be mixed with other types of access 
control to add dynamic features to the system such as RBAC (Xing et al., 2010; 
Zhao et al., 2010) and ABAC (Zhang et al., 2013). Yuan and Tong (2005) 
mentioned that mixing between access control types to utilise all their 
advantages is a normal process.  
From discussing the existing method to calculate the Trust Value (TV), it 
appears that there is no golden rule for calculations. However, some ideas in 
different approaches can be changed slightly and adopted to fit the system design 
in this thesis. 
There is no published literature relating to the use of Trust Based Access 
Control in the context of databases in general and in the XML area in particular 
except the research papers that relate to this thesis. The aims of applying trust to 
XML databases were described in Chapter 5. The system design is described in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter described the main concepts in Trust Based Access Control. 
It classified the trust relationship into direct trust and indirect trust. Several 
methods to calculate Trust Value were discussed. Although, these models 
described Trust Based Access Control in network area, the general aspect can be 
adopted to XML databases. The next Chapter described the research motivations 
and objectives of applying Trust Based Access Control for XML databases. 
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5 THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter presents the motivation for this research in Section 5.2 and 
the research hypothesis in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, the main objective, which 
is to develop a dynamic access model that is responsive to an evaluation of 
users’ history, is explained. The model tracks users’ errors and bad transactions 
over time and updates their privileges dynamically. The system prevents 
outsiders’ attacks as well as insiders’ malicious processes, effectively preventing 
users from taking advantage of their role.    
5.2 Research Motivation 
In this Section, the various motivations behind this research are 
highlighted. The discussion starts by explaining in Section 5.2.1 the importance 
of using XML databases as opposed to traditional databases. Section 5.2.2 then 
explains why the research scope is concerned with the security issues in XML 
databases. Section 5.2.3 motivates the real need to improve access control for 
both outsiders and insiders. Overall, the motivation for this research is to 
develop and improve security in XML databases. 
5.2.1 The Importance of XML Databases 
In the last decade XML has become well established and used in a wide 
range of areas and applications such as the web, businesses, information 
systems, and databases (Abiteboul et al., 2000; Champion, 2001; Tidwell, 2002; 
Oqbuji, 2004b; Vakali et al., 2005; Anderson, 2008; Jonge, 2008; Whatley, 
2009; W3C, 2010; Palani, 2011; Sun and Wang, 2011; Abd El-Aziz and Kannan, 
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2012b; Abd El-Aziz and Kannan, 2012c; Noaman and Almansour, 2012; Verma 
et al., 2012; Desai, 2013; Vela et al., 2013; W3Schools, 2013a). Due to the 
recent increase in their usage, much research has been undertaken to improve 
their efficiency. XML is used to store, transfer, and manipulate data. It has many 
advantages; it is readable for both humans and machines. It is flexible, simple, 
and self-descriptive (Abiteboul et al., 2000; Champion, 2001; Tidwell, 2002; 
Vakali et al., 2005; Jonge, 2008; Whatley, 2009; W3C, 2010; Palani, 2011; 
W3Schools, 2013a). This was discussed further in Chapter 2. As a result of this 
flexibility, the use of XML databases can be expected to improve and develop. 
5.2.2 Security in XML Databases 
Having data is a power but it must be dealt with in an appropriate and 
accurate manner (Griffin et al., 2012). Much of the research on XML focuses on 
storage strategies and query performance. Although data storage and retrieval 
techniques are important, so is security and, in comparison, this seems to be a 
neglected research area. XML databases are multi-user systems, meaning they 
can be accessed by millions of users, and they can provide a huge amount of 
data. In all applications and especially in platforms such as business and medical 
applications, XML databases can contain sensitive, personal, and important data. 
Confidential data needs to be protected and saved in a secure environment for 
legal reasons and in order to prevent loss or misuse. Security for XML databases 
is therefore crucial in protecting data from unauthorised processes and misuse 
(Sun and Wang, 2011; Griffin et al., 2012; Noaman and Almansour, 2012; 
Verma et al., 2012; Desai, 2013).  
One of the main approaches to guarantee security in any system, not just 
XML databases, is to apply access control. The access control model manages 
access to data and prevents unauthorised processes (Murata et al., 2006; Sun and 
Wang, 2011; Verma et al., 2012; Desai, 2013). There has been extensive 
research in this area but still there are many points that need to be investigated.  
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5.2.3 Trust Based Access Control (TBAC) 
Many different models for XML database access control have been 
proposed and developed (see Chapter 3). They can be categorised into three core 
categories: Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC), and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) (Sandhu et al., 1996; Hitchens 
and Varadharajan, 2001; Wang and Osborn, 2004; Zhu et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 
2009; Xing et al., 2010). There are many other types that are non-traditional, 
such as function based access control and purpose based access control (Qi et al., 
2005; Sun et al., 2010; Sun and Wang, 2011; Fiebig et al., 2012). Some of these 
models have been applied to provide a secure environment for XML databases. 
Most traditional access control models protect data from the malicious activities 
of outside users but cannot protect the data from insiders. They cannot easily 
provide protection for privacy data (Chagarlamudi et al., 2009; Xing et al., 2010; 
Sun and Wang, 2011). Research has highlighted that damage caused by insiders, 
who know the system, is more harmful than that of outsiders (Park and 
Giordano, 2006; Xing et al., 2010). Moreover, internal users may abuse their 
role and take advantage of their position in the system. The insider threat is a 
huge topic in data security and many methods have been proposed to identify 
misuse behaviour (Yi and Brajendra, 2003; Chinchani et al., 2005; 
Chagarlamudi et al., 2009); yet there has been no work by other authors on 
dynamic updates to access privileges in relation to trust for XML databases. 
Trust Based Access Control is established and used in many areas, such 
as networks and virtual organisations. It depends on a trust management system, 
which automatically calculates and updates the Trust Values of users. Trust 
Values rely on users’ behaviours, histories, credit, and operations. Users can 
access resources through Trust Values and levels (Cahill et al., 2003; Bhatti et 
al., 2004; Almenarez et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2006; Feng et al., 2008; Ma et al., 
2008; Lang et al., 2009; Xing et al., 2010; Farooqi and North, 2011a; Farooqi 
and North, 2011b; Singh, 2011; Farooqi and North, 2012c; Farooqi and North, 
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2012a; Farooqi and North, 2012b; Farooqi and North, 2012d; Farooqi and North, 
2013). This was discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
5.3 The Research Hypothesis 
Working in the light of motivations in the previous Section, this research 
aims to test the following hypothesis: 
“Since the Trust Based Access Control (TBAC) approach has been 
applied successfully in many areas, such as networks and virtual 
organisations, it may also improve security in the XML database research field 
by providing security to protect sensitive and confidential data from misuse by 
both outsiders and insiders while not restricting appropriate access.” 
In this thesis, this hypothesis is investigated by a practical 
implementation that is tested and evaluated. The implementation covers many 
concepts: calculating trust factors, developing log files, and managing access 
processes to XML databases. Then, it has been tested and evaluated with several 
XML databases of different sizes and structures as well as with different 
numbers of users.  
5.4 The Research Objectives and Contributions 
Considering the problems of the traditional access control model 
mentioned in Section 5.2.3 and applying the research hypothesis that is 
formalised in Section 5.3, this research has three objectives; they are described 
in the following Sections. 
5.4.1 Appling the Trust Based Access Approach to XML Databases 
Since the trust based approach is considered to be one of the new types of 
access control systems (Lin et al., 2006; Ma et al., 2008), its benefits have not 
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yet been applied to XML databases (Farooqi and North, 2011a; Farooqi and 
North, 2011b; Farooqi and North, 2012c; Farooqi and North, 2012d; Farooqi and 
North, 2012a; Farooqi and North, 2012b; Farooqi and North, 2013). Applying 
trust factors may make the XML databases’ environment more reliable. This 
mainly depends on using evaluation processes to prevent misuse and encapsulate 
the access process to make it more secure. Including a trust notion in access 
procedure makes this approach quite realistic and simulates the trust concept in 
the real world. 
5.4.2 Extending Dynamic and Automatic Access Control to XML 
Databases 
One of the most important features of Trust Based Access Control is that 
it is dynamic. Compared with traditional approaches to access control, which are 
static, Trust Based Access Control can make access systems responsive and 
active (Abiteboul et al., 2000; Champion, 2001; Vakali et al., 2005; W3C, 2010; 
Xing et al., 2010; Farooqi and North, 2011a; Farooqi and North, 2011b; Sun and 
Wang, 2011; Farooqi and North, 2012c; Farooqi and North, 2012a; Farooqi and 
North, 2012b; Farooqi and North, 2012d; Farooqi and North, 2013; W3Schools, 
2013a). This approach aims to use a trust management system that automatically 
calculates users’ Trust Values. The Trust Values are then updated according to 
an evaluation of the user’s history. 
5.4.3 Improving the Access Control Security Level for XML Databases and 
User Performance 
This model improves data security by evaluating users’ histories and 
operations. This approach extends the established work by considering errors 
when calculating Trust Values. Therefore, users’ permissions and privileges can 
change in response to their behaviour (Farooqi and North, 2011a; Farooqi and 
North, 2011b; Farooqi and North, 2012c; Farooqi and North, 2012a; Farooqi and 
North, 2012b; Farooqi and North, 2012d; Farooqi and North, 2013). This 
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approach leads to a side effect that is concerned with users’ performance. While 
simultaneously increasing the level of security, this approach can be expected to 
improve the quality of users’ performances by recording their operations.  
5.5 Conclusion 
It is important to tackle security problems in XML databases to reduce 
misuse and attacks. Improving access control work is vital to protect the 
sensitive data and provide a secure environment for users. This approach aims to 
combine detecting insider threats and improving access control by using trust-
based access control. It proposes using trust notions to protect personal data and 
provide a range of values for accessibility to data. It aims to evaluate users’ 
histories of errors and bad transactions and change their access depending on 
their behaviour. It attempts to improve the access control performance for XML 
databases by providing a dynamic and automatic system.  
This Chapter endeavoured to highlight the research motivations and 
define the thesis’ objectives. The research hypothesis is formulated by applying 
Trust Based Access Control for XML databases. The next Chapter gives an 
overview of the design Trust Based Access Control for XML databases. 
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6 TRUST BASED ACCESS CONTROL (TBAC) 
FOR XML DATABASES  
6.1 Introduction 
Trust based access is an established technique in many fields, such as 
networks and distributed systems, but has not previously been used for any sort 
of databases. As mentioned in Chapter 4, in Trust Based Access Control, user 
privileges are calculated dynamically depending on the user’s Trust Value. 
Applying the technique to XML databases might be expected to have advantages 
over current techniques. 
This Chapter presents Trust Based Access Control for XML databases. It 
discusses the system generally before going into detail in Chapters 7 and 8. In 
this Chapter, a general overview of the system is given in Section 6.2. Then, in 
Section 6.3, the system’s main components are explained and their functions are 
described. Besides showing the system concepts, the rules to manage exceptional 
situations are defined in Sections 6.4 and 6.6. The Chapter ends with a general 
conclusion that leads to the following Chapters – 7 and 8 – which explain the 
system’s components in detail. 
6.2 The System Overview 
In order to improve security and provide dynamic access control for 
XML databases, Trust Based Access Control for XML databases has been 
developed. It aims to provide secure access control by detecting insider threats 
through evaluating users’ operations over time. Trust Based Access Control for 
XML databases manages the access policy depending on users’ trustworthiness 
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and may prevent unauthorised processes, malicious transactions, and misuse 
from insiders. Outsiders who are not related to the system can be assumed to 
have no access right but outsiders impersonating insiders should be detected. 
Trust scores are updated on the basis of users’ histories. Privileges are 
automatically modified and adjusted over time depending on user behaviour to 
deal with insider threats. 
Trust Based Access Control for XML databases is based on direct trust 
and ignores indirect trust (see Section 4.5). Direct trust focuses on users’ 
operations and errors. Indirect trust depends on recommendations and therefore 
is largely irrelevant in this context. In this system, some specific operations are 
defined for monitoring misused. Errors are even though they do not reflect 
malicious intent. In real life, the person who makes many mistakes is probably 
not reliable. Such a person could not be trusted to handle important transactions 
and access sensitive data (Trochim, 2006; Mobley, 2011). The next Section 
describes the system’s components in outline and explains the main functions of 
each part.  
6.3 The System Components 
In this Section, a Trust Based Access Control module for XML databases 
is described. Users access the system through the simple user interface. The user 
interface receives the access request to the XML database as an XML query then 
sends it to the system. The module consists of two main parts: the trust module 
and the access control module. The trust module is responsible for recording 
errors and bad transactions, evaluating them, and calculating the new Trust 
Value. The access control module is responsible for the access permission policy 
and access decisions. Both modules are explained in detail in the next two 
Chapters 7 and 8. The system uses the concept of designed structure proposed by 
Zhang and Rao (2010) as a guide to design its structure. The architecture of 
Trust Based Access Control for XML databases is shown in Figure 6.1.  
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Figure ‎6.1 The structure of Trust Based Access Control for XML databases 
6.3.1 The Trust Module 
The trust module is constructed of many parts that work together to 
achieve the main goal of calculating users’ Trust Values. These parts consist of 
an error detector, an operation evaluator, an operation recorder, and a trust 
calculator. Both the error detector and operation evaluator work in the light of 
the error policy file and the operation policy file and capture bad operations and 
errors. Each of these policy files has the role of defining what an error or a bad 
transaction is. The operation recorder records errors and bad transactions in the 
XLog file. The XLog file is designed to be dynamic and to be stored only 
temporarily for a set period to reduce storage and improve search performance. 
The trust calculator uses the data recorded in the XLog file in its calculation. The 
main goal of the trust calculator is to compute a new Trust Value that depends 
on the user’s history of bad transactions and errors.  
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6.3.2 Access Control Module 
The access control module consists of the access manager and the access 
decision maker. The access manager deals with access permission policies that 
primarily depend on Trust Value (TV). These policies are divided into subject 
policy and object policy. A Trust Value is assigned to the subject and the object 
policy concentrates on giving each item of data the appropriate Trust Value.  
The access decision maker handles the XML query and then either 
permits or denies the request. The final decision depends directly on defined 
access permission policies in the access manager. The Trust Value (TV) of the 
user is compared with the Trust Value (TV) of the required XML data. If the 
Trust Value (TV) for users equals or is larger than the Trust Value (TV) of data, 
then the user is allowed to access the data; otherwise access is denied. The whole 
system combining both modules is explained in the next Section. 
6.4 The System Processes 
The trust module is connected to the access control module to form the 
complete system. The system processes can be characterised into two main 
classifications: access supervision and trust maintenance. The access supervision 
process is always run for each access to the system. The trust maintenance 
process occurs frequently but depends on the organisation’s policy for updating 
the users’ Trust Value, therefore it could run weekly, daily or hourly.  
The access supervision process contains a series of small processes. This 
series starts by receiving an XML query and detecting errors and/or bad 
transactions, then recording them in the log. The trust maintenance process also 
consists of a sequence of small processes. These processes evaluate errors and 
bad transactions, calculating a new Trust Value and updating users’ privileges. 
The whole system is illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure ‎6.2 The‎system’s‎processes 
6.5 The Objectives of Policy Files 
The policy files contain rules. In this Section, the goals of using the 
policy files are described. The policy rules depend on the organisation policy 
that differ from one organisation to another. Organisations that contain much 
sensitive and personal data, such as banks, normally use strict policy rules to 
provide high level of security to the system. Other organisations may not be 
concerned about security issues but may focus on processes’ speed, which need 
more flexible and simple policy rules. 
 In this experimental Trust Based Access Control for an XML databases 
system, some very basic policy rules are recorded in policy files but they can 
easily be extended to cover many other complicated policies. The system divides 
the policy rules into sub rules and records them in individual policy files. The 
idea of this division is to make the policy rules clear and easy to update and 
change. Each policy file contains a group of rules related to the specific part in 
the system. 
The policy file is a standard XML file and has defined tags that related to 
the recorded policy rules. Policy files are written in XML even though there are 
other access policy languages, which are mentioned in Chapter 3, because these 
languages do not fit well with Trust Based Access Control properties. These 
languages depend on DAC, RBAC and ABAC. Furthermore, XML is the 
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original language and other access languages are derived from it. Using XML 
makes the policy file clear, easy to use, and flexible; simultaneously, ensuring 
the file type is consistent with the rest of the system. 
  There are five different policy files: error, operation, trust, XML 
database’s access permission, and user access permission policy files. The error 
policy file and the operation policy file have the rules to define what an error and 
a bad transaction is. They are used by the error detector and the operation 
evaluator to capture errors and bad transactions. The trust policy file provides 
the rules to calculate the Trust Value used by the trust calculator. Both the XML 
database access permission policy file and user access permission policy file are 
required by the access manager. The XML databases’ access permission policy 
file contains the trust rules to access XML databases by assigning each node an 
appropriate Trust Value. The user permission access policy file contains the 
Trust Value for each user in the system. This file is relatively dynamic because 
the Trust Values for users change over time according to their behaviour. The 
structure and the content of each policy file are described with the related part of 
the system in Chapters 7 and 8. 
6.6 Boundary Management 
Boundary management aims to define basic rules to avoid anomalous 
situations that may occur in the system over time. As any database’s system, the 
administrator manages the policy rules mentioned in the Section 6.4 and assigns 
the Trust Values for data and assigns users initial Trust Values based on their 
roles. The administrator must be authorised to handle any exceptional 
circumstances that may have occurred in the system.  
One of the critical points in the system is the handling calculation Trust 
Value for users. Since, the Trust Value is dynamic and updated over time; it may 
cause other access problems such as a Trust Value dropping until it blocks the 
user’s access completely. The boundaries for Trust Values are designed to 
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control the change in the Trust Value and to make sure the user’s access is 
within the right ranges. There are two main boundaries: the maximum and the 
minimum. Both values depend on organisational policy and are related to the 
role of users in the system. The maximum value is the highest Trust Value that 
the user can reach and the minimum value is the lowest Trust Value the user can 
fall to. 
 These boundaries control the powers and permissions of the access in 
the system. The maximum ensures that user access only the authorised data and 
the minimum prevents blocking data. This point is adopted from models 
proposed by Xing et al. (2010) and Zhao et al. (2010). For example, the Trust 
Value for the manager could be between the maximum value 1 and the minimum 
value 0.75 (1>= TV>=0.75). Within this range the Trust Value for the manager 
can change according to behaviour. Any member of staff whose Trust Value 
approached the minimum too often could be considered a threat. Boundary 
management can be easily modified to cover other organisations’ strategies to 
handle future risks that the system may face.   
6.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter described the general approach to Trust Based Access 
Control for XML databases. It showed the system’s components and explained 
their main functions. The main rules, which are easily modified, for the system 
policy and risk management were defined. The system outlined here consists of 
two main modules: the trust module that is described in detail in Chapter 7 and 
the access control module that is fully described in Chapter 8. 
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7 THE TRUST MODULE 
7.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the previous Chapter, Trust Based Access Control for 
XML databases consists of two main modules: the trust module and the 
access control module. In this Chapter, the trust module and its components 
are described in detail. The outlines of the module are given in Section 7.2. 
Then each component of the module is explained separately. Section 7.3 
shows how the operation evaluator works using the operation policy file. The 
error detector and the rules of defining errors are described in Section 7.4. In 
Section 7.5, the operation recorder is mentioned, the recording process in the 
XLog file is described, and the structure and features of the XLog file are 
highlighted. Then, the calculation of Trust Value is described in Section 7.6. 
Finally, a conclusion, summarising the main points, is given in Section 7.7.  
7.2 The Trust Module Overall 
The trust module is the main part of the Trust Based Access Control 
system for XML databases. It receives XML queries from users through the 
user interface, evaluates their queries and calculates their Trust Value. The 
evaluation process depends on the users existing Trust Value and new bad 
transactions and errors. After calculating the new Trust Value for the user, it 
will send the Trust Value to the access control module to update the user’s 
privileges. The trust module aims to: 
 Detect bad transactions and errors in the XML query using policy rules for 
errors and bad transactions. 
 Evaluate bad transactions and errors and assign appropriate weights to them.  
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 Calculate the user’s new Trust Value using the policy rules. 
This module consists of many parts: the operation evaluator, the error 
detector, the operation recorder, and the trust calculator. Each part has its 
functions and works in the light of the related policy rules. All these parts are 
connected together to achieve the main goal of calculating Trust Values for 
users. These components are described in detail in the next Sections.   
7.3  The Operation Evaluator  
The operation evaluator is a component of the trust module. It handles 
XML queries, checks processes, and captures bad and malicious transactions. 
The evaluation process for the XML query depends on the policy rules 
defined in the operation policy file. It is integrated with the access decision 
maker in the access control module in that they work coherently together. It 
shares the Trust Value for users and data with the access decision maker 
allowing it to detect the unauthorised bad transactions. The operation policy 
file contains the rules which define a bad transaction. In the experimental 
Trust Based Access Control for XML databases, this file contains only five 
basic types of bad transactions. These rules are:  
 Read unauthorised node: this rule means that the user tries to access the 
content of a node for which he does not have the right to. 
 Write unauthorised node: this rule aims to detect transactions when the 
user tries to write a new node or update the content of an existing node for 
which his Trust Value is insufficient. 
 Delete unauthorised node: this rule captures the situation when the user 
attempts to delete a specific node but is not allowed to by his Trust Value.  
 Delete root node: this rule discovers if the user intended to delete the root 
node in the XML database, which would cause catastrophic damage to the 
XML database. 
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 Delete parent node with existing children: this rule means that the user 
wanted to delete a node that has children. Such a transaction affects the 
XML database’s structure and content and so is not permitted. 
These operation policy rules aim to detect unauthorised transactions 
(read- write-delete) and transactions that cause damage to the structure and 
content of the XML database. They can be easily extended to cover other 
situations to detect myriad bad transactions. Organisations can define these 
rules according to their system strategies.  
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the operation policy file is written in 
XML. It is treated as a standard XML file. Some specific defined tags are 
used to record rules. The root node is defined using <Bad Transactions>. Then 
each bad transaction rule is defined using <Transaction>. This transaction tag 
contains two sub elements: <ID> and <Type>. The <ID> is the identifier for 
each rule. The <Type> defines the rule of each bad transaction. Figure 7.1 
shows the structure of the operation policy file. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎7.1 The operation policy file 
<Bad Transactions> 
<Transaction > 
<ID> 1 </ID> 
<Type> Read unauthorised node </Type > 
</Transaction> 
<Transaction > 
<ID> 2 </ID> 
<Type> Write unauthorised node </Type > 
</Transaction> 
<Transaction > 
<ID> 3 </ID> 
<Type> Delete unauthorised node </Type > 
</Transaction> 
<Transaction > 
<ID> 4 </ID> 
<Type> Delete root node </Type > 
</Transaction> 
<Transaction > 
<ID> 5 </ID> 
<Type> Delete parent node with existing children</Type > 
</Transaction> 
</Bad Transactions> 
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7.4 The Error Detector  
The error detector is part of the trust module. The error detector aims 
to capture errors in users’ transactions. The process of detecting errors 
depends on the policy rules defined in the error policy file. In general, it 
works similarly to the operation evaluator. It receives the user queries, checks 
their accuracy, and detects errors in transactions. Like the operation evaluator, 
the error detector works with the access control module through sharing the 
Trust Value for users and data with the access decision maker to detect errors 
in transactions. When an error is detected, it is included in the evaluation 
process for user behaviour because it reflects on the user reliability when 
accessing important and sensitive data.   
The error policy file includes the policy rules of defining errors. Only 
three simple types of errors are used in the practical Trust Based Access 
Control for XML databases: 
 Read non-existent node: this rule means that the user wanted to access a 
node that is not in the XML databases. 
 Write non-existent node: this rule discovers if the user aimed to add or 
update a node that is not defined in the structure of the XML database. A 
normal user cannot give a Trust Value to the non-existent node because 
that is the administrator’s responsibility. The user can add a new node that 
is found in the XML database’s structure and has its own Trust Value. The 
write process is limited based on the XML database’s access permission 
policy file that is described in Section 8.3.   
 Delete non-existent node: this rule means that the user wanted to delete a 
node that did not exist in the XML database. 
The error rules focus on accessing (read-write-delete) non-existent 
nodes. Like the bad transaction rules, they can easily be extended to cover 
other policies. Furthermore, although these rules do not depend on the 
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existence of a schema – a fixed structure for the XML document – they could 
easily be extended to cover problems that affect the XML file structure when 
there is a schema.  
The error policy file is a standard XML file that uses some specific 
tags to define what an error in the system is. The root node is defined by 
<Errors>. Each error is defined by <Error> and all errors are classified by their 
identifier and type. The <ID> tag is used to identify each rule. The <Type> 
defines the rule. The structure of the error policy file is described in Figure 
7.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎7.2. The error policy file 
7.5 The Operation Recorder 
The operation recorder is also a component in the trust module. It 
aims to store bad transactions and errors for users and provide these recorded 
operations to the trust calculator. After the operation evaluator and the error 
detector capture bad transactions and errors, the operation recorder registers 
these bad transactions and errors in the XLog file. This XLog file is used by 
the trust calculator to calculate the new Trust Value. 
<Errors> 
   <Error > 
      <ID> 1 </ID> 
<Type> Read nonexistent node</Type > 
    </Error> 
   <Error > 
       <ID> 2 </ID> 
 <Type> Write nonexistent node </Type > 
    </Error> 
    <Error > 
        <ID> 3 </ID> 
  <Type> Delete nonexistent node</Type > 
   </Error> 
</Errors > 
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Logging is an important process in databases and is used for recovery 
and security purposes. Logging in XML databases has rarely been discussed in 
the literature. The main purpose of logging in normal databases is to record 
transaction information that is used for recovery when the system crashes and 
sometimes for concurrency control (Elmasri and Navathe, 2007; H. Molina  et 
al., 2009); it can also be useful for security purposes to track malicious 
transactions in databases (Etoh et al., 2010). The main classifications in logging 
are: undo logging, redo logging, and undo/redo logging, all of which are used 
mainly to restore data (Elmasri and Navathe, 2007; H. Molina  et al., 2009). 
Logs can be represented as tables in databases or files. Log files can be written 
in various syntaxes, formats, and languages. Wang et al. (2006) suggest that 
using XML to create the log file saves both time and space compared to tables. 
In this system the XLog file is used, not for recovery, but to calculate 
user Trust Values by temporarily recording users’ bad transactions and errors. 
It is described in the following Sections. 
7.5.1 The XLog File 
The XLog file for XML databases with Trust Based Access Control, 
unlike conventional log files, is focused on security rather than recovery. 
Thus the XLog file will: 
 Support a secure environment for access control of XML databases. 
 Track user operations and behaviour by recording and organising their 
actions. 
 Produce a log file that can be used to calculate a Trust Value that directly 
affects user access privileges. 
It is dynamic and temporary as it is retained only for a certain period 
of time depending on the organisation’s policy, such as a session, a day, or a 
week. The XLog file is written in XML and is processed as a normal XML 
file. Its structure differs from a normal log file, since it depends on the user 
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identifier instead of time and transaction identifier. Using this structure makes 
capturing user behaviour fast and easy. It does not need to record the time for 
each transaction because it is irrelevant to the calculation of trust. 
In this file, the root node is defined by <Users>. Bad transactions and 
errors are grouped for each user by using <User>. The <User> tag consists of 
three kinds of sub elements: <ID>, <Bad Transaction>, and <Error>. The <ID> 
tag indicates the user identification. The <Bad Transaction> tag refers to the 
identifier of a specific bad transaction defined in the operation policy file. The 
< Error> tag indicates the identifier of the error rule that is defined in the error 
policy file. The structure of the XLog file is shown in Figure 7.3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎7.3 The XLog file 
7.5.2  XLog File Features 
As mentioned above, the main purpose of the XLog file is to record 
user behaviour. The features of this file are discussed in this section. The 
majority of its advantages appear through applying a simple structure and 
using the XML to write the XLog file. Consequently, the XLog file adopts the 
advantages of XML such as flexibility and simplicity (Ray, 2003; W3C, 
2010; W3Schools, 2013a). The important features are discussed below. 
 Temporary: the XLog file is created to be used for a certain period 
depending on the organisation’s needs. The organisation and the system 
administrator can define how long the XLog file will exist. The period 
<Users> 
   <User > 
     <ID> 30 </ID> 
     <Bad Transaction> 1 </Bad Transaction> 
     <Bad Transaction> 4 </Bad Transaction>      
     <Error> 1 </Error> 
     <Error> 3 </Error> 
      … 
     </User> 
</Users> 
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could be a session, a day, or a week. After using data from the XLog file 
to calculate users’ trust by the trust calculator and update their privileges 
by the access manager, the XLog file is destroyed. This leads to another 
feature; the XLog file consumes little storage. 
 Dynamic: one of the main features of the XLog file is that it is dynamic 
and updated regularly. It reflects misuse as soon as it occurs. This feature 
is derived from its transient nature. The XLog file is temporary; it is 
amended to record each fresh transaction and thus contains all recent data. 
 Consumes little storage: as a result of its temporary and dynamic 
structure, the XLog file contains only recent processes. Furthermore, this 
storage is only retained for a defined period.  
 Flexible: the XLog file is flexible in that it is written in XML. XML gives 
the users the freedom to create their own tags according as necessary. 
Even the XLog file structure, defined in the previous Section, can be 
changed by the administrator and tags can be amended to serve particular 
needs. 
 Simple: the XLog file is created to be simple. Through using XML, the 
XLog file becomes easy to use and understandable for both humans and 
machines. 
 Interrelated with other files: the XLog file can be related easily and 
smoothly with the operation policy file and the error policy file. The 
content refers to other files by using reference identification <ID>. The 
organisation can extend errors and bad operations types in the policy files 
and these can be automatically related to and recorded in the XLog file.  
 Consistent environment: since the motivation of creating the XLog file 
is to serve XML databases’ security, the XLog file is obviously best 
written in XML. 
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7.6 The Trust Calculator  
The trust calculator is one of the principal parts in the trust module. It 
calculates the new Trust Value for the users. It finds both bad transactions 
and errors recorded in the XLog file and depends on the trust policy file to 
make the calculations. After calculating the new Trust Value, this trust 
calculator integrates with the access decision maker to update the Trust Value 
for the users.  
The majority of trust-based access control models define their policy 
to calculate Trust Value according to their system’s needs. They specify 
which factors are considered in their calculations and then define the rules 
and equations (see Chapter 4). The calculation process and the structure of the 
trust policy file for this system are described in detail in the next Sections.  
7.6.1 Calculating Trust Values 
 A new Trust Value (TV) is a float value in the range [0, 1]. 0 denotes 
the lowest value of trustworthiness and 1 refers to the highest value. The new 
Trust Value (TV) is generated using three values: Existing Trust Value 
(ETV), Bad Transaction Factor (BTF), and Error Factor (EF). Each factor is 
multiplied by a weight that reflects the importance of the factor in the system 
and shows to what extent the factor affects the final Trust Value (TV). Each 
weight is a percentage that shows how much the factor will affect the general 
equation and the new Trust Value (TV).  
The weights are Existing Trust Value Weight (ETVW), Bad 
Transaction Factor Weight (BTFW), and Error Factor Weight (EFW). All 
ETVW, BTFW, and EFW percentages can be set in line with the 
organisation’s policies. For example, if the organisation does not consider the 
Error Factor important then EFW can be 1% but if the organisation considers 
the error rate to be important then EFW it could be 10%. 
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Both Bad Transaction Factor Weight (BTFW) and Error Factor 
Weight (EFW) range between 1% and 10%. The Existing Trust Value Weight 
(ETVW) range is between 80% and 98%. Range values are selected to keep 
the Trust Value (TV) within suitable bounds. The maximum for both bad 
transaction and error weights is 10% and not higher because the aim of the 
system is to adjust user privilege according to behaviour and not to block user 
access completely. For example, if this weight much higher say as 50%, then 
the Trust Value (TV) would drop suddenly and dramatically and may cause 
other access problems. The Existing Trust Value Weight (ETVW) is regarded 
as the basic value to calculate the new TV. The new TV is derived from the 
existing one and this explains why its weight should be high. In the practice 
the range between 80% and 98% was used. This was arrived at by series of 
experiments.  
The trust calculator completes the calculation process for the new 
Trust Value in a number of steps: 
 Find the number of bad transactions and the number of errors recorded in 
the XLog file. 
 Assign values to both the Bad Transaction Factor and the Error Factor 
depending on the trust policy file. 
 Assign weights to each factor of ETVW, BTFW, and EFW depending on 
the trust policies. 
 Calculate the new Trust Value according to the equations that are 
recorded in the trust policy file. 
 Send the new Trust Value to the access decision maker to update the 
users’ privileges. 
The value of Bad Transaction Factor (BTF) depends on the Bad 
Transaction Number (BTNum) found in the XLog file. After the BTNum has 
been counted, the range for the BTF is selected. There are five ranges: 
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negligible, low, moderate, high, and extreme. These ranges are defined 
according to the organisation’s policy for classifying bad transactions.  
For the purposes of these experiments in Trust Based Access Control 
for XML databases, the ranges are defined as follows. The negligible range is 
used when there are no bad transactions in the XLog file and the BTF will be 
0. The low range is selected when the BTNum is between 1 and 5 bad 
transactions. Then BTF will be equal to 0.25. If the number of bad 
transactions is between 6 and 10, the moderate range is selected and the BTF 
will be 0.50. The high range reflects a BTNum between 11 and 15 and the 
BTF will be 0.75. The BTF reaches 1 when the BTNum fits into the extreme 
range that is defined to be larger than 15. Table 7.1 shows these ranges and 
the equivalent BTF. 
Table ‎7.1 The equivalent range for the Bad Transaction Number (BTNum) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Like the Bad Transaction Factor (BTF), the Error Factor (EF) is 
defined according to the Error Number (ENum) counted in the XLog file 
which leads to a range. The EF ranges are also negligible, low, moderate, 
high, and extreme. Each one reflects how many errors are detected in the 
XLog file. These ranges can be defined according to the organisation’s policy 
for classifying errors and are shown in Table 7.2. 
Range Name 
Bad Transaction 
Number (BTNum) 
Bad Transaction 
Factor (BTF) 
Negligible 0 0 
Low 0< BTNum< = 5 0.25 
Moderate 5< BTNum< =10 0.50 
High 10< BTNum < =15 0.75 
Extreme 15< BTNum 1 
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Table ‎7.2 The equivalent range for the Error Number (ENum) 
Range Name Error Number (ENum) Error Factor (EF) 
Negligible 0 0 
Low 0< ENum< = 5 0.25 
Moderate 5< ENum< =10 0.50 
High 10< ENum < =15 0.75 
Extreme 15< ENum 1 
 
After the trust calculator finds the BTF and the EF, the Trust Value (TV) 
is calculated. The TV increases when there are no bad transactions or errors but 
drops markedly when the Bad Transaction Factor (BTF), Error Factor (EF), or 
both increase. There are four different equations to calculate the Trust Value and 
each one applies to specific cases. Trust Value equations are: 
   {  
         (     )       (    )                            ( )
                                                                                          ( ) 
                                                                                             ( )
                                                                       ( )
 
Equation 1 is used to calculate Trust Value (TV) when there are no 
errors or bad transactions and Trust Value increases slightly. In this specific 
case, the three weights must sum to 1. This equation could be simplified, 
since it is used when the error and bad transaction factors are zero. It can be 
shown in the following simple form: 
                                                ( ). 
If there are errors or bad transactions, (2) or (3) is used to calculate the 
TV. In general, if there are bad transactions or errors the TV will decrease. As 
a consequence, the Bad Transaction Factor (BTF) is subtracted from the 
Existing Trust Value (ETV) in (2). The same principle applies to (3) when 
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there are only errors without bad transactions; the Error Factor (EF) is 
subtracted from Existing Trust Value (ETV). Equation 4 is used when there 
are both bad transactions and errors. It subtracts both the Bad Transaction 
Factor (BTF) and the Error Factor (EF) from Existing Trust Value (ETV) to 
find the new Trust Value (TV).  
Table 7.3 illustrates some examples of the calculation of a new Trust 
Value for some general cases when the Existing Trust Value (ETV) = 0.5. 
More examples and calculation case studies on the Trust Value will be 
mentioned in the experimental part of the trust module in Chapter 10. The 
next Section describes the trust policy file. 
Table ‎7.3 The calculation of Trust Value (TV) 
 
 
 
7.6.2 The Trust Policy File 
The trust policy file contains all policies that are related to the 
calculation of the Trust Value. These policies can be classified as the Bad 
Transaction Factor policy, the Error Factor policy, the weights policy, and the 
equations policy. The bad transactions policy is used to assign a value for 
BTF based on the number of errors recorded in the XLog file. The Error 
Factor (EF) policy aims to find the value for the EF using the number of 
errors in the XLog file. Both the Bad Transaction Factor policy and Error 
Factor policy were described in the previous Section (7.6.1). The weights 
policy stores the percentages of ETVW, BTFW, and EFW. These percentages 
are defined by the administrator according to the organisation strategies. The 
ETV ETVW EF EFW BTF BTFW TV 
0.5 85% 0 5% 0 10% 0.575 
0.5 85% 0.25 5% 0.25 10% 0.387 
0.5 85% 0.5 5% 0.5 10% 0.350 
0.5 85% 0.75 5% 0.75 10% 0.312 
0.5 85% 1 5% 1 10% 0.275 
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equations policy contains the equations that are used to calculate the new 
Trust Value. These equations were also explained earlier in Section 7.6.1.  
Like other policy files, the trust policy file is a standard XML file. It 
starts with the root node <New Trust Value>, which has four children. Each of 
these sub nodes represents one of the four policies. The Bad Transaction 
Factor policy is defined by <Bad Transaction Factor>. The Error Factor policy 
is defined by <Error Factor>. <Weights> is used to represent the weights 
policy. This node consists of three sub elements: <ETVW>, <BTFW>, and 
<EFW>. Each one of these elements contains a percentage for the specific 
factor. The equations policy is defined by <Equations>. This tag contains the 
equations syntax to calculate the new Trust Value. The structure of the trust 
policy file is shown in Figure 7.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎7.4 The trust policy file 
<New Trust Value > 
<Bad Transaction Factor > 
IF BTNUM=0    Then BTF=0, “Negligible”. 
IF 0<BTNUM<=5    Then BTF=0.25, “Low”. 
IF 5<BTNUM<=10    Then BTF=0.50, “Moderate”. 
IF 10<BTNUM<=15    Then BTF=0.75, “High”. 
IF 15 <BTNUM     Then BTF=1, “Extreme”. 
</Bad Transaction Factor > 
<Error Factor> 
IF ENUM=0    Then EF=0, “Negligible”. 
IF 0<ENUM<=5    Then EF=0.25, “Low”. 
IF 5<ENUM<=10    Then EF=0.50, “Moderate”. 
IF 10<ENUM<=15    Then EF=0.75, “High”. 
IF 15 <ENUM     Then EF=1, “Extreme”. 
</Error Factor> 
<Weights> 
<ETVW>85%</ETVW> 
<BTFW>10%</BTFW> 
<EFW>5%</EFW> 
</Weights> 
<Equations>  
Where EF=0 and BTF=0 Then TV= ETV*ETVW + (1-BTF)*BTFW + (1-EF)*EFW.   
Where EF=0 and BTF>0 Then TV= ETV*ETVW - BTF *BTFW.                              
Where EF>0 and BTF=0 Then TV= ETV*ETVW - EF *EFW.                            
Where EF>0 and BTF>0 Then TV= ETV*ETVW - EF*EFW - BTF*BTFW.            
</Equations> 
</New Trust Value> 
Chapter 7: THE TRUST MODULE 
 
79 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
The trust module is the first part of the system. It is integrated with the 
access control module to perform the system’s process. The trust module 
aims to capture the user behaviour and calculate the Trust Value. It consists 
of four components and all of them work together. The components’ 
functions depend on the policy files. Defining specific policies is difficult 
because the rules will be different from system to system and from one 
organisation to another. Therefore, policies are defined in general and can be 
changed or extended according to system and organisation needs. The second 
part of the system, which is the access control module, is described in the 
following Chapter. 
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8 THE ACCESS CONTROL MODULE 
8.1 Introduction 
The Trust Based Access Control for XML databases consists of two 
modules: the trust module and the access control module. The trust module was 
described in detail in the previous Chapter. In this Chapter the access control 
module is explained. This module consists of two parts: the access manager and 
the access decision maker. Section 8.2 gives the overall view of the access 
control module. The access manager is explained and the access permission 
policies for both users and data are described in Section 8.3. The access decision 
maker is described in 8.4. The conclusions are summarised in Section 8.5.   
8.2 Access Control Module Overall 
The access control module is connected to the trust module (see Chapter 
6), which is the other important part of the Trust Based Access Control system. 
The combination makes the access processes dynamic and responsive to the 
current evaluation of users’ Trust Values. The access control module: 
 Stores the access rules for both users and data in the policy files. 
 Checks the queries and makes the decision whether access is to be permitted 
or denied. 
 Searches and retrieves data from the XML database when access is approved. 
 Update users’ privileges depending on the Trust Values that are provided by 
the trust module.     
The access process in this module depends on the access manager and the 
access decision maker. The access manager deals with access policies; the access 
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decision maker determines, in the light of these policies, whether the access can 
be permitted or denied. Both the access manager and the access decision maker 
mechanisms are explained in the following Sections.  
8.3 Access Manager 
The main goal of the access manager is to store and handle permission 
policies, which are dependent on Trust Value. The access manager breaks down 
policies into two parts: subject policy related to the user and object policy related 
to the data. Subject policy uses the user’s identification, role, and trust factor. 
The identification is a serial number to distinguish users easily. The role is 
similar to ‘role’ in conventional access modules but in this system is far less 
significant. The role is given to the user in the initial stage. The Trust Value 
(TV) is dynamic and updated according to an evaluation of users’ behaviour 
over time. It is used to capture and prevent misuse by all users but especially 
from insiders who exploit their role and take advantage of their position. The 
initial TV for each user is assigned by the administrator and then it is changed, 
as described, according to users’ behaviour over time. 
The subject policy is recorded in a users’ access permission policy file. 
In this file, each user is assigned a Trust Value according to his history of errors 
and bad transactions. The variable TV provides different access permissions for 
the same role. For instance, the managers in the system can have different TVs 
from each other. At the same time, the TV is amended inside a specific range 
that is defined by using boundary management. As mentioned in Section 6.6, 
there are two boundaries: the maximum and the minimum boundary. The 
maximum boundary is the highest TV that the user can reach. The minimum 
boundary is the lowest TV. The idea of using this boundary is to change the 
access permission for users according to their behaviour and, at the same time, 
ensure the access permission is not blocked completely. For example, the highest 
boundary for staff is 0.75 and the minimum boundary is 0.5. Subsequently, the 
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TV for each member of staff can be increased or decreased inside this defined 
range. 
The users’ access permission policy file is written in XML and is handled 
as a standard XML file. Some specific tags are used to define the access 
permission for users. The file starts by the root node <Users> that includes all 
users in the system. The access privilege for each user is defined by using 
<User>, which consists of three sub elements: <ID>, <Role>, and <TV>. The <ID> 
refers to the user identification. The <Role> reflects the user role in the system. 
The role is recorded to support the boundary management that were described in 
Chapter 6. <TV> is the Trust Value for the user that manages the user’s privileges 
to access data. Figure 8.1 shows the structure of the users’ access permission 
file.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎8.1 The‎users’‎access‎permission‎policy‎file  
Like the subject policy, the data policy assigns a Trust Value to each item 
of data. A high Trust Value reflects that the data are sensitive and need higher 
levels of protections and vice versa. Each node has its own TV independent of 
other nodes. The required node is accessed through XPath to ensure that no 
<Users> 
<User> 
<ID> 1 </ID> 
<Role> manager </Role> 
<TV> 0.8 </TV> 
</User> 
<User> 
<ID> 57 </ID> 
<Role> staff </Role> 
<TV> 0. 50 </TV> 
</User> 
<User> 
. . . 
</User> 
. . .  
. . . 
</Users> 
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inappropriate node will face disclosure. For consistency, the parent node has the 
lowest TV that is assigned to any of its children. Compared to subject policy, 
data policy is far more static and rarely needs to change. The administrator is 
responsible for assigning the appropriate TV for each node. Using this strategy 
explains why the user cannot add new nodes that do not exist in the object 
policy. As mentioned in Chapter 7, this process is recorded as an error because 
when a normal user adds a new node that is not defined in the system and does 
not have a TV, he cannot assign the appropriate TV for it since that is the 
administrator’s responsibility. The administrator can add new nodes to the 
structure in XML files and assign the appropriate Trust Value for each node.     
The object policy is recorded in an XML database’s access permission 
policy file and is dealt with as a normal XML file. The file contains all nodes in 
the original XML database, but it is relatively small because it includes the 
nodes without repetition. Each node has the proper TV according to its 
sensitivity and importance. The file starts with the root node <Database> that 
includes all nodes. The TV for each node is a content of the <Node> element. 
The structure of this file is explained in Figure 8.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎8.2 The‎XML‎database’s‎access‎permission‎policy‎file 
8.4 Access Decision Maker 
The access decision maker is part of the access control module. It 
analyses the XML query and checks policies in the access manager to reach the 
<Database> 
<Node1 > 0.5  
  <Node2> 0.5 <Node2> 
  <Node3> 0.75 </Node3> 
</Node1> 
<Node4> 0.25 </Node4> 
 . . . 
 . . . 
</Database> 
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final decision whether to permit or deny the request. This process is carried out 
in a number of steps: 
 Search the Trust Value for the user in the users’ access permission policy 
file. 
 Search the Trust Value for the queried data in the XML databases’ access 
permission policy file. 
  Compare the user’s Trust Value and data Trust Value. If the user’s Trust 
Value equals or is larger than the data Trust Value and the process is not 
classified as a bad transaction or error then the user can access the data in the 
XML database; otherwise, access is denied. 
 Search and retrieve the required data from the XML database when the 
access is permitted. The XML database is stored natively in the system and is 
represented as a tree when the access is allowed. Accessing the required node 
is achieved using an XPath expression. 
The access decision is dependent on Trust Values. It is connected with 
the access manager to determine the Trust Value (TV) for both users and data. 
The access decision maker also works coherently with the trust module to check 
the queries entered and decide whether access is permitted or denied. Figure 8.3 
shows the decision process in the access module for XML databases. 
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Figure ‎8.3 The access process in the access control module 
8.5 Conclusion 
The access control module is part of the Trust Based Access Control for 
XML databases. It is responsible for storing access permission policies and 
makes the decision whether access is allowed or not. It includes two parts – the 
access manger and the access decision maker – that work together to achieve the 
main goal of this module. This module is integrated with the trust module to 
perform access control. In the next Chapter, the design of experiments to test this 
approach is explained and the data sets are described. 
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9 THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapters 6 to 8 explained the structure of Trust Based Access Control for 
XML databases. This Chapter explains the design of experiments used to 
evaluate the system performance, functionality, scalability, and security.  
Seven different experiments were run to test the system units, the system 
integration, and the whole system. The first three experiments evaluate specific 
parts of the system individually: the trust module, the access control module, and 
the XLog file. Two other experiments evaluate the performance of the system’s 
processes, namely the trust maintenance and the access supervision (see Chapter 
6). The last two are comparison experiments. The sixth experiment measured the 
real time cost of applying Trust Based Access Control (TBAC) by comparing the 
proposed system with another system that does not depend on TBAC. The final 
experiment compares the proposed system with the traditional Mandatory 
Access Control (MAC).  
The remainder of this Chapter is divided as follows. Section 9.2 
describes the objectives of each experiment and the general strategy for 
evaluation. Section 9.3 explains the tool considerations and the platform 
specifications. In Section 9.4, the review for existing data sets and XML 
benchmarks and the selection of data sets’ criteria are made. The samples of 
users are mentioned in Section 9.5. Section 7.6 explains the setup for each 
experiment. A summary is provided in Section 9.7. 
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9.2 The Overall Experimental Design  
The main goal for running the test described here is to evaluate the 
research hypothesis stated in Chapter 5. Experiments were designed to ensure 
that the system design described in Chapters 6-8 met the system objectives and 
requirements mentioned in Chapter 5. To evaluate the validity, functionality, 
performance, and security of Trust Based Access Control for XML databases, 
seven different experiments were run. The early stage of development of this 
work is not yet at a phase where rigorous hypotheses could be developed for the 
experiments, as would be required for formal experiments in empirical software 
engineering. So, these experiments were designed only for the general scientific 
sense and not for the more specialised sense used in empirical software 
engineering. 
The system was tested practically using three levels: unit testing, 
integration testing, and system testing. Three experiments were designed to test 
system units, two experiments were used to evaluate the integration between 
modules; a further two experiments were run to check how the whole system 
worked and compares with other existing approaches. These experiments are: 
 The trust module experiment 
 The logging experiment 
 The access control module experiment 
 The trust maintenance experiment 
 The access supervision experiment 
 The experiment to determine the cost of Trust Based Access Control 
 The comparison with MAC experiment 
All these experiments and their objectives are described in detail in the 
following Sections. 
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9.2.1  The Objectives of The Experiments 
As mentioned before, these experiments aim to evaluate applying Trust 
Based Access Control for XML databases. They check the system performance, 
security, and functionality. The system’s main functions were mentioned in the 
design description in Chapters 6-8; they can be summarised as follows: 
 Evaluating user operations by checking XML queries, capturing errors, and 
bad transactions. 
 Recording errors and bad transactions. 
 Calculating the Trust Value (TV). 
 Making the access decision for XML databases. 
 Retrieving data from XML databases. 
 Updating user’s privileges according to their behaviour. 
Each experiment is designed to test some tasks in the system and achieve 
specific goals. The objectives of each experiment are described below. 
 The trust module experiment: This experiment aims to test the trust 
module in the system as an individual unit. The main goal of the trust module 
experiment is to identify appropriate ranges of values for the various factors 
and weights. It also evaluates the Trust Value performance. Trust Value is 
changed depending on the Existing Trust Value (ETV), Error Factor (EF), 
Bad Transaction Factor (BTF), and their weights. This experiment tests how 
the Trust Value is affected by these factors from two perspectives. The first 
viewpoint shows the change in Trust Value depending on the existing Trust 
Value, Error, and Bad Transaction Factors. The second explains how the 
weight values affect calculation of the Trust Value. The expected results 
from these experiments are that TV increases when there are no errors or bad 
transactions and decreases when there are only errors, bad transactions, or 
both. The results will be linear. 
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 The logging experiment: This experiment evaluates the performance of the 
XLog file for XML databases. It checks its performance speed over time 
from two perspectives. The first is to test the creation process. The second 
focuses on the reading process and retrieval of data. Both perspectives are 
evaluated in three ways: with errors only, bad transactions only, and a 
mixture of both errors and bad transactions. The expectations for results are 
that both reading and creation processes will consume little time due to the 
design of the XLog file being dynamic and updated.  
 The access control module experiment: This experiment is designed to 
evaluate the functionality, performance, and scalability of the access control 
module. It evaluates each step of the access process and also tests the whole 
access module. From scalability perspective, the access module works with 
small to large databases. The data sets and their size are explained in Section 
9.4. Similarly, the access module is tested with different sized users’ access 
permission policy files reflecting different number of users. The selection of 
the number of users will be described in Section 9.5. The expected results are 
that the access process in this module will consume much time since it 
includes a searching process for TV for both users and data. 
 The trust maintenance experiment: This experiment aims to test the 
integration between the trust module and the access control module. In this 
experiment, the performance of both modules working together is tested. It 
evaluates the trust maintenance process, described in Chapter 6, with 
different numbers of users, errors, and bad transactions. The total time to 
perform this process is measured. This time includes the evaluation time for 
errors and bad transactions recorded in the XLog file, the calculation time, 
and the time to update privileges, which are recorded in the user’s access 
permission policy file. The performance of this process is expected to be 
reasonable, due to the XLog file design. 
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 The access supervision experiment: Like the trust maintenance experiment, 
this experiment evaluates the integration of two modules. It tests the 
performance of the access supervision process, which is described in Chapter 
6, by evaluating the time needed to finish this process. The time includes the 
access time, the time for detecting errors and bad transactions, and then the 
time required for recording in the XLog file. The expected completion time 
for this process when the access is permitted will be longer than when it is 
denied because it excludes the retrieval time from the original XML 
databases. Both situations will take long time since the access supervision 
process includes three complex sub processes: accessing, detecting, and 
creating the XLog. 
 The experiment to determine the cost of TBAC: This experiment aims to 
test the whole system performance and scalability. It evaluates the time 
needed to apply the Trust Based Access Control for XML databases by 
comparing the time consumed with and without the Trust Based Access 
Control. It also checks the scalability of the system by using small to large 
XML databases. The size of data sets is explained in Section 9.4. The 
expected results are that TBAC will be applied successfully and will add 
more security features while take four times the normal access time.   
 The comparison with Mandatory Access Control (MAC) experiment: 
This experiment aims to evaluate the performance of Trust Based Access 
Control for XML databases through comparing it with other existing 
approaches. The Mandatory Access Control for XML databases designed by 
(Zhu et al., 2009) is selected because it is a traditional access type. It has 
been implemented practically and has published experimental results. This 
experiment measured the time consumed for both Trust Based Access 
Control and Mandatory Access Control for several sizes of XML databases. 
The expected results are that the performance of TBAC will be slower than 
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traditional MAC performance, but at the same time it will add dynamic 
security features.     
9.2.2 The Strategy of The Experimental Evaluation  
To achieve all objectives mentioned in above, the design of experiments 
must cover these points: 
 The operational environment for these experiments. Both software and 
hardware are identified according to experiments’ aims (see Section 9.3). 
  The choice of XML data sets for each experiment and the number of user 
(see Sections 9.4 and 9.5).  
 The choice of the queries depending on the objectives of experiments.  
 The inputs and outputs for each experiment and the unit of measurement. 
  Analyses of the experimental results (see Chapter 10) and evaluations of the 
system (see Chapter 11). Identifying the significant results and possible 
improvements (see Chapter 12). The next Sections and Chapters describe 
these points in detail.  
9.3 The Implementation Platforms and Tools’ Considerations 
Practical Trust Based Access Control for XML databases was tested on 
two platforms. The five experiments that focus on unit testing or integration 
testing were performed on a laptop with 2.40 GHz Intel® Core™ i5 CPU, 4 GB 
of main memory, and Windows 7 operating system.  
The second platform is a PC with 2.83 GHz Intel® Core™ 2 Duo CPU 
E8300. The system is implemented using Java Language (JDK 1.7.0) and Net 
Beans IDE 7.0.1 platform framework. Several XML databases with different file 
sizes and different numbers of users are used in experiments. The detail of the 
data sets and users appear later in Sections 9.4 and 9.5. 
The further two experiments that focus on comparison were performed 
on platform two. The specifications of platform two were selected to be the same 
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as in the practical experiments of the Mandatory Access Control approach 
(MAC) (Zhu et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 2009)  to obtain better and more accurate 
comparative results. 
The practical Trust Based Access Control for XML databases adopts 
DOM as a parser over SAX. As mentioned in Chapter 2, DOM parses the XML 
file and represents it as a tree. It supports XPath and Queries. It provides easy 
navigation and traversal in any direction. It allows reading and manipulation of 
data. The only problem with DOM is that it consumes memory space. SAX, on 
the other hand, is simple and offers high performance. It creates a stream and 
represents the elements as events. It supports only up-down traversal and reading 
without manipulation.  
The main reason for selecting DOM as a parser for this system was to 
meet the system objectives and requirements. The system needs to represent the 
XML file as a tree and understands the whole structure to capture specific kinds 
of bad transactions and errors. For example, to check if the required node is a 
root or a parent of children. Moreover, manipulating XML data is an important 
process in the system to evaluate the user transactions. Another logical reason is 
that DOM supports XPath, which is used in the practical system to access XML 
data. Although SAX is faster, DOM provides more functions. However, using 
DOM may restrict the size of data sets that used in the experiments. As 
mentioned in Section 2.6, XPath was selected over XQuery to access data due to 
its simplicity. The next Section reviews existing data sets and describes the 
selection criteria for each experiment.  
9.4 Real-World Data Sets and XML Benchmarks  
This Section discusses some real XML data sets and benchmarks. The 
discussion briefly covers the properties of each data set and benchmark in 
Sections 9.4.1 and 9.4.2. A real XML data set is a single XML file that includes 
real data. An XML benchmark is a tool that generates synthetic data sets with 
different sizes and provides query sets. Both real data sets and benchmarks are 
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used to evaluate the system performance. Since benchmarks provide data sets 
and query sets at the same time, the storage techniques and query processing can 
be easily compared between the experimental approach and other existing 
systems (Schmidt et al., 2001). The choice of real-world data sets and the 
benchmarks that are used in the experiments is explained in Section 9.4.3. 
 
9.4.1 A Review of Existing Real-World Data Sets 
These data sets include real data and structures that make the evaluation 
process simpler than synthetic benchmarks data sets (see Section 9.4.2) 
(Mlynkova, 2008). Six real data sets, which are the most widely used in XML 
evaluations, are described here. All these data sets are free and can be download 
from the XML Data Repository website (Suciu, 2002). 
 DBLP Database: This data set is an acronym for Digital Bibliography 
Library Project. It is a large XML file that includes genuine bibliographic 
information about computer science publications. These publications cover 
the major conferences (e.g. VLDB, PODS, ICDE), journals (e.g. CACM, 
TODS, TOIS), series (e.g. LNCS/LNAI, IFIP), and books in the field of 
computer science (Suciu, 2002; DBLP, 2013). Many applications for XML 
databases (Liefke and Suciu, 2000; Wang et al., 2003; Lawrence, 2004; Lu et 
al., 2005; Xu and Papakonstantinou 2005; Chen et al., 2006; Li et al., 2007; 
Al-Badawi, 2010) used this data set in their evaluation experiments. This 
data set has a simple, shallow, and wide structure (Lu et al., 2005; Chen et 
al., 2006; Lee et al., 2010). The original version of this data set can be 
downloaded from the DBLP website (DBLP, 2013). The size of this data set 
is extremely large. On 14
th
 March 2013, the size of the DBLP database was 
around 1.1 GB (DBLP, 2013). Some features of the smaller version with 127 
MB of this data set are provided in Table 9.1 (Suciu, 2002). 
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 Protein Sequence Database: This database is designed by Georgetown 
University. It is a resource of integrated bioinformatics that includes 
information about the protein sequence. Like DBLP, this data set is a large 
XML file and has a shallow, wide, and regular structure (Wong et al., 2007). 
The size reaches 683MB and the depth is seven levels. It has been used to 
evaluate experiments on the XML storage (Wong et al., 2007), the 
processing XML streams (Green et al., 2003; Jittrawong and Wong, 2007), 
and filtering (Suciu, 2002; Silvasti et al., 2009). 
 
 Treebank Database: This database was developed by the Computer and 
Information Science Department at the University of Pennsylvania. It 
includes English sentences that are annotated for linguistic structures. This 
database is partially encrypted to protect copyright for text nodes. This 
encryption does not affect the XML structure at all. This data set is 
considered an interesting case for evaluation experiments due to its deep 
recursive structure (Onizuka, 2003; Chen et al., 2005; Lu et al., 2005; Chen 
et al., 2006; Wong et al., 2007). The tree contains a huge number of nested 
structures 386,614 and is considered as a complex XML database (Onizuka, 
2003). This real data set is widely used to evaluate different aspects of many 
XML applications (Liefke and Suciu, 2000; Green et al., 2003; Onizuka, 
2003; Steedman et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2005; Lu et al., 2005; Chen et al., 
2006; Li et al., 2007; Wong et al., 2007). The size of this XML file is 82MB 
(Treebank, 1999; Suciu, 2002). Basic statistical information about this data 
set is provided in Table 9.1.  
 
 NASA Database: This database contains genuine astronomical data. This 
XML data set is generated from a flat file format. It is part of the 
GSFC/NASA XML Project. The size of the XML document is 23 MB 
(NASA, 2001; Suciu, 2002). Unlike Treebank, this data set is shallow. The 
number of recursive elements is only 18 (Onizuka, 2003). It is used to test 
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many XML applications that are designed for processing XPath and XML 
queries (Green et al., 2003; Onizuka, 2003; Zhang et al., 2005; Jittrawong 
and Wong, 2007), indexing techniques (He and Yang, 2004), labelling (Wu 
et al., 2004), filtering (Silvasti et al., 2009), and searching (Lee et al., 2010). 
Other features of the XML structure are mentioned in Table 9.1 (Suciu, 
2002). 
 
 SIGMOD Record database: This data set includes real data for some 
articles published by the ACM SIGMOD website. It is a relatively small 
database since the XML file size is around 0.5 MB (Merialdo., 1999; Suciu, 
2002). This database is generally used to evaluate the XML systems’ 
performance with small XML databases (Li and Moon, 2001; Lawrence, 
2004; Wu et al., 2004; Rafiei et al., 2006; Li et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2010). 
The database structure features are explained in Table 9.1. More detail about 
this data set can be found on the ACM SIGMOD Record website (Suciu, 
2002). 
 
 University Courses Database: This data set contains information for 
courses in three universities. There are three small versions of this database 
with different sizes. The first version is a small XML file with 277KB and 
the number of levels is four. The size of the second version is 1MB and the 
depth is four levels. The third version is 2MB with five levels. Although the 
number of versions is limited, the different sizes for this data set support 
scalability tests to some extent (Suciu, 2002). 
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Table ‎9.1 Real-world XML databases’ features 
 
Database 
name 
DBLP 
Protein 
sequence 
Treebank NASA 
SIGMOD 
Record 
University courses 
Database size 127 MB 683 MB 82 MB 23 MB 
467 KB 
≈ 0.5 MB 
277KB 1MB 2MB 
The number 
of nodes 
3,736,406 22,596,465 2,437,667 532,963 15,263 10,546 74,557 66,735 
The number 
of elements 
3,332,130 21305818 2,437,666 476,646 11,526 10,546 74,557 66,729 
The number 
of attributes 
404,276 1290647 1 56,317 3,737 0 0 6 
The number 
of levels 
6 7 36 8 6 4 4 5 
Chapter 9: THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
97 
 
9.4.2 A Review of Existing XML Benchmarks 
XML benchmarks were developed to consider data storage and query 
processing (Schmidt et al., 2001). XML benchmarks can be classified into 
application benchmarks or micro benchmarks (Yao et al., 2004; Runapongsa et 
al., 2006b). The application benchmarks aim to evaluate the performance of the 
XML database as a whole with both data and queries. In contrast, the micro 
benchmarks focus on evaluating aspects of a specific component in the system 
such as query processing (joins, grouping, and sorting) (Yao et al., 2004; 
Runapongsa et al., 2006b). The most popular and widely used XML benchmarks 
are discussed in this Section. 
 XMark Benchmark: This benchmark has the ability to generate several 
sizes of XML database. The query set is designed to cover most of the query-
able aspects. XMark was developed by Schmidt et al. (2002) and is widely 
used to evaluate XML applications (Davis et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2003; 
Arion et al., 2004; He and Yang, 2004; Lawrence, 2004; Chen et al., 2005; 
Lu et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2006; Li et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2010). XMark 
generates the data set as a single XML file that contains simulated data of an 
online auction website. An XMark data set is easy to understand. The 
generator of XMark data set is free to download from the XMark project 
website (Schmidt, 2003). The size of the database is controlled by a scaling 
factor. So, it allows developers to generate their data sets according to their 
needs. The number of levels of the XML tree (depth) is always twelve 
regardless of the size of XML file. It has a repetitive structure with a fair 
number of recursions (Chen et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2005). XMark data sets 
are an appropriate tool to evaluate the system performance especially from 
the scalability perspective. Although, this benchmark provides a query set 
that is designed to evaluate several aspects of databases, this query set does 
not cover update transactions. There are twenty queries that focus on 
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searching transactions (Schmidt, 2003). XMark’s basic features are 
summarised in Table 9.2. 
 
 XOO7 Benchmark: Li et al. (2001) applied the original idea of Object 
Oriented RDBMS benchmark (OO7) that was developed by Carey et al. 
(1993) to the XML environment. The data and query sets of OO7 were 
converted to be used in the XML version of the benchmark (XOO7). XOO7 
also generates an XML data set as a single XML file. There are three 
versions of this data set: small, medium, and large. The limitations in data 
sets size restrict the scalability evaluation. The depth of this data set, like that 
of XMark, is static irrespective of the size. For XOO7 it is five deep with all 
three versions. The query set includes twenty three queries that cover search 
processes again without update (Li, 2003). Some features of XOO7 
benchmark are explained in Table 9.2. The XOO7 benchmark is freely 
available on the XOO7 Benchmark website (Li, 2003).   
 
  XBench Benchmark: XBench is a template based benchmark that generates 
a wide design of XML files. It can generate data centric XML files (DC) and 
text centric XML files (TC). The database can be in a single XML document 
(SD) or multiple XML documents (MD). Four classes of XML databases can 
be created by the toXgen tool: DC/SD, DC/MD, TC/SD, and TC/MD. This 
benchmark provides four XML databases sizes. The small database is 10MB, 
the normal size reaches 100MB, the large size is 1GB, and the huge size is 
10GB (Yao et al., 2004). The benchmark has the same drawbacks as XOO7; 
the sizes of the databases are fixed. Unlike XMark and XOO7, this 
benchmark provides a limited range for the number of levels (depth) that is 
set by parameter. XBench contains twenty queries that focus on search 
without update. 
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 XMach-1 Benchmark: This benchmark is designed to be multi-user. It was 
developed by Böhme and Rahm (2003). It depends on a web based 
application scenario. The structure of this benchmark consists of four parts: 
the XML database, server, loader, and client. Figure 9.1 shows the 
architecture of XMach-1 benchmark. The XMach-1 data set consists of a 
large number of small XML files. There are four versions of the data set size 
depending on the number of XML files, which can be   ,    ,      and   . 
The size of each XML file is between 2KB and 100KB. The maximum depth 
is six levels. The query set contains eleven queries. Eight of them consider 
the search processes and the other three focus on update transactions (Böhme 
and Rahm, 2000). Table 9.2 shows some basic characteristics of this 
benchmark. Both data set and query set for this benchmark are available on 
the website of XMach-1: A benchmark for XML Data Management (Böhme 
and Rahm, 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎9.1 The structure of XMach-1 Benchmark (Böhme and Rahm, 2000) 
 
 The Michigan Benchmark: This benchmark is classified by its authors as a 
micro benchmark that is designed to evaluate specific features in the system 
(Yao et al., 2004; Runapongsa et al., 2006b). It was developed by 
Runapongsa et al. in (2006b). The data set is generated as a single XML file 
that contains a minimum of 728,000 nodes. The maximum number of nodes 
Chapter 9: THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
100 
 
is ten times as large. The depth of this data set is sixteen levels and the 
breadth is changeable. The breadth is defined by a fan-out parameter, of 
which the minimum value is two nodes at each level and the maximum is 13 
nodes. The query set contains thirty one queries that are designed to test 
several aspects of databases including update processes (Runapongsa et al., 
2006a). Some characteristics of the Michigan benchmark are mentioned in 
Table 9.2. This benchmark can be found in the project website (Runapongsa 
et al., 2006a). 
 
 TPoX benchmark: TPoX is an acronym of Transaction Processing over 
XML. It is an application benchmark that aims to evaluate the whole system. 
The generation of XML files process depends on templates. XML Schema is 
used to control the size of XML files by defining the depth and the breadth of 
the database. The database is generated as multiple tiny XML files. The size 
of each file is between 2KB and 20KB (Nicola et al., 2007b). This 
benchmark provides seventeen queries that focus mainly on updating XML 
databases, unlike other benchmarks that are more concerned with searching 
processes. Some features of this benchmark are shown in Table 9.2. The 
benchmark can be downloaded from the project website (Nicola et al., 
2007a). 
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Table ‎9.2 Features of some XML benchmarks 
Benchmark Name XMark XOO7 XMach-1 Michigan XBench TPoX 
Data set 
The number of 
files 
1 1 
Multiple 
(   ,    ,      and 
   ) files 
1 Mixed 
Multiple 
From 
3.6×106 
to 
3.6×1011 
The size 
Varies From 
tiny (KB) to 
huge (GB) 
Small (500B), 
Medium (1000B), 
Large (1000B) 
with different nodes 
number. 
From 2 to 100KB  
per XML file 
 
 
Min: 
728,000 nodes. 
Max: 
10 times Min 
Small (10MB) 
Medium(199MB) 
Large (1GB) 
Huge (10 GB) 
From 2KB to 
25KB per 
XML file 
 
 
The number of 
levels 
12 5 ≤ 6 5 to 16 Limited range 
Multiple 
Controlled by 
template 
Query set 
The number of 
queries 
20 23 11 31 20 17 
The number of users 1 1 Multiple 1 1 Multiple 
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9.4.3 The Experimental Data Sets’ Criteria 
In order to test the practical Trust Based Access Control for XML 
databases, seven different experiments were designed (see Section 9.2). These 
experiments test the system from different perspectives. The selection of data 
sets and benchmarks from those described in Sections 9.4.1 and 9.4.2 was made 
based on the experiments’ objectives.  
In general, real-world data sets were selected in preference to benchmark 
data sets for the five experiments: the trust module experiment, the logging 
experiment, the access control module experiment, the trust maintenance 
experiment, and the access supervision experiment. This is because real-world 
data sets are simple but contain realistic data. The benchmarks are generally 
used to test the management systems of XML databases and focus on storage 
techniques and query processing. Since this system handles security issues, using 
natural data sets is more appropriate. 
From the data sets reviewed in Section 9.4.1, Treebank, NASA, and 
SIGMOD Record were used in these five experiments. These three genuine data 
sets provide an environment to evaluate the system with different database size, 
structure, and depth. DBLP and Protein Sequence Database were excluded due 
to the large size of the XML files, which require higher specifications of 
hardware and software. Treebank was selected because of its complex recursive 
structure. Lee et al. (2010) state that DBLP, NASA, SIGMOD Record, and 
XMark are the most popular data sets used to evaluate experiments in research in 
XML databases. Therefore, NASA and SIGMOD Record were selected in 
preference to the University Courses database. 
The two comparison experiments, the comparison between the system 
with and without Trust Based Access Control (TBAC) and the comparison 
between Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Trust Based Access Control 
(TBAC), used the XMark benchmark for many reasons. The most important one 
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is that XMark was used in the practical experiments of the Mandatory Access 
Control system (MAC) designed by Zhu et al. (2009). The comparison 
experiments must run with the same environment including benchmarks to 
obtain accurate performance results. XMark is an appropriate tool to evaluate the 
whole system and compare different approaches. XMark is a well-known 
benchmark that provides XML databases in several sizes that make the 
scalability tests easier.  
Eleven XML data sets were generated to compare the Trust Based 
Access Control with other systems. The minimum size was 27KB for XFile1 and 
the size gradually increased for other files. The size 30.2MB in XFile11 was the 
maximum due to the limitations in the resources. Moreover, using DOM as a 
parser in the system consumes much memory storage. Table 9.3 shows the XML 
files generated by XMark and used in the comparison experiments. 
Table ‎9.3 The size of XMark data set used in comparison experiments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
File Name Scaling Factor (F) File Size (MB) 
XFile1 0.00001 0.027 
XFile2 0.005 0.56 
XFile3 0.01 1.15 
XFile4 0.02 2.3 
XFile5 0.05 5.7 
XFile6 0.061 7 
XFile7 0.087 10.1 
XFile8 0.13 15 
XFile9 0.175 20.2 
XFile10 0.22 25.5 
XFile11 0.26 30.2 
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In contrast, XOO7 and XBench benchmarks provide only restricted XML 
databases’ sizes and do limit the scalability evaluation in comparison 
experiments. The XMach-1 and TPoX benchmarks are also not useful because 
the database is divided into many XML files. The experimental system requires 
an understanding of the whole database structure and all data to capture errors 
and bad transactions. The Michigan benchmark is a micro benchmark, thus it is 
not an appropriate tool to test this system either. 
9.5 The Sample of Users 
This Section explains the user samples employed in the experiments. The 
selection of the number of users was made to cover small, medium, and large 
organisations. The size definition for companies varies from country to country. 
The Companies Act (2006) of the United Kingdom and defines legislations for 
different sized organisations. These relate to several points such as annual sales 
(turnover), balance, and number of employees. Only the number of employees is 
relevant for this research. According to the Companies Act (2006), the 
maximum number of employees in a small company is 50. For the medium sized 
organisation, the number of employees is not more than 250. If the number of 
users is larger than 250 the company is classified as large. Furthermore, the 
European Union defines the business sizes similarly to the definition of the 
United Kingdom. A large company has no more than 1,000 employees. When 
the number of employees is greater than 1,000 the company is considered an 
enterprise. 
The United States defines the number of employees for small and 
medium organisations differently. The maximum number of employees is 250 
for a small company and 500 for a medium company, while the same numbers as 
in the European Union apply for large and enterprise companies. In a large 
company, the number of employees is greater than 500 and less than or equal to 
1,000. An enterprise company has more than 1,000 employees.  
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The business size definition depending on the number of employees is 
completely different in Australia. The small company according to the Fair 
Work Act (2009) includes no more than 15 employees. The number of 
employees in the medium company is less than or equal to 200. The maximum 
number of employees in the large company is 500. If the number of employees is 
larger than 500, the company is categorised as an enterprise.  
Since this research takes place in the United Kingdom, it follows the 
organisation size definition produced by the government of the United Kingdom. 
Thus the selection for the number of users was 50, 100, and 1,000, which covers 
small, medium, and large organisations. 
The data for the users were virtual and not real. Only information related 
to user privileges are recorded in the users’ access permission policy file. The 
file structure was described in Chapter 8. The file contains the ID, Role, and 
Trust Value (TV) for each user. ID refers to the user’s identification. Role 
describes the user’s role in the organisation. TV reflects the trustworthy value 
for the user according to the behaviour. 
Three versions of a users’ access permission policy file were generated 
with 50, 100, and 1,000 users.  
These user sets are used to test the system in all designed experiments 
expect the trust module experiment, because that experiment cannot be affected 
by the number of users. The next Section describes the input required for all 
experiments and how they are run. 
9.6 The Setup of Experiments 
As mentioned earlier, seven different experiments were designed to 
evaluate the Trust Based Access Control for XML databases. The objectives of 
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each experiment were explained in Section 9.2. In this Section, the setup of 
experiments is described. 
9.6.1 The Trust Module Experiment 
This experiment is used to find the appropriate values for factors and 
their weights. It evaluates performance of calculation of the Trust Value (TV). It 
shows various situations for calculating TV depending on Existing Trust Value 
(ETV), Bad Transaction Factor (BTF), Error Factor (EF), Existing Trust Value 
Weight (ETVW), Bad Transaction Factor Weight (BTFW), and Error Factor 
Weight (EFW).  
The procedure for running this experiment is that a new Trust Value 
(TV) is calculated using formulae in Chapter 7 from values: ETV, BTF, EF, 
ETVW, BTFW, and EFW. The initial values are varied, keeping some stable, to 
check the effect on the output. Thus the experiment studies the relationship 
between TV and these six factors. 
9.6.2 The Logging Experiment 
This experiment is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on 
evaluating the creation process for the XLog file. The second part tests the 
performance of retrieving data from the XLog file. Both write and read 
processes are compared using thirty XLog files created with different sizes 
according to the type and the number of recorded processes. Three types of 
XLog file are defined: an XLog file with only bad transactions, an XLog file 
with only errors, and the XLog file with both bad transactions and errors. The 
first ten versions of the XLog file include only bad transactions and the number 
of bad transactions increase by ten for every version. The second ten versions of 
the XLog file contain only errors and also increased by ten errors each time. The 
third type is XLog files include a mixture of both bad transaction and errors. 
They too increase by ten bad transactions and ten errors each time. 
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9.6.2.1 Creating the XLog File 
The creation process includes generating the XLog file and writing 
detected bad transactions and errors. The technical setup for the creation process 
of the XLog file is summarised here. The time consumed to create the XLog file 
is measured in milliseconds. This procedure was repeated thirty times for all 
versions of the XLog file. The times for the ten versions of each type of the 
XLog file were compared. This experiment studies the effects of changing the 
type and the number of processes in the performance of creating an XLog file.  
9.6.2.2 Reading the XLog File 
This Section explains the second part of the logging experiment that 
handles retrieving data from the XLog file. The reading process includes 
scanning the XLog file, searching for bad transactions and errors for a specific 
user and counting their number. The technical setup for the reading process is 
that the count of bad transactions and errors are calculated; the required time for 
reading the XLog file is measured. This step was repeated with thirty versions of 
the XLog file. The results for time consumed were compared from the 
perspectives of both the processes’ type and number. Thus, this part of 
experiment evaluates retrieving data performance for all XLog files and finds the 
effects of changing the type and the number of processes on the time required to 
read the XLog file. 
9.6.3 The Access Control Module Experiment 
This experiment tests the access process from the functionality, 
scalability, and performance perspectives. It evaluates the access time for the 
access control module with different databases and numbers of users. The 
technical points of the experiment setup are described here. The access request is 
received as an XML query. Then, the Trust Value for the required node in the 
XML database’s permission policy file is found and the time consumed is 
measured in milliseconds. The search process runs again to find the Trust Value 
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for the user in the users’ access permission policy file and the required time is 
measured in milliseconds. After finding the Trust Value for the subject and the 
object, a comparison is made. If the TV for user is equal or larger than the TV 
for the node, the access decision allows the user to access the data. Otherwise 
access is denied. When the access is permitted, the time consumed for retrieving 
the data from XML databases, which is affected by the size of database, is 
measured in milliseconds. Finally, the total time for the access control module is 
measured in milliseconds. 
This experiment was performed with different data sets (SIGMOD 
Record, NASA, and Treebank) and with different sizes of the user’s access 
permission policy files (50, 100, and 1,000 users). The results include the time 
consumed in searching for the Trust Value of the user, finding the Trust Value of 
the node, the retrieval time, and the total time. The experiment compares the 
access control performance from two perspectives: the size of XML database 
and the number of users in the organisation 
9.6.4 The Trust Maintenance Experiment 
This experiment evaluates the performance of the whole system, 
integration between the trust module and the access control module. It measures 
the time required to perform the trust maintenance process. As mentioned in 
Chapter 6, trust maintenance includes three sub processes: evaluating for bad 
transactions and errors recorded in the XLog file, the calculation of Trust Value, 
and updating user privileges.  
The technical points of the experiment setup are described here. The 
setup starts by reading the XLog file and counting the number of bad 
transactions (BTNum) and errors (ENum). Then, these numbers are evaluated 
and assigned the equivalent value for the Bad Transaction Factor (BTF) and 
Error Factor (EF). The Trust Value (TV) is calculated depending on the existing 
Trust Value (ETV), the Bad Transaction Factor (BTF), the Error Factor (EF), 
Chapter 9: THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
109 
 
and their weights. After the calculation, the user Trust Value in the users’ access 
permission policy file is updated. The time consumed to complete the whole 
process is measured in milliseconds. 
These technical procedures were run twelve times with different number 
of bad transactions and errors and with three users’ sets: 50, 100, and 1,000. It 
compares the total time and evaluates the performance of the trust maintenance 
process depending on the changes in the number of bad transactions and errors 
and with a different number of users. 
9.6.5  The Access Supervision Experiment 
Like the trust maintenance, the access supervision experiment tests both 
modules working together. The access supervision process includes three 
processes: the access process, detecting bad transactions and errors, and 
recording in the XLog file. This experiment tests the performance and the 
scalability of the access supervision process. It compares the time required to 
perform this process with three data sets (Treebank, NASA, and SIGMOD 
Record) and with three user sets (50, 100, and 1,000) in two situations, when the 
access is permitted and when it is denied.  
Two simple queries are used in this experiment. The first query includes 
deleting the root node, which is classified as a bad transaction process. [Q1: 
Deleting /RootNode]. This query tests the performance of the access supervision 
when the access is denied. The second query is a normal query that includes 
searching for a specific node: [Q2: Retrieving a specific node //node1]. This 
simple query is used to evaluate the access supervision process when the access 
is permitted. 
The experimental setup includes many steps. It starts by performing the 
access process that is described in the access control module experiment (7.6.3) 
with respect to whether the XML query includes bad transactions or errors. 
Detecting bad transactions and errors in the XML query depending on the 
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operation policy file and error policy file was discussed in Chapter 7. After that, 
the XLog file is created and the bad transaction detected is recorded. Finally, the 
time consumed to perform the access supervision process is measured in 
milliseconds. The experiment compares the total time depending on the size of 
XML databases and the changing in the number of users. 
9.6.6 The Experiment to Determine The Cost of Trust Based Access 
Control (TBAC) 
This experiment tests the whole system of Trust Based Access Control 
for XML database (TBAC). It also compares the system performance and 
scalability with and without Trust Based Access Control (TBAC) to find the real 
time cost of applying TBAC. 
XMark benchmark was used to generate different sized XML databases. 
Eleven XML databases from XFile1 to Xfile11 were used. These databases were 
defined in Section 9.4.3. The three versions of the users’ access permission 
policy file were used in this experiment, which include the sets with 50, 100, and 
1000 users. 
Two queries were used to test the read privilege in both systems. The 
first is a simple query [Q3: //site/open_auctions/open_auction/initial]. The 
second is a complex query that includes joins of ancestor-descendant [Q4: 
//listitem//keyword]. The technical points of the experiment setup include 
performing both queries with different data sets and user sets in the Trust Based 
Access Control for XML databases and the access system without TBAC. The 
time required for both systems is measured in milliseconds and compared to 
examine performance. 
 
 
Chapter 9: THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
111 
 
9.6.7 The Comparison with MAC Experiment 
This experiment compares Trust Based Access Control for XML 
database (TBAC) with the traditional approach of the Mandatory Access Control 
for XML databases (MAC) designed by Zhu (2009).  
The experimental setup is almost the same as the one described in the 
previous Section (9.6.6) except that six XML files were used rather than eleven 
because the Mandatory Access Control approach designed by Zhu (2009) had 
published results with two queries for only these six files sizes.  
The experimental setup includes performing both queries (Q3 and Q4) in 
the Trust Based Access Control for XML databases with different databases and 
user sets. The time required for the Trust Based Access Control system is 
measured in milliseconds. The performance speed of the Trust Based Access 
Control (TBAC) is compared with the published results of the Mandatory 
Access Control system (MAC) (Zhu et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 2009). 
9.7  Conclusion 
To test and evaluate the Trust Based Access Control for XML databases, 
seven experiments were performed. This Chapter described the design of 
experiments and explained their objectives. It reviewed existing natural data sets 
and XML benchmarks and the selection between them for the experiments. 
Three real data sets are used in the five experiments and the XMark benchmark 
used in the comparative experiments. The user sets are defined to cover the 
number of employees in small, medium, and large organisations. The setup for 
each experiment was discussed including: inputs, outputs, data sets, user sets, 
procedures, and measurements. The following Chapter presents the results from 
the experiments. 
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10 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
10.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 9, the design of seven experiments to evaluate Trust Based 
Access Control for XML databases was described. They evaluated the system in 
terms of functionality, performance, speed, scalability, and security. The first 
experiment focused on the calculation of Trust Value (TV). The second 
experiment concerned evaluating the logging process. The third evaluated the 
access control module and the fourth and fifth experiments were designed to test 
the system’s processes, which are the trust maintenance and the access 
supervision. Finally, the sixth and seven experiments compared the results of the 
Trust Based Access Control system with the normal access, without TBAC, and 
the Mandatory Access Control method. 
This Chapter presents and analyses the results of all these experiments. 
The results of each experiment are discussed in individual Sections. The 
discussion in Sections 10.2 to 10.8 summarises the experimental design from 
Chapter 9 and shows the results in tabular and graphical form.  
10.2 The Trust Module Experiment 
This Section discusses the results of the trust module experiment 
designed to evaluate calculations of the Trust Value (TV). 
10.2.1 The Experimental Design Summary 
Recall from Chapter 9, the trust module experiment was designed to 
identify appropriate values for the various weights, calculate the Trust Value 
(TV), and evaluate its performance and flexibility. The Trust Value depends on 
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six factors: Existing Trust Value (ETV), Bad Transaction Factor (BTF), Error 
Factor (EF), Existing Trust Value Weight (ETVW), Bad Transaction Factor 
Weight (BTFW), and Error Factor Weight (EFW). The calculations depend on 
four equations that were described in detail in Chapter 7. 
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The Trust Value (TV) performance was tested varying these six factors. 
The relationship between Trust Value (TV) and each factor is described in 
Section 10.2.3. This experiment was run to find the results of Trust Value (TV) 
when there are bad transactions, errors, or both. At the same time, the 
calculations of Trust Value (TV) were evaluated from the flexibility perspective 
depending on the weights.  
10.2.2 Analytic Procedures  
This Section explains procedures used to obtain the results (see Section 
8.2.3) for the trust module experiment. Each factor used in calculating a TV has 
many values. The statistical results for all factors are represented in tabular 
format to explain the overall calculations. In addition, graphical representations 
are used to show the relationship between TV and the various factors. The 
results will be analysed in the next Section (10.2.3) from two viewpoints: the 
existence of bad transactions and errors and the altered weights.  
10.2.3 Results Analysis 
This Section discusses the results of the first experiment. All case 
studies are tested using three starting points for the Existing Trust Value 
(ETV): 0.75, 0.50, and 0.25. The experiment includes those where there are 
errors but no bad transactions, those where there are bad transactions but no 
errors, and those where there are both 
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Table 10.1 shows various TV when there is an Error Factor without a 
Bad Transaction Factor. The weight for both errors and bad transactions are at 
the maximum 10%. Since there is no bad transaction, its weight is not 
considered in the calculations. While the Error Factor increases gradually, the 
TV also decreases steadily. If ETV=0.75 when the Error Factor is 0.25 then the 
TV drops to 0.575. The TV falls to 0.5 while the Error Factor reaches the 
maximum of 1. Figure 10.1 depends on data in Table 10.1 and represents 
graphically the relationship between the changes in Trust Value (TV) and 
various values of errors. 
 
Table ‎10.1 The results with various values of the Error Factor without the Bad Transaction 
Factor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ETV ETVW EF EFW BTF BTFW TV 
0.75 %80 0.25 %10 0 %10 0.575 
0.50 %80 0.25 %10 0 %10 0.375 
0.25 %80 0.25 %10 0 %10 0.175 
0.75 %80 0.5 %10 0 %10 0.55 
0.5 %80 0.5 %10 0 %10 0.35 
0.25 %80 0.5 %10 0 %10 0.15 
0.75 %80 0.75 %10 0 %10 0.525 
0.5 %80 0.75 %10 0 %10 0.325 
0.25 %80 0.75 %10 0 %10 0.125 
0.75 %80 1 %10 0 %10 0.5 
0.5 %80 1 %10 0 %10 0.3 
0.25 %80 1 %10 0 %10 0.1 
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Figure ‎10.1 The relation between TV and EF 
Table 10.2 illustrates the calculations of TV when there is only Bad 
Transaction Factor without the Error Factor. The results for TV are the same as 
in Table 10.1 because the same weights for errors and bad transaction are used. 
The Bad Transaction Factor again affects inversely in TV. While the Bad 
Transaction Factor increases, the TV decreases. This inverse relationship is 
displayed graphically in Figure 10.2. 
Table ‎10.2 The results with only the Bad Transaction Factor (without the Error Factor) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ETV ETVW EF EFW BTF BTFW TV 
0.75 %80 0 %10 0.25 %10 0.575 
0.50 %80 0 %10 0.25 %10 0.375 
0.25 %80 0 %10 0.25 %10 0.175 
0.75 %80 0 %10 0.5 %10 0.55 
0.5 %80 0 %10 0.5 %10 0.35 
0.25 %80 0 %10 0.5 %10 0.15 
0.75 %80 0 %10 0.75 %10 0.525 
0.5 %80 0 %10 0.75 %10 0.325 
0.25 %80 0 %10 0.75 %10 0.125 
0.75 %80 0 %10 1 %10 0.5 
0.5 %80 0 %10 1 %10 0.3 
0.25 %80 0 %10 1 %10 0.1 
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Figure ‎10.2 The relation between TV and BTF 
After explaining the results with Error Factor only and bad transaction 
only, the results of TV when there is a mixture of errors and bad transactions 
are described in the following diagrams. The results are measured with four 
categories of weights: the maximum, the minimum, the intermediate, and the 
recommended weights. The effects of changes in error and bad transaction 
weights are now discussed. As mentioned in Section 7.6, both Bad Transaction 
Factor Weight (BTFW) and Error Factor Weight (EFW) range between 1% and 
10%. The Existing Trust Value Weight (ETVW) range is between 80% and 
98%.   
Demonstrations of the variation in Trust Value with different values for 
both errors and bad transactions are summarised in Table 10.3, Table 10.4, 
Table 10.5, and Table 10.6. Table 10.3 explains the statistical results when the 
error and bad transaction weights are at the maximum value and the Existing 
Trust Value Weight is at its minimum: ETVW=80%, EFW=10%, and 
BTFW=10%. The results show how the Trust Value is changed significantly 
due to the effects of these weights. Using data in Table 10.3, Figure 10.3 
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graphically displays the relation between TV and the mixture of errors and bad 
transactions with the maximum weights. 
Table ‎10.3 The‎results‎when‎errors‎and‎bad‎transactions’‎weights‎are‎at‎the‎maximum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎10.3 The comparative results of various values for both errors and bad transactions 
with the maximum weights 
 
ETV ETVW EF EFW BTF BTFW TV 
0.75 %80 0.25 %10 0.25 %10 0.55 
0.50 %80 0.25 %10 0.25 %10 0.35 
0.25 %80 0.25 %10 0.25 %10 0.15 
0.75 %80 0.5 %10 0.5 %10 0.5 
0.5 %80 0.5 %10 0.5 %10 0.3 
0.25 %80 0.5 %10 0.5 %10 0.1 
0.75 %80 0.75 %10 0.75 %10 0.45 
0.5 %80 0.75 %10 0.75 %10 0.25 
0.25 %80 0.75 %10 0.75 %10 0.05 
0.75 %80 1 %10 1 %10 0.4 
0.5 %80 1 %10 1 %10 0.2 
0.25 %80 1 %10 1 %10 0 
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Table 10.4 shows the results when the error and bad transactions’ 
weights are at the minimum and the Existing Trust Value Weight is at its 
maximum; therefore, ETVW=98%, EFW=1%, and BTFW=1%. Using these 
weights means the new Trust Value is only slightly affected by errors and bad 
transactions. This reflects that the organisation considers that both the Error 
Factor and the Bad Transaction Factor are not important in the user evaluation 
process. The outcomes show that, using these weights, the TV is relatively 
static. Figure 10.4 represents graphically the relation between TV and the 
mixture of errors and bad transactions with the minimum weights. 
Table ‎10.4 The‎results‎when‎errors‎and‎bad‎transactions’‎weights‎are‎at‎the‎minimum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ETV ETVW EF EFW BTF BTFW TV 
0.75 %98 0.25 %1 0.25 %1 0.73 
0.50 %98 0.25 %1 0.25 %1 0.485 
0.25 %98 0.25 %1 0.25 %1 0.24 
0.75 %98 0.5 %1 0.5 %1 0.725 
0.5 %98 0.5 %1 0.5 %1 0.48 
0.25 %98 0.5 %1 0.5 %1 0.235 
0.75 %98 0.75 %1 0.75 %1 0.72 
0.5 %98 0.75 %1 0.75 %1 0.475 
0.25 %98 0.75 %1 0.75 %1 0.229 
0.75 %98 1 %1 1 %1 0.715 
0.5 %98 1 %1 1 %1 0.47 
0.25 %98 1 %1 1 %1 0.224 
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Figure ‎10.4 The comparative results of various values for both errors and bad transactions 
with the minimum weights 
These calculations were then repeated with the intermediate weight. 
Table 10.5 shows the calculations results with the intermediate weight for both 
the Error Factor and Bad Transaction Factor. The results illustrate that the 
weights at 5% reasonably affect the calculations.  
Table ‎10.5 The results when‎errors‎and‎bad‎transactions’‎weights‎are‎at‎the‎middle‎range 
 
 
 
 
ETV ETVW EF EFW BTF BTFW TV 
0.75 %90 0.25 %5 0.25 %5 0.65 
0.50 %90 0.25 %5 0.25 %5 0.425 
0.25 %90 0.25 %5 0.25 %5 0.199 
0.75 %90 0.5 %5 0.5 %5 0.625 
0.5 %90 0.5 %5 0.5 %5 0.399 
0.25 %90 0.5 %5 0.5 %5 0.175 
0.75 %90 0.75 %5 0.75 %5 0.6 
0.5 %90 0.75 %5 0.75 %5 0.375 
0.25 %90 0.75 %5 0.75 %5 0.15 
0.75 %90 1 %5 1 %5 0.575 
0.5 %90 1 %5 1 %5 0.350 
0.25 %90 1 %5 1 %5 0.124 
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Figure ‎10.5 The comparative results of various values for both errors and bad transactions 
with the middle range weights 
 
The weights are flexible and can be changed with the organisation’s 
policy. Compared to the results in Table 10.3, Table 10.4, and Table 10.5, the 
recommended weights are ETVW=85%, EFW=5%, and BTFW=10%. The 
Error Factor Weight is selected to be 5%, the middle range value, because an 
error cannot be as harmful as a bad transaction. For the Bad Transaction Factor 
Weight, the weight is recommended to be the highest value allowed, which is 
10%, because a bad transaction could reflect malicious intent. The results of 
these recommended weights are shown in Table 10.6. It appears that the Trust 
Value changes regularly and markedly for all starting points of the Existing 
Trust Value. The relation between TV and the error and Bad Transaction 
Factors is displayed in Figure 10.6. 
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Table ‎10.6 The results when errors and bad transactions’‎weights‎are‎at‎the‎recommended‎
weights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎10.6 The comparative results of various values for both errors and bad transactions 
with the recommended weights 
Having demonstrated the decrement in TV depending on various values 
of the Error Factor and Bad Transaction Factor, the increment in TV is now 
discussed. Table 10.7 displays the increment in Trust Value (TV) when there is 
ETV ETVW EF EFW BTF BTFW TV 
0.75 %85 0.25 %5 0.25 %10 0.6 
0.50 %85 0.25 %5 0.25 %10 0.387 
0.25 %85 0.25 %5 0.25 %10 0.175 
0.75 %85 0.5 %5 0.5 %10 0.562 
0.5 %85 0.5 %5 0.5 %10 0.35 
0.25 %85 0.5 %5 0.5 %10 0.137 
0.75 %85 0.75 %5 0.75 %10 0.524 
0.5 %85 0.75 %5 0.75 %10 0.312 
0.25 %85 0.75 %5 0.75 %10 0.099 
0.75 %85 1 %5 1 %10 0.487 
0.5 %85 1 %5 1 %10 0.275 
0.25 %85 1 %5 1 %10 0.062 
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no error and bad transaction whatsoever. The outcomes show different case 
studies. The calculations are made with the minimum, the maximum, the 
intermediate, and the recommended weights. Figure 10.7 compares the 
increment in TV with different weights. 
Table ‎10.7 The results when there are no errors or bad transactions whatsoever 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎10.7 The comparative results for different values of ETVW with no errors or bad 
transactions 
ETV ETVW EF EFW BTF BTFW TV 
0.75 %80 0 %10 0 %10 0.8 
0.50 %80 0 %10 0 %10 0.6 
0.25 %80 0 %10 0 %10 0.4 
0.75 %85 0 %5 0 %10 0.787 
0.50 %85 0 %5 0 %10 0.575 
0.25 %85 0 %5 0 %10 0.362 
0.75 %90 0 %5 0 %5 0.775 
0.50 %90 0 %5 0 %5 0.55 
0.25 %90 0 %5 0 %5 0.325 
0.75 %98 0 %1 0 %1 0.755 
0.50 %98 0 %1 0 %1 0.51 
0.25 %98 0 %1 0 %1 0.265 
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10.2.4 Conclusion  
The experimental results described the changes in TV depending on the 
values of errors and bad transactions and explained the effects of weights. After 
analysing the results, the recommendations for weights were made. Both 
increment and decrement in the calculations was displayed in graphical forms. In 
general, the results of this experiment were as expected. The TV increased when 
there were no errors and bad transactions whatsoever. It decreased if there were 
errors, bad transactions, or both. This experiment showed the flexibility of 
calculating TV for users, which supports using dynamic Trust Based Access 
Control to amend users’ privileges based on their operations to prevent insider 
threats.   
10.3 The Logging Experiment 
This Section shows and analyses the results for the logging experiment 
designed to evaluate logging in Trust Based Access Control for XML databases.  
10.3.1 The Experimental Design Summary 
This experiment was divided into two parts. The first part handled the 
creation process of the XLog file. The second focused on the reading from the 
log file. The main goal of the creation experiment is to measure the time 
required to create the XLog file and record processes. The retrieval experiments 
were used to evaluate the performance of reading the XLog files. 
10.3.2 Analytic Procedures  
Both the creation and retrieval experiments were executed with three 
types of XLog files. The first file type consists of errors. The second file type 
includes only bad transactions. The third has errors with bad transactions. These 
three XLog files were then tested in several steps depending on the number of 
recorded processes. The first and second XLog files start from 10 processes with 
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either errors or bad transaction until they reach 100 processes. In each step, the 
number of processes is increased by 10. Since the third XLog file has both errors 
and bad transactions, the number of processes is shared equally between them. 
This third XLog file runs from 20 to 200 processes. The number of processes is 
increased by 10 errors and 10 bad transactions each step.  
These experiments were executed by using two test factors, which are the 
process types and the number of processes. In the next Section, the results are 
described in graphical representations and the comparison between two 
processes is made.   
10.3.3 Results Analysis 
10.3.3.1 The Creation Process for the XLog File 
The results of creating the first XLog file that contains errors only and 
the second that includes only bad transactions were almost identical. This is 
because the time consumed for recording the same number of processes in 
different XLog files is similar even if the type of process is different. As result 
the creation of the XLog file is affected by the number of recorded processes 
regardless of their type. The time required to create the XLog file with 10 
processes with errors or bad transactions is 122 milliseconds. This time increases 
steadily by around 50 milliseconds when the number of errors or bad 
transactions is raised by 10 processes each time. When the number of either 
errors or bad transactions is 100 processes, the time reaches around 566 
milliseconds. Figure 10.8 illustrates the outcomes of the creation of the XLog 
file with only errors or only bad transactions. 
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Figure ‎10.8 The comparatives results of creating the XLog file with errors only or bad 
transaction only 
The time taken to create the third XLog file, which has a mixture of 
errors and bad transactions, is increased by around 100 milliseconds when the 
number of processes is increased by 20 processes. At the start, when the number 
of errors is 10 and the number of bad transactions is 10, the time for creating the 
XLog file with these 20 processes is 186 milliseconds. The creation time grows 
markedly until reaching 1,098 milliseconds when there are 200 processes, which 
are 100 errors and 100 bad transactions. Figure 10.9 shows the result of creating 
the XLog file with both errors and bad transactions. 
 
Figure ‎10.9 The required time for creating the XLog file with both errors and bad 
transactions 
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10.3.3.2 Reading the XLog File 
The time required for reading the XLog files that contained either only 
errors or only bad transactions is again similar. The time starts to increase from 
79 milliseconds to read 10 processes up to 103 milliseconds to read 100 
processes. The time is increased by around four milliseconds when the number 
of errors or bad transaction is increased by 10 processes. Figure 10.10 represents 
the time required to read an XLog file that contains only errors or only bad 
transactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎10.10 The comparatives results of reading the XLog file with errors only or bad 
transaction only 
The time consumed to read the third XLog file type, which has both 
errors and bad transactions, increases by around six milliseconds when the 
number of processes grows by 20 processes. The time to access the third XLog 
file starts from 82 when the number of processes is 20 and ends with 125 
milliseconds when the number of processes is 200. Figure 10.11 explains the 
results of reading and accessing the XLog file when half of the processes are 
errors and the others are bad transactions. 
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Figure ‎10.11 The required time for reading the XLog file with both errors and bad 
transactions 
The results of the creation and reading processes with both errors and bad 
transactions are compared in Figure 10.12. The comparison shows that the 
reading process is faster than the creation process for the XLog file. The time 
required for the creation increases significantly depending on the number of 
processes. In contrast, the time required for reading increases steadily while the 
number of processes grows.   
 
Figure ‎10.12 The comparative results of creation and reading processes with both errors and 
bad transactions 
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10.3.4 Conclusion 
This experiment focused on evaluating the creation of the Xlog file and 
reading it. This evaluation ensures that the Xlog file worked properly, which 
improves the security level and supports Trust Based Access Control for XML 
databases. In general, the time consumed for the reading process was always less 
than the time for creation. Both processes consumed a reasonable time: this was 
expected based on the dynamic design of the XLog file.  The creation and 
retrieval processes were not affected by the type of processes, whether errors or 
bad transactions. Both experiments are affected markedly by changing the 
number of processes in each step.  
10.4 The Access Control Module Experiment 
In this Section, the results of the access control module experiment to 
evaluate the performance of the access module in Trust Based Access Control 
for XML databases are discussed. 
10.4.1 The Experimental Design Summary 
As mentioned in Chapter 9, this experiment tested the access process in 
the access control module from performance, speed and scalability perspectives. 
To evaluate the access process performance, the access time taken with different 
databases and different numbers of users were measured. The access time 
consists of the search time for both the user and data Trust Values and the 
retrieval time from the original databases. The accessibility evaluation depends 
on accessing processing time for the three data sets with the three different 
numbers of users. The experimental results are compared in Section 10.4.3. Full 
results detail are shown in APPENDIX I. 
 
 
Chapter 10: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
129 
 
10.4.2 Analytic Procedures  
The access processing evaluation is executed in three steps: 
 Checking user’s TV search time: this is the time to find the user Trust Value 
in the user access permission policy file. 
 Checking data TV search time: the time to find the data’s Trust Value in the 
XML database permission policy file. 
 Checking node searched time: this is the time to retrieve the node 
information from the original XML database.  
Three real XML databases with different file sizes were tested: SIGMOD 
Record, NASA, and Treebank. This experiment was performed with a number of 
user access permission policy files with different number of users: 50, 100, and 
1,000. The results of each step are compared. The total required time for the 
entire access process is described. All results are displayed graphically in the 
next Section.  
10.4.3 Results Analysis 
The results include the search time for the user, the node and data, and 
the total time. Figure 10.13 shows the user’s TV search time for different XML 
databases with different number of users. In general, the time taken to find the 
user Trust Value increases directly with the growth in the number of users. It 
seems that the data set’s size does not cause marked changes in user TV search 
time. When the number of user is 50, the time is around 4 milliseconds. When 
the number of users is 100, the time is around 7.5 milliseconds. The time rises to 
reach 20 milliseconds when the number of user is 1,000. 
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Figure ‎10.13 User TV search time 
Figure 10.14 shows the result of searching data Trust Value in the XML 
database permission policy file with different data sets and different number of 
users. Since the XML database permission policy file is small and only contains 
the nodes’ structure without the repetition in the original XML database, the 
time consumed to find the data Trust Value is short. The time is not affected by 
the number of users. Correspondingly, it does not depend on data sets’ size and 
is only slightly affected by the XML database structure. The time for SIGMOD 
is around 1.4 milliseconds, NASA is about 2 milliseconds, and Treebank is 1.5 
milliseconds.  
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Figure 10.15 presents the result of retrieving data from the XML 
databases when access is permitted. It is evident that the time is affected mostly 
by XML databases’ sizes and it is not significantly affected by the changes in the 
number of users. The time for SIGMOD is nearly 37 milliseconds, NASA 724 
milliseconds, and Treebank 1,990 milliseconds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎10.15 Node search time 
 
Figure 10.16 shows the total access time for a specific node in three 
databases with different numbers of users. In general, this time is affected 
significantly by the retrieval time, which means that the final access time is 
dependent mainly on the size of the database. The time for SIGMOD is around 
0.15 seconds, NASA is about 2 seconds, and Treebank is 5.6 seconds.  
Figure 6: Node search time. 
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Figure ‎10.16 The access time using a variety of different sized users’‎sets 
 
10.4.4 Conclusion  
This experiment tested the performance and the scalability of the access 
control module to large XML databases and different numbers of users. Testing 
the access control module ensures that the access process is performed 
efficiently by checking users’ privileges based on TV, which prevents 
unauthorised transactions. The results showed that the access module worked 
with small (SIGMOD), medium (NASA), and large (Treebank) XML databases. 
The system was tested with different number of users to cover small (50), 
medium (100), and large (1,000) organisations. The time needed to discover a 
user’s Trust Value is affected by the number of users. The time to find data Trust 
Value is slightly affected by the XML databases’ structure. The retrieval time is 
mainly affected by the size of the databases. The total access time is affected 
chiefly by the retrieval time. The access performance is better than expected. 
This is because searching processes for users’ TV and data TV were relatively 
fast due to dividing policy rules into sub files. 
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10.5 The Trust Maintenance Experiment 
Combining the trust module and the access control module generates the 
system processes. These processes are classified into trust maintenance and 
access supervision (see Chapter 6). This Section describes the results of the trust 
maintenance experiment. 
10.5.1 The Experimental Design Summary 
This experiment was designed to test the performance, speed, and 
scalability in the trust maintenance process. The maintenance process consists of 
three sub processes: evaluating errors and bad transactions, calculating the Trust 
Value (TV), and updating users’ Trust Values. This process runs at a frequency 
depending on the organisation policy and is used to evaluate users’ behaviour 
and update their privileges. It could be performed hourly, daily, weekly, or 
monthly.  
10.5.2 Analytic Procedures  
The experiment was performed to evaluate the time required to 
accomplish the whole process. The total time of the trust maintenance includes: 
  The evaluation time: the required time to read the XLog file and count errors 
and bad transactions. 
 The calculation time: this time is used to calculate the new TV using the 
equations, given in Section 7.6. The calculation process is described in 
Chapter 7 and its experiment was discussed in Section 10.2. 
 The update time: the time needed to update the user Trust Value in the users’ 
access permission policy file. Updating the TV for the user means changing 
the user’s privilege to access the system. 
This experiment was performed with three versions of the users’ access 
permission policy file that include 50, 100, and 1,000 users. The results have 
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been compared graphically depending on the values of both the Error Factor and 
the Bad Transaction Factor. 
10.5.3 Results Analysis 
The time consumed for processing the trust maintenance is explained in 
Figure 10.17. The time was relatively short for all case studies. When the 
number of users was 50, the time was around 0.12 seconds for all values of the 
Error Factor and the Bad Transaction Factor. The time is 0.13 seconds with 100 
users and 0.18 with a 1,000 user sample. Changes in both the Error Factor and 
the Bad Transactions Factor do not affect the total time. The time increases 
slowly when the number of users grows. Extra results of repeating this 
experiment in platform two are in APPENDIX II and are consistent with these 
results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎10.17 The time consumed for the trust maintenance process 
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10.5.4 Conclusion  
This experiment aimed to evaluate the performance speed of the trust 
maintenance process. This evaluation confirms that security features worked 
properly in the system since this process included the evaluation errors and bad 
transactions, calculating TV, and updating privileges. The results show that 
running this process is quite fast and requires little time. The time is only slightly 
affected by the number of users in the system. As expected, it appears that the 
short and dynamic design of the XLog file leads to an efficient performance of 
the trust maintenance process.  
10.6 The Access Supervision Experiment 
The access supervision process is the second main process in the system. 
This Section discusses the experiment to test this process from the perspectives 
of functionality, performance, and scalability. The results are represented 
graphically in Section 10.6.3. Extra results for platform two are given in 
APPENDIX III. 
10.6.1 The Experimental Design Summary 
This experiment was designed to evaluate the access supervision process. 
The process includes three mini processes: access, detecting errors and bad 
transactions, and recording in the log file. It is performed for each access 
request. The experiment tested its speed and its performance in both cases; when 
the access is permitted and denied.   
10.6.2 Analytic Procedures  
The time required to perform the access supervision process is measured 
in milliseconds. This total time includes: 
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 The access time: when the access is permitted, this is the time required to 
access and retrieve data from the XML databases. This was described in 
detail in the access control module experiment (see Section 10.4). 
 The detection time: the time needed to capture errors and bad transaction in 
the XML query. 
 The recording time: the time to record errors and bad transactions in the 
XLog file. 
The performance of the supervision process was tested through two 
queries. The first query consisted of deleting the root node from the XML 
databases [Q1: Deleting/RootNode]. This query is denied and is recorded as a 
bad transaction. The second query concerns retrieving a specific node from the 
XML databases [Q2: //NodeName]. This query is a permitted access. The total 
time for both situations is compared with three different data sets: SIGMOD 
Record, NASA, and Treebank. Three user sets were also used in the evaluation 
process.  
10.6.3 Results Analysis 
The result of the supervision process when access is denied and the 
operation is recorded in the XLog file as a bad transaction is illustrated in Figure 
10.18. The time consumed to complete the supervision process for the first query 
is relatively short because the retrieval time from the original databases does not 
include any access. The time needed includes the search time for the Trust 
Values for both users and data and the time required for logging. In this case 
study, the time is slightly affected by the number of users. For three different 
data sets, the time consumed is around 87 milliseconds when the number of 
users is 50. The time is 96 milliseconds for 100 users and around 128 
milliseconds for 1,000 users. 
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Figure ‎10.18 The time consumed for processing the access supervision process in the first 
query (Q1) 
Figure 10.19 shows the results when the access is permitted using the 
second query (Q2). The supervision process takes longer to execute the second 
query. The final access decision for the second query is to permit it, so that the 
access time includes the retrieval time, which depends on the XML database 
size. The time increases with the growth in the size of XML databases. The time 
is between 155 and 183 milliseconds for SIGMOD Record. The time range for 
NASA is from 2,039 milliseconds with 50 users to 2,086 milliseconds with 
1,000 users. The total time significantly increases in Treebank due to the size of 
the XML database. It reaches 6,101 milliseconds with 1,000 users.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎10.19 The time consumed for processing the access supervision process in the second 
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The comparative results of the time consumed for supervising the process 
in the system for both situations (Q1 and Q2) with 1,000 users are summarised 
in Figure 10.20. 
 
 
 
Figure ‎10.20 The time consumed for processing the access supervision process with 1,000 
users 
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10.7 The Experiment to Determine the Cost of Trust Based 
Access Control (TBAC) 
In this Section, the use of Trust Based Access Control is evaluated by 
measuring the real time cost. The comparison experiment for the system with 
and without TBAC is described in Section 10.7.3.  
10.7.1 The Experimental Design Summary 
The main goal of this experiment is to evaluate the performance of Trust 
Based Access Control. This experiment aims to evaluate the time required to 
apply Trust Based Access Control for XML databases by comparing the time 
with and without this control.  
10.7.2 Analytic Procedures  
This experiment evaluated the access time with and without Trust Based 
Access Control. It was performed in two steps. The first step measured the real 
time cost of applying Trust Based Access Control for XML databases. The 
second compared the results with the normal access time. 
The first part of the experiment tested the scalability in XML databases 
and the number of users. XMark benchmark was used to generate eleven XML 
databases with different file sizes. Table 11.3 shows the size of each XML 
database used in the experiment. Three user sets (50, 100, and 1,000) were used 
in the first step of experiment. 
For simplicity, only read privilege was tested through two queries. The 
first was a simple query [Q3: //site/open_auctions/open_auction/initial]. The 
second was a complex query that includes joins of ancestor-descendant [Q4: 
//listitem//keyword].  
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The normal access time was again tested through these queries. The 
comparative results are represented graphically in the next Section. In the 
comparison, the number of users was selected to be 50 as its minimum because 
the main aim of this experiment is to measure the access time with and without 
Trust Based Access Control and not to check the scalability in the number of 
users.  
10.7.3 Results Analysis 
The results of Trust Based Access Control for XML databases with the 
simple query are summarised in Figure 10.21 and those with the complex query 
are illustrated in Figure 10.22. The results for Trust Based Access Control are 
affected markedly by changing the size of the XML database. The real time 
consumed increases as the database size increases. The results with three user 
sets in both queries are very similar, which means that changing the number of 
users does not have great consequence in the system. The performance of the 
simple query is slightly faster than the complex query. The time for simple 
query starts with 50 milliseconds when the XML database size is 0.027MB and 
reaches 3.8 seconds when the XML database size is 30.2MB. In the results of 
the complex query, the time consumed is 54 milliseconds when the XML 
database size is 0.027MB and it is 4.1 seconds when the size is 30.2MB. 
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Figure ‎10.21 The results of TBAC in the simple query 
 
 
Figure ‎10.22 The results of TBAC in the complex query 
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After finding the real time required for Trust Based Access Control, the 
comparative results with the normal access time are illustrated in the following 
figures. Figure 10.23 and Figure 10.24 compare the results of access time for 
both queries (Q3 and Q4) in eleven different sizes of XML databases with and 
without Trust Based Access Control. The time consumed for Trust Based 
Access Control is longer than the time consumed without it for both queries. In 
the simple query, the time for Trust Based Access Control increases markedly 
when the size of the files is increased. The normal time to access the 0.027MB 
file is 31 milliseconds while the time consumed for Trust Based Access Control 
for the same file is 49 milliseconds. Then the time for Trust Based Access 
Control increases sharply to reach 3,863 milliseconds when the file size is 
30.2MB. This time is almost double the normal time to access the 30.2MB file.  
Using the complex query, the time starts at 50 milliseconds when the file 
size is 0.027MB and then reaches 4,076 milliseconds when the file size is 
30.2MB. As expected, the access time without Trust Based Access Control is 
shorter. When the file size is 0.027MB, it needs around 32 milliseconds. Then 
the time increases gradually to reach 1,971 milliseconds when the file size is 
30.2MB. 
Figure ‎10.23 The comparative results for with and without TBAC in the simple query (Q3) 
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Figure ‎10.24 The comparative results for with and without TBAC in the complex query Q4 
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10.8 The Comparison with Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC) Experiment 
This Section compares the performance speed of the proposed Trust 
Based Access Control system for XML databases with the traditional Mandatory 
Access Control for XML databases. 
10.8.1 The Experimental Design Summary 
The experiment aims to compare Trust Based Access Control and the 
Mandatory Access Control. As mentioned in Chapter 9, the Mandatory Access 
Control was selected for two main reasons. It is one of three main traditional 
access types. Using a well-known and well-established approach in the 
comparison makes the results fairer and more reasonable. The Mandatory 
Access Control approach is practically applied to XML databases and the 
experimental results were published by (Zhu et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 2009). 
10.8.2 Analytic Procedures  
Some results of the Trust Based Access Control with 1,000 users that 
were described in the previous experiment (Section 10.7) are also used here. For 
comparison, the published results of Mandatory Access Control were provided 
by Zhu et al. (Zhu et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 2009). The comparison between two 
systems was run with six different databases’ sizes that were generated by 
XMark benchmark. These sizes were selected for ease of comparison with the 
published experimental work in the Mandatory Access Control. Both systems 
were tested using the simple and complex queries. The simple query was [Q3: 
//site/open_auctions/open_auction/initial] and the complex query was [Q4: 
//listitem//keyword]. The comparative results of the performance speed are 
presented graphically in the next Section. 
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10.8.3 Results Analysis 
In terms of security, Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is one of the 
main traditional types of access control that are well-established, as mentioned 
in Chapter 3. It manages the access process based on classifying both subjects 
and objects into security levels. This approach has two main principles: read-
down and write-up. Although it provides a high level of security, it is not 
widely used due to difficulties in classifying security levels in organisations. It 
also suffers from limitations in data integrity concepts due to using the write-up 
principle. 
 On the other hand, Trust Based Access Control (TBAC) is considered 
to be one of the new types of access control (see Chapter 4). The access process 
depends on the trust management system that evaluates users’ operations over 
time. It is unlike MAC, which is static; it provides dynamic access control that 
updates privileges based on Trust Value (TV). Trust Based Access Control 
(TBAC) protects data from misuse by both outsiders and insiders by capturing 
bad transactions and errors. In contrast, MAC, like other traditional types, can 
prevent misuse by outsiders but can only handle limited forms of insider 
threats. Trust Based Access Control provides automatic calculations for TV that 
make the classification process for users’ privileges easier than MAC, where 
classification can not be automatic. Although TBAC provides many new 
security features, it needs further developments to improve its functionalities.    
This experiment compared the performance between TBAC and MAC 
for XML databases in practice. To obtain accurate results, the same data sets 
and a similar environment that has most of the platform features were used. The 
platform used by TBAC was slightly different in terms of operating system. 
MAC was run in Windows XP but TBAC was run in Windows 7. This point 
may affect the reliability of this experiment to some extent. 
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   The comparative results between the Trust Based Access Control and 
the Mandatory Access Control are displayed in Figure 10.25 and Figure 10.26. 
Figure 10.25 shows the results for the simple query (Q3) in six different XML 
databases. In general, the performance of Trust Based Access Control is 
markedly faster than the Mandatory Access Control. The time was 50 
milliseconds for TBAC and 220 milliseconds for MAC when the size of the 
database is 0.027MB. The time increased significantly in Mandatory Access 
Control to reach 3,900 milliseconds when the XML database size was 7MB. On 
the other hand, the time consumed for Trust Based Access Control grows slowly 
while the size of the database increases until it reaches 844 milliseconds for 
7MB.    
Figure ‎10.25 The comparative results between TBAC and MAC in the simple query (Q3) 
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Figure ‎10.26 The comparative results between TBAC and MAC in the complex query Q4 
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shorter than the Mandatory Access Control with all XML databases and both 
queries. The interesting comparative results suggest that the Trust Based Access 
Control added more security features with little time and storage cost; this was 
unexpected. The storage cost will be described in the next Chapter. 
10.9 Conclusion 
The experimental results were presented in this Chapter. Each 
experiment was discussed in detail and the main outcomes identified in its 
specific Section. The results of the first experiment displayed the flexibility in 
the calculation process of Trust Value. The second experiment showed that the 
writing and reading in the XLog file were affected by the number of recorded 
processes regardless of the type of process. The third experiment measured the 
access time in the access control module and identified that the total time 
depended on the retrieval time. The results of the trust maintenance experiment 
illustrated that this process needed little time due to the dynamic design of the 
XLog file. The fifth experiment explained the time consumed to run the access 
supervision process when the access is permitted and denied. The results showed 
that the process is faster when the access is denied because it did not include the 
retrieval time. The process time increased when the access was permitted and 
varied depending on the size of the XML databases. The comparative results in 
the sixth and seventh experiments showed that the Trust Based Access Control 
consumed a reasonable time while adding more security features compared to 
existing techniques. 
 
In general, the results were acceptable. The evaluations for these results 
and the limitations of the experimental design are described in the next Chapter. 
Chapter 11 revisits the research hypotheses and summarises the main findings of 
applying the Trust Based Access Control for XML databases. 
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11 EVALUATION 
11.1 Introduction 
Chapter 10 provided and analysed the results of the experiment. In this 
Chapter, the system in general is evaluated (Section 11.2) and the experimental 
design and the results for specific experiments are evaluated individually 
(Section 11.3). The storage consumed by applying Trust Based Access Control 
for XML databases is also evaluated in Section 11.4. After the evaluation, the 
features and the limitations of experiments are summarised in Section 11.5. 
Section 11.6 contains the conclusions. 
11.2 The System’s Overall Evaluation 
This Section describes the evaluation of the Trust Based Access Control 
for XML databases. The system was proposed based on the research hypothesis 
stated in Chapter 5 (Section 5.3): 
 “Since the Trust Based Access Control (TBAC) approach has been 
applied successfully in many areas, such as networks and virtual 
organisations, it may also improve security in the XML database research field 
by providing security to protect sensitive and confidential data from misuse by 
both outsiders and insiders while not restricting appropriate access.” 
This approach aimed to improve the security of XML databases as 
mentioned in the Section on the research objectives and contribution (Section 
5.4). It intended to improve the security level in XML databases by providing a 
new dynamic access control for the XML database environment that depends on 
trust.  The trust access control aimed to evaluate user’s behaviour over time and 
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update privileges automatically. The improvement in the user performance could 
be considered as a side effect of using this technique but it has not been tested in 
this thesis.  
To test the research hypothesis, the Trust Based Access Control for XML 
databases was implemented successfully. The design of the system was 
described in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. The system performance was evaluated by 
developing seven different experiments. These experiments were designed to 
ensure that the Trust Based Access Control could be applied to XML databases. 
The experimental design was discussed in Chapter 9 and the empirical results 
were analysed in Chapter 10. 
It is clear that the research hypothesis was supported by reasonable and 
expected results based on the proposal (Chapter 5), the system design (Chapters 
6 to 8), the experimental design (Chapter 9), and the results (Chapter 10). The 
trust access control was applied and extensively tested on XML databases. The 
results met the objectives and expectations. In general, the Trust Based Access 
Control for XML databases worked properly, protected sensitive data, evaluated 
users’ behaviours, and updated privileges automatically with reasonable 
performance time. 
This Section aims to evaluate the overall system to identify further 
improvements. Although the system was implemented properly and the results 
were obtained as hoped, some further improvements can be made to develop the 
system’s efficiency. From the system design perspective, the Trust Value (TV) 
depends only on the direct trust and ignores the indirect trust. This concept 
worked properly and the TV was calculated correctly. The TV could be extended 
to depend on more factors such as the time and place. As mentioned in Chapter 
6, the indirect trust is not relevant in the databases area. However, indirect 
factors rules could be included the calculations as additional features. For 
example, the recommendations factor can be used by the administrator of the 
system. The calculation technique for the TV was simple, which made the 
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system implementation phase easier and the performance faster. This technique 
could be improved considering machine learning and probability. This point will 
be discussed further under the heading of future works (Chapter 12).  
The assignment of TV to nodes in XML databases could be developed by 
identifying group nodes that have the same TV which reduce the time and 
storage consumed. This will also be discussed as future work. 
The system was designed to evaluate the user behaviour by capturing 
errors and bad transactions. Detecting errors and bad transactions depended on 
policy rules. In this system there were five rules for capturing bad transactions 
and three for capturing the errors. They were designed for the initial stage to 
ensure the system’s functionality and were simple and limited to basic 
transactions in XML databases. They could easily be extended to cover more 
complex rules. Many rules for errors or bad transactions can be defined 
depending on a schema. Moreover, the method for detecting errors and bad 
transactions can be extended with other techniques used to capture insider 
threats (Yi and Panda, 2003; Chinchani et al., 2005; Chagarlamudi et al., 2009). 
These viewpoints are considered as suggestions in the future work, which is 
described in Chapter 12.  
 From an implementation perspective, applying the Trust Based Access 
Control for XML databases worked perfectly. The system was tested with 
different real data sets (Treebank, NASA, SIGMOD Record) and synthetic 
benchmarks (XMark). The larger data sets such as DBLP were not used due to 
the limitations in the resources. The scalability test can be developed by 
providing better facilities. The user sets covered small (50), medium (100), and 
large (1,000) organisations. The results were enough to gather and analyse data. 
More user sets may be used to provide further analysis. The practical evaluations 
for experimental results are discussed in detail in the next Section.    
Chapter 11: EVALUATION 
 
152 
 
11.3 The Experiments Evaluation 
This Section evaluates the experimental design (see Chapter 9) and 
results (see Chapter 10). In general, all results were reasonable and acceptable, 
as expected, but further improvements can be made.  
11.3.1 The Trust Module Experiment 
This Section discusses the evaluation of the design and the results of the 
first experiment, which focused on calculating Trust Value (TV). The design of 
this experiment (see Chapter 9) was simple and met its objectives. The 
experimental results were appropriate and accurate. The Trust Value increased 
when there were no errors or bad transaction, otherwise it declined. The results 
show flexibility in calculating TV depends on six factors. The weights can be 
changed depending on organisation policy to provide more freedom. The 
calculations were repeated with different weights (the maximum, the minimum, 
the medium range) then the recommended weights were selected. The 
recommended weights were selected to keep the Trust Value (TV) dynamic with 
respect to other access rules.   
This experiment can be easily extended to cover other factors in the 
calculations. Although, the experimental results were enough to make the 
recommendations, the experiment can be repeated with other various readings to 
find more results for scalability evaluation.    
11.3.2 The Logging Experiment 
This Section evaluates the design of the XLog file and the results for 
reading and writing processes. The dynamic design of the XLog file makes the 
performance of reading, writing, and other related processes fast and easy. The 
results, as expected, showed that reading consumed less time than writing. Both 
processes’ performances were affected markedly by the number of recorded 
processes regardless of the type. 
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From all results, it appears that using logging to both detect insider 
threats and update privileges in the Trust Based Access Control worked well and 
was therefore worthwhile. Logging is an important topic in security but it is 
rarely discussed in XML databases’ literature. This approach of using logging in 
Trust Based Access Control and its results adds useful information to the 
literature on XML databases security. This leads to the question whether to 
apply traditional logging to XML databases. This viewpoint will be discussed 
later in the future work (Chapter 12).   
11.3.3 The Access Control Module Experiment 
The evaluation for the design and results of the access control module are 
discussed here. The simple design technique (see Chapter 9) used to find and 
compare the Trust Value (TV) for both the user and the node worked accurately. 
The results in Chapter 10 showed that the access time was affected mainly by the 
retrieval time, which depended on the size of XML databases. Due to the 
resources and time limitation, the scalability test for the access control module 
was run with only three data sets and three user sets. This test could be repeated 
with various data sets and user sets to find more results. 
11.3.4 The Trust Maintenance Experiment 
This experiment was designed to test the performance speed for the trust 
maintenance. The frequency of the trust maintenance process is defined by the 
organisation policy. The results showed that the time consumed was very short 
with different user sets. It is recommended to perform this process very 
frequently, such as hourly. This makes the system dynamic and more responsive 
to user behaviour. The short time required is related to the short and dynamic 
structure of the XLog file. 
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11.3.5 The Access Supervision Experiment 
This Section evaluates the design and results of the access supervision 
process. The experiment was performed in two cases where access was 
permitted or denied with two simple XPath queries. The first was considered a 
bad transaction and the second a normal transaction. The results demonstrated 
that the time consumed when access is denied is shorter than when the access is 
permitted. The access time when access was allowed is mainly affected by the 
size of XML databases. 
The design worked well and the results were reasonable; however, 
further improvements can be made to obtain more accurate results. The XML 
query syntax could be executed as an XQuery rather than XPath. Although, 
XQuery is more complicated than XPath, it is widely used in XML applications. 
The scalability test could be extended to cover XML benchmarks. The 
experiment could be repeated with several sizes of benchmarks’ data sets. 
Moreover, the access supervision could be tested using the query sets designed 
by benchmarks to obtain comparative results.  
11.3.6 The Experiment to Determine the Cost of Trust Based Access Control 
(TBAC) 
This experiment was designed to test the whole system with eleven data 
sets generated by XMark using two XPath queries. The first query is simple and 
the second is complex. The results showed that Trust Based Access Control ran 
in reasonable time. The time is affected by the size of the data sets. These results 
were compared with the normal access result without TBAC. The comparative 
results showed that the access time in Trust Based Access Control is around 
double the normal access time. Even though Trust Based Access Control 
required more time, it provided more security features in an acceptable time 
range.  
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The experimental design and results were respectable but they could 
include more developments. The scalability test was performed with eleven data 
sets starting from 0.027MB to reach 30.2MB. The size ranges were selected with 
respect to the resources limitations. The system performance could be tested 
with larger databases on faster machines. With regard to the data sets generated 
by XMark, the query sets could also be used to check the performance and 
obtain more comparative results. 
11.3.7 The Comparison with MAC Experiment 
This Section evaluates the comparison between the Trust Based Access 
Control and the Mandatory Access Control for XML databases. The results 
showed that the TBAC performed faster than traditional Mandatory Access 
Control. This experiment presented good comparative results. It seems that the 
Trust Based Access Control improved security in XML databases within a 
reasonable time range.  
The comparison was limited to the Mandatory Access Control because it 
is implemented practically and has published results. Other traditional and new 
access approaches have been proposed but only theoretically without 
implementations. Implementing these approaches to obtain the results is beyond 
the scope of this work. It is possible that authors of other approaches may 
publish results in the future. It would be an interesting comparison.  
11.4 The Storage Evaluation 
Although this research concerns the security aspect in XML databases, 
this Section discusses storage in the Trust Based Access Control in general. The 
storage evaluation focuses on measuring space consumed to store the XML files.   
The Trust Based Access Control uses seven types of XML files, which include 
the XLog file, the error policy file, the operation policy file, the trust policy file, 
the XML database’s permission policy file, the user’s permission policy file, and 
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the original XML database. The structure, the syntax, and the contents of these 
files were described earlier in Chapters 7 and 8. This Section evaluates the file 
size, the disk size, and finds the total storage space required.  
The XLog file size changes depending on the type and number of 
recorded transactions. Three types of the XLog files were evaluated: with errors 
only, bad transactions only, and a mixture of both. When the file contains errors 
only, the size increases gradually with the number of recorded errors. The file 
size starts at 471 Bytes with ten errors and grows to reach 4,119 Bytes with 100 
errors. The disk size remains stable at 4,096 Bytes for all versions of the XLog 
file but the disk size doubles when the number of errors is 100. The file size 
consumes more storage space when the XLog file contains bad transactions only. 
The file size is 649 Bytes when the number of bad transaction is 10 and 5,919 
Bytes when the number of bad transaction is 100. The disk size is 4,096 Bytes 
when the XLog file contains 10 to 60 bad transactions and 8,192 Bytes when the 
XLog file has 70, 80, 90, and 100 bad transactions. Figure 11.1 shows both the 
file size and the disk size for the XLog file when it has errors only or bad 
transactions only. The size of the XLog file that has both errors and bad 
transaction increases markedly when the number of process is increased. The file 
size is 1,094 Bytes when it has 10 errors and 10 bad transactions. It reaches 
10,019 Bytes when the XLog file includes 100 errors and 100 bad transactions. 
The disk size keeps stable for three or four versions and then increases by 4,096 
Bytes each time. Figure 11.2 illustrates the storage consumed for the XLog file 
including both errors and bad transactions. 
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.  
Figure ‎11.1 The file size and the disk size for the XLog file containing errors only or bad 
transactions only 
 
Figure ‎11.2 The file size and the disk size for the XLog file containing a mixture of errors or 
bad transactions 
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The three policy files are related to the trust module – the error policy 
file, the operation policy file and the trust policy file – were not tested as 
multiple versions unlike the XLog file, but they could easily be extended to 
cover additional policy rules. In general, these files consume little storage space. 
The file size for the error policy is 288 Bytes, for the operation policy is 486 
Bytes, and for the trust policy is 955 Bytes. All three files require the same disk 
size 4,096 Bytes.  
The users’ access permission policy file was evaluated with three user 
sets: 50, 100, and 1,000. The storage required increased depending on the 
increase in the number of users. When the file includes 50 users, the file size is 
5,368 Bytes and the disk size is 8,192 Bytes. This file size increases to 10,843 
Bytes and the disk size to 12,288 Bytes with 100 users. When the number of 
users is 1,000, the file size is 107,146 Bytes and the disk size is 110,592 Bytes. 
The storage required for the users’ permission policy file with three user sets is 
presented graphically in Figure 11.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎11.3 The‎file‎size‎and‎the‎disk‎size‎for‎the‎users’‎access‎permission‎policy‎file 
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The databases’ permission policy file size is related to the structure of the 
XML database. The storage space consumed while applying the Trust Based 
Access Control with the three real-world data sets, were used in the experiments 
(see Chapter 9), is explained in Table 11.1. This table measures the file size in 
kilobytes (KB) for all XML files used in the system with 50 users and 20 
recorded processes in the XLog file. Based on this table, Figure 11.4 compares 
the storage required for three data sets with their own and with TBAC to find the 
storage cost for using the Trust Based Access Control. This diagram shows that 
the storage space required to apply TBAC is small, around 9KB. The storage 
needed for the XML data sets with and without TBAC is almost the same.  
 
Table ‎11.1 The file size storage consumed by applying TBAC for the selected real-world data 
sets 
The name of file SIGMOD Record NASA TreeBank 
The original XML file 466 24,464 84,065 
The‎XML‎database’s‎
permission policy file 
0.571 1.32 0.815 
The‎user’s‎access‎
permission policy file 
(50) 
5.242 5.242 5.242 
The error policy file 0.281 0.281 0.281 
The operation policy file 0.474 0.474 0.474 
The trust policy file 0.932 0.932 0.932 
The XLog file (20) 1.024 1.024 1.024 
Total size 474.524 (KB) 24,473.273 (KB) 84,073.768 (KB) 
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Figure ‎11.4 The comparison between the storage consumed with and without TBAC for three 
selected real data sets 
The storage consumed by Trust Based Access Control with the eleven 
data sets generated by the XMark ( see Chapter 9), are illustrated in Figure 11.5. 
The total file sizes for each data set with TBAC are larger than the original file 
size by around 10 KB. The total file sizes are the summation of the XML files 
(seven types) used in TBAC.  
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To compare the storage required for Trust Based Access Control (TBAC) 
and Mandatory Access Control (MAC), only six data sets out of elven were used 
to match the published material. As mentioned earlier, the storage required for 
the Trust Based Access Control includes the file size of the XLog file, the error 
policy file, the operation policy file, the trust policy file, the users’ access 
permission policy file, the database’s access permission policy file, and the 
XML data set file. The Trust Based Access Control approach breaks down 
policies into many files to avoid repetition in assigning TV for data. This 
technique saves much storage space. In contrast, Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC) includes the access policy in the XML data set file. This increases the 
storage space required for MAC as assigning labels to data is repeated. In 
general, the storage space required to handle the data set in Mandatory Access 
Control is larger than in Trust Based Access Control. Figure 11.6 shows the 
storage space for the normal XML data sets, with both TBAC and with MAC.  
 
Figure ‎11.6 The comparison between the storage consumed with TBAC and MAC for XMark 
data sets 
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11.5 The Features, Limitations, and The Main Findings of 
The Experiments 
Although the seven experiments were intended to be simple, accurate, 
and effective, they had limitations. The features of these experiments are 
described in Section 11.5.1; the limitations are highlighted in Section 11.5.2.  
11.5.1 Features of the Experiments 
In order to meet the objectives below, seven experiments were designed 
to cover a number of aspects. The objectives were: 
 to implement the Trust Based Access Control for XML databases in real 
environments and find the system’s actual performance. 
 to test the system over several XML databases. The data sets were selected 
carefully to include different structures such as depth. Both natural and 
synthetic data sets were used. 
 to include comprehensive view points to test XML databases such as 
functionality, performance, and scalability. 
 to provide the experimental design and results to be published and available 
for further and related research.  
11.5.2 Limitations of The Experiments 
Although the experiments worked accurately, they suffer from some 
limitations. The experimental design was simple and covered only basic aspects. 
The theory behind this was to ensure that the system works properly first before 
extending it to cover more complex features. They could be extended to obtain 
more elaborate results by using more data sets, user sets, and query sets 
generated by benchmarks. The limitation on the XML database size due to the 
need to keep it in memory could be improved through using a larger computer 
but it will always be a restriction.  Many technical points, which were described 
in detail in the previous Sections, could be used to improve and extend the 
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system as future work (Chapter 12). These cover calculation techniques, the 
rules for detecting errors and bad transaction, the method for capturing insider 
threats and the access queries language.  
11.5.3 The Main Findings of the Experiments 
The important finding is that the experiment results confirmed the main 
idea in the research hypothesis. In general, all the experiments showed that the 
Trust Based Access Control can be applied practically to XML databases. They 
demonstrated the flexibility in calculating Trust Value, simplicity in capturing 
errors and bad transaction, regularity in the access process, and scalability with 
different data sets and user sets. Each experiment met its objectives. The results 
of the experiments can be summarised by saying that the Trust Based Access 
Control provides more security features with reasonable time and storage. The 
main findings of the whole research are described in the next Chapter. 
11.6 Conclusion 
Initially, in order to develop the system, some simple rules were applied 
to ensure that the system worked perfectly, before any further developments 
were made. The Trust Based Access Control has been applied to XML databases 
but it can be extended to cover further developments. This Chapter evaluated the 
experiments and their results. Limitations in the system and experiments were 
identified. Some suggestions and improvements were mentioned briefly. They 
are explained in more detail in the future work Section in the next Chapter. 
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12 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
12.1  Introduction 
This work attempted to improve security in XML databases using 
dynamic trust access control. The objectives, design, experiments, results, and 
evaluation were described in the previous Chapters. This is the final Chapter of 
the thesis. Section 12.2 summarises the work completed in relation to this 
research. The main contributions of the research are highlighted in Section 12.3; 
it relates the outcomes to the hypothesis in 12.4. Further development and future 
work are discussed in Section 12.5.   
12.2 Thesis Summary 
Based on the system development life cycle (SDLC) (Avison and 
Fitzgerald, 2006) that is widely used in system engineering and information 
systems, this research was designed to provide more security features for XML 
databases. The objective was to improve security in XML databases using 
dynamic access control depending on trust. These objectives were defined in 
Chapter 5. XML databases are an active research topic due to a recent increase 
in their use (Abiteboul et al., 2000; Champion, 2001; Vakali et al., 2005; Sun 
and Wang, 2011; Noaman and Almansour, 2012; Verma et al., 2012; Desai, 
2013; Vela et al., 2013). As with any database, they can contain sensitive and 
important data; therefore, it is imperative to be able to provide a secure 
environment to deal with such data. Secure systems need access control to 
manage access to the data and prevent unauthorised and malicious processes.  
Traditional access models are limited in that they are static and focused 
mostly on protection from outsiders (Xing et al., 2010; Sun and Wang, 2011). 
Access control is one of the main issues in XML databases that need further 
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investigation (Sun and Wang, 2011; Verma et al., 2012; Desai, 2013). There has 
been extensive research in this area, discussed in Chapter 3, but many points still 
need to be developed. At present there is no golden standard for access control in 
XML databases (Lee and Yu, 2008; Gonzalez et al., 2009). 
Trust Based Access Control is an established technology and is used in 
many areas, such as networks and virtual organisations (Almenarez et al., 2006; 
Lin et al., 2006; Ma et al., 2008; Xing et al., 2010; Singh, 2011). It depends on a 
trust management system, which automatically calculates and updates the Trust 
Values of users. Trust Values rely on users’ behaviour, history, credit, and 
operations. Users can access resources for which their Trust Value is 
appropriate. 
The Trust Based Access Control tracks users’ errors and bad transactions 
over time and updates their privileges dynamically. It prevents outsiders’ attacks 
as well as insiders’ malicious processes, effectively preventing users from taking 
advantage of their role within certain limits.  
  Chapter 1 outlined the thesis structure and listed the published work. 
Chapter 2 described the main topics in XML databases such as components, 
syntax, and parsing. Chapter 3 explained security in XML databases and 
discussed the access control approaches and methods used in current research. 
Access control models for XML databases can be categorised into the 
Discretionary Access Control model (DAC), the Mandatory Access Control 
model (MAC), and Role Based Access Control (RBAC) (Hitchens and 
Varadharajan, 2001; Wang and Osborn, 2004; Zhu et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 2009; 
Rashid et al., 2010; Sun and Wang, 2011). The related work on Trust Based 
Access Control was then discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 described the 
research motivations and objectives and highlighted the hypothesis.  
 The design stage includes Chapters 6, 7, and 8. The overall structure of 
Trust Based Access Control was described in Chapter 6. The system consists of 
two modules: the trust module and the access control module. It focuses on 
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observing users’ behaviour by recording and evaluating bad transactions and 
errors. The access control module aims to make access decision depending on 
the access policies. Each of these two modules contains many components.  
The trust module includes an operation recorder, an error detector, an 
operation evaluator, and a trust calculator. The operation recorder registers both 
errors and bad transactions in an XLog file. The error detector and the operation 
evaluator depend on policy files that define what an error or a bad transaction is. 
The trust calculator calculates the new Trust Value depending on three factors: 
existing Trust Value, Error Factor, and Bad Transaction Factor. The trust module 
was explained in detail in Chapter 7. 
 The access module consists of the access manager, which works in the 
light of access policies files and the access decision maker, and is responsible for 
handling queries. It either permits or denies the request. The access control 
module was explained in Chapter 8. 
After designing the system, it was implemented. Implementation was 
tested using seven experiments that included several tools, data sets, and user 
sets. Chapter 9 showed the experimental design and Chapter 10 illustrated the 
practical results of applying Trust Based Access Control for XML databases.   
Then the evaluation of the implementation included the experimental 
design and results. It can be summarised by saying that applying Trust Based 
Access Control for XML databases consumed reasonable time and storage. The 
system is important in that it tackles security problems in XML databases by 
reducing misuse and the cost is not excessive. The following Section discusses 
the research contributions.   
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12.3 The Main Contributions of the Research(Findings) 
This research addressed the security problems in XML databases and 
offered a solution. It aimed to take advantage of trust approach, which is used in 
other areas, and applied it to XML databases. This thesis and published work 
contributed to the literature on the following main points: 
 A new dynamic access control type for XML databases depending on a trust 
factor that evaluates user behaviours over time and updates the privileges. 
 The research provided more security for XML databases. 
 The research can capture misuse from both insiders and outsiders and so 
improved the security level for handling XML databases. 
  The research offered empirical proof of Trust Based Access Control for 
XML databases. 
12.4 Relating Research Outcomes to Hypothesis 
The research hypothesis in Chapter 5 proposed that the Trust Based 
Access Control can be applied to improve the security of XML databases. As 
can be seen from experimental results and evaluation, the trust access control 
approach was successfully applied to XML databases with reasonable cost in 
terms of time and storage.  
The hypothesis was tested with seven experiments using several data sets 
and user sets. Interesting results were found that showed the flexibility, 
simplicity, and efficiency of using Trust Based Access Control for XML 
databases. The first experiment showed the flexibility in calculating Trust Value 
based on several factors. The second experiment developed the XLog file that 
was used to record bad transactions and errors. The third experiment explained 
and measured the access process. The fourth and fifth experiments tested the 
whole system and measured the time consumed to perform the trust maintenance 
and the access supervision. The sixth and seventh experiments found the real 
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cost of using trust access control in XML databases and compared it with normal 
access and the Mandatory Access Control. All results supported the hypothesis 
and provided worthwhile information regarding security in XML databases.   
12.5 Future Work 
Trust Based Access Control is a relatively new approach in security. 
Applying this type of access control to XML databases is a novel idea proposed 
in this thesis. The research work in the thesis covered many points but still there 
is plenty of scope for further investigation.  
More complex calculation techniques could be used to calculate the Trust 
Value. The trust calculator could depend on numerous approaches in machine 
learning and probability such as Bayes’ theorem (Almenarez et al., 2006). The 
way the Trust Value is assigned to the node could also be improved to reduce 
time consumed and storage space. The Trust Value could be assigned to a group 
of nodes rather than just one node using techniques that are used in compression 
XML databases (Müldner et al., 2009).  
The rules for defining errors and bad transactions could be extended to 
capture other problems. One way to extend the rules is to use a schema to find 
changes in the XML databases’ structure. If a transaction would cause damage to 
the schema structure, it could be classified as a bad transaction. If the transaction 
could affect the structure, it might be defined as an error. 
 Beside the rules, the method used to capture bad transactions and errors 
could also be improved based on the techniques used for insider threats. Insider 
threat is a huge topic in security and different approaches have been proposed to 
solve this problem. This topic included tackling the transactions sequence as a 
way of capturing misuse (Yi and Brajendra, 2003; Chagarlamudi et al., 2009) or 
using read set, pre-write set, and post-write set, and then checking these sets (Yi 
and Brajendra, 2003). Some approaches define a normal scenario to perform 
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each task, then record the user scenario and compare it to the normal one 
(Chinchani et al., 2005). The system in this thesis could possibly be extended 
with these techniques to detect misuse.  
Logging is one of the important topics in security but it is rarely 
discussed in XML databases. In this research, it is used to support the access 
control and dynamic update for privileges. Implementing the XLog file showed 
interesting results and this leads to the possibility of also applying traditional 
types of log for XML databases. 
The Trust Based Access Control for XML databases was implemented 
for the first time as part of this research. To use it for existing systems that 
already have their own access control system may face some obstacles. So, 
rather than replacing the existing approaches, it could be integrated with them to 
provide hybrid access control that includes dynamic update to privileges. It 
could also be applied to existing systems as a top security layer that offers more 
security features without much extra cost. 
As explained in this thesis, the Trust Based Access Control was applied 
successfully for XML databases with reasonable time and storage range. The 
flexible and hierarchy structure of XML databases supports and fits smoothly 
with the Trust Based Access Control approach. It could possibly be applied to 
other types of databases as well. Applying Trust Based Access Control to 
relational database is one of the main areas for further investigation. 
12.6 Finally 
This research focused on security in XML databases. It developed a 
dynamic access control for XML databases based on trust. This new approach 
evaluated users’ behaviour over time and updated their privileges. It improved 
security and detected misuse from insiders and outsiders. This Chapter 
summarised the work done and highlighted the research outcomes. Sometimes 
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answering a question will raise many other questions; as happened with this 
thesis. Due to time limitations, these questions and other developments for the 
Trust Based Access Control for XML databases will have to be further 
investigated in the future.  
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14 APPENDIX I: FULL RESULTS FOR THE ACCESS 
CONTROL MODUL EXPERIMENT 
14.1 Full Results in Platform One 
 SIGMOD Record 
 
 
 NASA 
   
 
 
 
 Treebank 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
users 
Node searched 
time 
User searched 
time 
TV searched 
time 
Total time for 
the whole code 
50 37.1 (26.2%) 4.34 (3.1%) 1.42 (1%) 141 
100 37.7 (25.7%) 7.52 (5.1%) 1.41 (0.9%) 146 
1000 35.6 (20.3%) 19.1 (10.9%) 1.44 (0.8%) 175 
Number of 
users 
Node searched 
time 
User searched 
time 
TV searched 
time 
Total time for 
the whole code 
50 724(37.2%) 4.5 (0.2%) 1.96 (0.1%) 1947 
100 729 (37.3%) 7.49 (0.4%) 1.95 (0.1%) 1955 
1000 724(36.4%) 20.3 (1%) 1.97 (0.1%) 1993 
Number of 
users 
Node searched 
time 
User searched 
time 
TV searched 
time 
Total time for 
the whole code 
50 1990 (35.3%) 4.24 (0.1%) 1.45 (0%) 5636 
100 1990 (35.2%) 7.33 (0.1%) 1.54 (0%) 5656 
1000 1995 (35.2%) 20.8 (0.4%) 1.50 (0%) 5670 
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14.2 Full Results in Platform Two 
 
 
 
  SIGMOD Record 
 
 
 NASA 
   
 
 
 
 Treebank 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
users 
Node searched 
time 
User searched 
time 
TV searched 
time 
Total time for 
the whole code 
50 45.6 (32.3%) 3.36 (2.4%) 0.99 (0.7%) 141 
100 44.8 (31.4%) 6.20 (4.3%) 1.0 (0.7%) 146 
1000 30.9 (17.9%) 18.7 (10.8%) 0.98 (0.8%) 172 
Number of 
users 
Node searched 
time 
User searched 
time 
TV searched 
time 
Total time for 
the whole code 
50 760(35.9%) 3.29 (0.2%) 1.52 (0.1%) 2115 
100 767 (35.9%) 5.97 (0.3%) 1.47 (0.1%) 2137 
1000 762 (35.4%) 18.1 (0.8%) 1.44 (0.1%) 2151 
Number of 
users 
Node searched 
time 
User searched 
time 
TV searched 
time 
Total time for 
the whole code 
50 3967 (15.4%) 3.44 (0.0%) 1.67 (0%) 25742 
100 4017 (15.6%) 6.11 (0.0%) 1.42 (0%) 25818 
1000 3983 (15.4%)  18.2 (0.1%) 1.25 (0%) 25908 
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15 APPENDIX II: EXTRA RESULTS FOR THE 
TRUST MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENT 
15.1 Results in Platform Two 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Number of Users 
50  100 1000 
EF&BTF = 0 109 122 188 
EF&BTF = 0.25 111 125 190 
EF&BTF = 0.5 112 127 191 
EF&BTF = 0.75 113 
127 
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EF&BTF = 1 
115 
 
129 
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16 APPENDIX III: EXTRA RESULTS FOR THE 
ACCESS SUPERVISION EXPERIMENT 
16.1 Results in Platform Two 
 The Time consumed for the first query Q1: Deleting/RootNode. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Time consumed for the second query Q2: //NodeName. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number 
of users 
SIGMOD NASA Treebank 
Average 
time         
(seconds) 
  
50 86.8 86.1 87.4 0.08 
100 95.5 95.5 94.2 0.09 
1000 126 129 131 0.13 
Number 
of users 
SIGMOD NASA Treebank 
50 243 2228 26282 
100 253 2234 26311 
1000 281 2261 26361 
